



Windows Security



User Account control

Two account types: standard users and administrators

When a user launches an application, the user's access token is added to it:


- At system logon, users receive an access token. The token contains a user SID and a list of rights and privileges the user has as well as information on the user's membership in security groups
- The access token is added to each process the user launches
- Windows Vista and newer systems check privileges and memberships of all users who log on. If the user has administrative rights, another access token is created, this time for a standard user. This means an administrator has two access tokens: a full administrator access token (AT) and a standard user access token (SAT)
- When a user launches a process, it only gets one of these tokens. The default option is to use the SAT token
- Once a token is applied to a process, it cannot be changed
- If UAC detects that a process requires elevated privileges to run, it will prompt a request for the application to run as elevated
- Processes launched by a program that has the AT token automatically inherit the token

User Account control

The SAT token is granted to a privileged user if

The user belongs to one of the four local security groups with elevated privileges:


- Administrators
- Backup operators
- Network configuration operators
- Power users



User Account control

The user has one of the nine additional privileges:

- SeCreateTokenPrivilege (allows users to create new token objects)
- SeTcbPrivilege (allows users to act as part of the operating system)
- SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege (allows users to take ownerships of objects owned by all users)
- SeLoadDriverPrivilege (allows users to load and run drivers)
- SeRestorePrivilege (allows users to restore backups, including system files, which can make changes to system settings)
- SeImpersonatePrivilege (allows users to run processes with other privileges)
- SeRelabelPrivilege (allows users to modify the labels of processes and objects)
- SeDebugPrivilege




User Account control

Pressing **Ctrl+Alt+Del** is not required for security in elevation prompts

When a program that requires administrator-level of privileges to run is launched, the user is switched to the secure desktop mode


How the secure desktop works:

- It aims to reduce the risk connected to attackers and malware spoofing the UAC dialogue boxes
- Preventing overlooking elevation requests when desktop is crammed with many windows



User Account control


While this security principle is essential to keep systems safe, it is often ignored due to many applications being written to require administrator privileges to run



User Account Control

UAC configuration has been considerably streamlined in beginning with Windows 7

In Windows Vista, UAC could only be turned on or off in the Control Panel, while calibrating individual options required users to set appropriate group policies manually



Exercise

User account control

Process virtualisation




Internet Explorer protected mode

Goal: preventing the automatic launch of programs downloaded from the Internet and preventing these programs from writing to system settings and user files

Realisation: running the browser at low integrity

The **ieuser.exe process**, acting as a proxy, requires users to confirm if they want to run all programs that come from the Internet

Internet Explorer Protected Mode is the only security mechanism that takes full advantage of mandatory integrity control




	PID	CPU
sm.exe	484	
sm.exe	1108	0.75
winlogon.exe	2076	
ieuser.exe	3152	8.42
VBBoxTray.exe	4076	0.01
lsass.exe	880	
processp.exe	3056	7.35
ieuser.exe	3932	0.01
ieuser.exe	3420	2.28

Commit Charge: 14.88%

Internet Explorer protected mode

That said, it does not ensure the total isolation of programs downloaded from the Internet as it only disables them from writing to user data, whereas reading is allowed

Processes running at low integrity share a user session with other programs launched by the user that have the same integrity level



	PID	CPU
sm.exe	484	
sm.exe	1108	0.75
winlogon.exe	2076	
explorer.exe	3152	8.42
VMBoxTray.exe	4076	0.01
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
Additional security features

ASLR and DEP

How it works: an operating system can be loaded from one of 256 locations. ASLR is a security technique that involves using a randomised memory address for this procedure

At every restart Windows libraries will be located in a different RAM part

Also programs launched by users may be ASLR-protected You can use EMET to turn on ASLR



Additional security features

ASLR and DEP

The function of DEP is to prevent applications from executing code from data. AMD processors use the no-execute page-protection (NX) feature

Intel processors use the Execute Disable Bit (XD) feature



Exercise

ASLR and DEP

- How ASLR works
- Configuring DEP options
- Protecting applications using EMET




Additional security features

PatchGuard

PatchGuard prevents patching the kernel (changing processes and structures of the kernel in a way not supported by Microsoft) by checking the signature of the most critical system processes like Ntoskrnl.exe, Hal.dll, IDT, SSDT and MSR

If **PatchGuard detects** they have been modified, it will stop the system




Additional security features

PatchGuard

PatchGuard doesn't ensure effective security against rootkits and worms

Likewise, it doesn't offer protection against modifying files on-disk files




Additional security features

Kernel Mode Code Signing

Kernel Mode Code Signing is a security feature thwarting the installation of faulty or malicious device drivers and facilitating the identification of their manufacturers

To be loaded and started, all drivers have to be digitally signed:

- At system start, a list of revoked and blocked drivers is loaded
- Before a driver is launched, its signature is verified. Additionally, the operating system checks if the certificate used for signing it was issued by a trusted authority and checks if it has been revoked




Additional security features

Kernel Mode Code Signing

As **Kernel Mode Code Signing** doesn't analyse how drivers operate, all it takes for a driver creator to ensure the driver can be loaded is to pay 300\$ for a certificate

It has **no way of preventing users** from modifying on-disk files, which means an attacker may be able to change system files to turn off checking drivers' digital signatures, or the attacker may delete the list of blocked drivers



THANKS

