

EDR Evasion Primer

Hack-in-the-Box, Singapore, Aug 25, 2022

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**Security
Research
Labs**

<https://t.me/learningnets>

Today, we talk about circumventing Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) systems

Agenda

How EDRs work

Effective techniques to circumvent them

How to compensate for EDR protection gaps

Related work

- We are not the first to look at EDR evasion. Plenty of information is available online, including on the techniques presented herein
- Check out this paper for a summary and references:
www.mdpi.com/2624-800X/1/3/21

Nice to meet you :)

Jorge Gimenez

Red Teamer

Security
Researcher at
SRLabs



Karsten Nohl


Infrastructure
Hacker

Chief Scientist at
SRLabs

We run a small EDR test lab

Background

- SRLabs regularly conducts red team exercises
- The prepare and test EDR evasion for these exercises, we run our own mini EDR test lab
- Each EDR is running in an isolated virtual machine
- All EDR features are enabled with one exception: Cloud uploads
- The results shared in this presentation were generated in the test lab in August 2022



Agenda

How EDRs work

**Effective techniques to
circumvent them**


**How to compensate for
EDR protection gaps**

EDRs conduct three types of analyses to detect endpoint detection and abuse

	A. Static analysis	B. Dynamic analysis	C. Behavioral analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Extract information from binary	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Execute binary in a sandbox environment and observe it	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Observe the binary as its executing on the computer▪ Hook into important functions/syscalls to learn in realtime about behavior▪ Analyzes not only the binary, but everything that surrounds the execution
Looks for	<p>Common patterns:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Known malicious strings- Threat actor IP or domains- Malware binary hashes	<p>Malicious behavior in sandbox:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Network connections- Registry changes- Memory Access- File creation/deletion	<p>Malicious behavior when running without sandbox:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- User actions- system calls- commands executed in the command line- Which process is executing the code
	Antivirus tools are based on static and dynamic analysis		EDRs add behavioral analysis – <i>our focus today</i>

A. Static Analysis – your good ol’ antivirus engine

Static analysis detects malware through known indicators of compromise




Static analysis evasion allows malware to stay undetected by avoiding static signatures, using two techniques

- Obfuscation**
 - Change function and variable names
 - Applying encoding mechanisms such as Caesar ciphers
- Encryption**
 - Apply encryption to potentially-flagged code parts (“packer”/ “loader”)
 - Then obfuscate the decryption routine to avoid additional signatures

^[1] Checking for exact values can also be augmented by heuristics that are applied on the collected data


B. Dynamic Analysis – controlled detonation in a sandbox

Dynamic analysis observes malware in sandbox



Dynamic analysis evasion tries to detect the sandbox and stop the malware before being detected


Check number of processors	Sandbox environments usually run with a limited number of processors
Check memory size	Sandbox environments usually do not have much RAM memory available
Check filename	Check if the malware name changed when being copied into the sandbox
Call non-virtualized APIs	Some WinAPIs are not emulated by most sandboxes. For example, the return value of VirtualAllocExNuma() will be NULL
Check user/domain	For targeted attacks, the malware can check whether the targeted user account or domain name exists in the sandbox
Sleep	Delaying the execution of the malicious routine can help to exhaust the EDR engine

The more sandbox checks are used in parallel, the more suspicious the malware might appear 

^[1] Checking for exact values can also be augmented by heuristics that are applied on the collected data

C. Behavioral Analysis – playing with fire

Behavioral analysis closely monitors malware while it is executing on the actual computer



^[1] Different EDRs might apply different hooking methods and also choose other DLLs or functions to hook

Agenda


How EDRs work

**Effective techniques to
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
How to compensate for
EDR protection gaps

We are finding out EDR effectiveness by testing different versions of our encrypted malware loader

1. Apply **base evasion** to all samples



2. Experiment with different **Behavioral Analysis Evasion techniques**




Malware does not try to evade behavioral analysis and directly calls Windows APIs

Malware overwrites EDR hooks before executing payload


Malware circumvents hook in system dll's by directly sys-calling into kernel

Malware uses code fragments in kernel dll's without calling the hooked functions in those dll's


Evasion technique 1 – Unhook EDR by overwriting ntdll.dll with a clean version




Evasion technique 1 – Unhook EDR by overwriting ntdll.dll with a clean version




Evasion technique 1 – Unhook EDR by overwriting ntdll.dll with a clean version




Might not work:



- Accessing ntdll.dll from disk is often flagged by EDRs, as it is a common way of unhooking a process.
- The API calls to overwrite ntdll.dll are probably hooked as they reside within the hooked ntdll.dll



Evasion technique 2 – Avoid EDR hooks by directly calling kernel system calls




Evasion technique 2 – Avoid EDR hooks by directly calling kernel system calls

Malware	Normal <ul style="list-style-type: none">EDR hooks into NTDLL to analyze and correlate the dataCommon API calls go through NTDLL	Direct Syscalls <ul style="list-style-type: none">Implement own syscall in assemblyCall syscall directly and bypass NTDLL hooks <pre>NtAllocateVirtualMemory10 proc mov r10, rcx mov eax, 18h syscall ret NtAllocateVirtualMemory10 endp</pre>	SSN (System Service Number) <ul style="list-style-type: none">It identifies which syscall executesThe syscall number varies between Windows versionsIt can be obtained dynamically
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Might not work:

- Having syscall assembly instructions compiled into an executable is unusual and can be considered suspicious / malicious
- Heads up: only the loader evades the EDR. You need to be careful how you use the C2 malware to avoid detection



Evasion technique 3 – Further increase stealth through indirect system calling


Malware

EDR

Kernel

Normal

- EDR hooks into NTDLL to analyze and correlate the data
- Common API calls go through NTDLL




EDR catches syscall

NtAllocateVirtualMemory

Direct Syscalls

- Implement own syscall in assembly
- Call syscall directly and bypass NTDLL hooks

```
NtAllocateVirtualMemory10 proc
    mov r10, rcx
    mov eax, 18h
    syscall
    ret
NtAllocateVirtualMemory10 endp
```




EDR sees nothing

NtAllocateVirtualMemory

Indirect Syscalls

- Prepare syscall in assembly (as with direct syscalls)
- Then find a syscall instruction in ntdll.dll and jumps to that location

```
NtAllocateVirtualMemory10 proc
    mov r10, rcx
    mov eax, 18h
```




EDR sees nothing

NtAllocateVirtualMemory

One more thing: You can boost any of the evasion techniques by hiding inside a .dll


.exe

- Is designed to run independently
- Has its own memory space
- Allows EDR to tightly observe execution of suspicious files, for example Internet downloads



.dll

- The Windows implementation of “shared libraries”
- Need a host process loading them and shares memory space with the host process
- Harder to follow suspicious downloads



The 3 simple injection techniques work surprisingly well against common EDR systems

■ Detected
■ Undetected

Step 1: System Infection. We tested three different evasion techniques (and two base cases) against three leading EDR solutions, and one antivirus solution. All experiments were run in August 2022.

		EDR1		EDR2		EDR3		AV	
		Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver
No behavioral analysis or sandbox evasion	.exe	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected
	.dll	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected
Only sandbox evasion	.exe	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected
	.dll	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected
1 Unhooking	.exe	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
	.dll	Detected	Undetected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
2 Direct syscalls	.exe	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
	.dll	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
3 Indirect syscalls	.exe	Detected	Detected	Detected	Detected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
	.dll	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected


Cobalt Strike and **Sliver** are popular C&C tools to control infected computers

Base case. A malware that does not try to evade behavioral analysis

EDR evasion techniques. Three approaches to circumvent EDR behavioral analysis (as explained on previous slides)

- Take aways.**
- EDRs are more likely to trigger based on well-known abuse tools like Cobalt Strike, suggesting some level of fingerprinting
 - Malware hiding in .dll's is less likely to get detected by EDRs
 - EDRs differ in their effectiveness, however some evasion techniques successfully circumvent most (all?) of them
 - Our experiments so far only use well-known techniques. Better evasion is possible should it become necessary

After successful injection, the EDR might still detect the hacker based on suspicious actions



User interacts with infected file, e.g. .lnk, Office Macro

Malware is executed
– either in the delivery script or deferred with .dll hijacking

Hacker interacts with the malware remotely (“command and control”)

Hacker collects more information from system and Active Directory

Finally, **hacker performs malicious actions**, like stealing or encrypting files

What we covered so far

- Potential malware get downloaded/executed
- EDR analyses
- We use evasion techniques not to get detect

Let's look at the next steps in the hacking chain ...

- Once the malware is running, we can trigger different malicious actions
- These, too, can get detected by the EDR
- But mostly they are not – *see next slide*

EDR systems only trigger on few suspicious actions

Step 2: System Abuse. After successfully starting the malware (in step 1), we are now executing malicious actions of the target. All tests in this overview are based on the *indirect syscall .dll* injection technique (from step 1).

		EDR1		EDR2		EDR3		AV	
Abuse vector		Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver
Use malware built-in capabilities	C&C channel								
	Open SOCKS tunnel, e.g. for Network scanning								
	Data exfiltration								
	KeyLogger								
Dynamically add new capabilities	Run C# binary (through execute-assembly)								
	Run C# code (in process: beacon object file) e.g. Sharphound, NanoDump: dumping LSASS								
	Run C# code (in process: through inline-execute-assembly) e.g. certify								

Core functionality of Cobalt+ Sliver. Should be easier to detect based on behavior signatures

Community extensions. Harder to detect. Some extensions come in form of BOFs. For other tools that have not yet been prepared as BOF, you can instead use the generic 'inline-execute-assembly' as a wrapper and execute pretty much any tool

Take aways.

- EDRs are highly ineffective at detecting abuse actions after injection
- When adding new capabilities, red teamers should avoid the built-in 'execute-assembly' option that might trigger an EDR

Putting the pieces together: By combining the right injection and abuse strategies, hackers can fully circumvent common EDR solutions




The **user downloads a zip** file that contains some **.lnk** files

Browser bypass
Modern browsers refuse to download **.lnk** files. This protection is bypassed by putting the **.lnk** inside a **.zip**




.lnk executes **mshta.exe** with the malware location as argument

Applocker bypass
mshta.exe is a system default binary that can be misused; this successfully bypasses Applocker



mshta.exe **downloads and executes a .hta** malicious file from our server.



Due to **.dll hijacking**, our **payload is executed** every time Teams is opened

EDR system does not detect infection when using the evasion techniques discussed in this presentation

```

All hackers gain hidden agenda
[*] Server v1.5.16 - 23eef3d15cd
c116a1b9936cf392fdade37d93ad4
[*] Client v1.5.19 - c46e193153e
eea236b2e7098c0cd45ba4e3b4244
[*] Welcome to the sliver shell,
please type 'help' for options

[*] Check for updates with the '
update' command

sliver > sessions

[*] No sessions 😞

sliver >

```

Windows 10 HITB - VMware Workstation

File Edit View VM Tabs Help

Home x Windows 10 HITB x

Mail - Jorge Gimenez Duro - Outlook - Profile 1 - Microsoft Edge

https://outlook.office365.com/mail/deeplink

Reply all | Delete | Report

HITB SINGAPORE 2022 IMPORTANT

Jorge Gimenez Duro
To: Jorge Gimenez Duro
Tue 8/23/2022 11:26 PM

PLEASE.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU CLICK ON THIS LINK AND DOWNLOAD THE ZIP INSIDE.

IT IS COMPLETELY SAFE.

PLEASE DO IT

[PLEASE DOWNLOAD](#)

Best,
Jorge

Jorge Gimenez, Security Research Labs
jorge@srlabs.de, <https://srlabs.de/>

Reply | Forward

Type here to search 25°C 23:43 23/08/2022

Agenda

How EDRs work

Effective techniques to
circumvent them

**How to compensate for
EDR protection gaps**

Do we even need EDRs on endpoints?

Final experiment: Endpoint-based vs cloud-based detection.

- We uploaded the samples that every EDR in our test lab missed to VirusTotal (indirect system calls, .dll)
- 13/16 engines in VirusTotal successfully detected the malware, without any behavioral analysis on the target endpoint
- This suggests that it is possible to find well-obfuscated malware by building better sandboxes that are harder to detect

Cobalt Strike
sample
upload to
VirusTotal



ba9d078ab1736b051dce104ce15ec3277eb173e4fe92190eebaa0b0709cc69e1
prof.dll
64bits assembly invalid-rich-pe-linker-version pedll

275.00 KB
Size

2022-08-24 02:17:32
a moment ago

Sliver
sample
upload to
VirusTotal



8ec8c4d30e35479c619d84d32480f43690ab32d4885368f11f7c5d7920ea3d16
prof.dll
64bits assembly invalid-rich-pe-linker-version pedll

15.17 MB
Size

2022-08-24 02:15:11
1 minute ago

Some complimentary controls are available to make up for the protection gaps in EDRs

EDR make corporations “12%” harder to compromise

Back-of-the-envelope estimate:

- **8 weeks hacking baseline.** A red team exercise to take over a large corporate takes an average of 4 experts and 8 weeks, including preparation (this varies widely by company, of course)
- Knowing that an EDR is used makes red teaming much slower since testers become very careful not to trigger anomaly detection, and avoid servers that run EDRs
- **1 more week to evade EDR.** When the company uses an EDR on user endpoints and Windows servers, the red team requires about one more week of preparation and execution – “12% more”
- For smaller or easier-to-hack companies, the relative security uplift from using an EDR is larger

Other controls are needed to further increase hacking resilience

Additional security measures further increase the resilience to malware injections:


- App allow-listing
- Heavy monitoring on common external compromise vectors (.lnk, ISO, Word...)
- Tier-0 / zero-trust architecture
- Threat hunting, that is: Deeper analysis on EDR telemetry
- Prevent LSASS dumping by running it as protected process light (RunAsPPL)

Security software can introduce software bugs, further decreasing their protection contribution

EDR systems can have bugs, too

We found issues in a modern EDR system:

- Through default credentials we gained full access to the popular EDR backend, its privileges, and functions (on-premise only)
- Additionally, we discovered three high-severity vulnerabilities in the EDR, arising from weak access control on API endpoints: CVE-2022-27968 and -27969
- All issues have been fixed in the latest versions



EDR management interface, accessible over network with default credentials

Security software can introduce software bugs, further decreasing their protection contribution

Details of CVE-2022-27968 and -27969

```
curl https://<cynet-server>:8443/WebApp/DeceptionUser/GetAllDeceptionUsers
[
  {
    "Id":2,
    "UserName":"DecoyUser A",
    "DomainName":"company.local",
    "UserType":2,
    "GroupId":1,
    "GroupName":"Main"
  },
  {
    "Id":4,
    "UserName":"DecoyUser B",
    "DomainName":"company.local",
    "UserType":2,
    "GroupId":2,
    "GroupName":"Manually Installed Agents - Linux"
  },
  {
    "Id":3,
    "UserName":"DecoyUser C",
    "DomainName":"company.local",
    "UserType":2,
    "GroupId":3,
    "GroupName":"Manually Installed Agents"
  }
]
```

```
curl https://<cynet-server>:8443/WebApp/SettingsExclusion/GetExclusionsProfile?profileId=1
{
  "Payload":{
    "ExclusionRules":[
      {
        "Id":3,
        "Type":1,
        "Value":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\powershell.exe"
      }
    ]
  },
  "Id":1,
  "Name":"Exclude - Powershell",
  "DateCreated":"6/8/2021 5:58:57 PM",
  "IsDefault":false,
  "LastUpdate":"6/11/2021 2:26:07 PM",
  "Type":2,
  "PlatformType":100,
  "Groups":[]
},
"Hosts":[]
```

```
curl https://<cynet-server>:8443/WebApp/SettingsFileMonitor/GetFileMonitorProfiles
[
  {
    "Id":2,
    "Name":"Best Practice",
    "DateCreated":"1/1/2020 1:03:22 PM",
    "IsDefault":true,
    "LastUpdate":"1/1/2020 1:03:22 PM",
    "Type":4,
    "PlatformType":100,
    "Groups":null,
    "Hosts":null
  }
]
```

Take aways

1

EDR systems can be circumvented with well-documented techniques

2

The EDR slows down hackers, instead of preventing endpoint hacking

3

Complementary controls, in particular data analysis / threat hunting, are needed to reach high hacking resilience

Questions?

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