


↗ & breaking!


# Demystifying macOS's

## Background Task Management



## Patrick Wardle

Objective-See Foundation, 501(c)(3)



-  macOS security tools
-  "The Art of Mac Malware" books
-  "Objective by the Sea" conference

# WHAT YOU WILL LEARN



Although the talk is largely focused on macOS's Background Task Management (BTM) - we'll also cover topics of reversing, malware detection, macOS internals, and more!

1



Internals  
of macOS's BTM

2



Leveraging BTM  
to detect malware

3



Bypassing  
BTM alerts & ES messaging



4



Detecting  
these bypasses

# HOW WE'RE GOING TO GET THERE



Overview



Internals



Tools



Bypasses



Detection




Dumper



Monitor

# Overview



# SO WHAT IS BACKGROUND TASK MANAGEMENT (BTM) ?

governance of persistent items ("background tasks")




**The installation was successful**

You are on the version 5.15.0 (19644). [View release notes](#)

Automatically keep Zoom desktop client up to date  
Tip: You can change this in "Settings - General"

Done



**1**

**Background Items Added**  
Software from "Zoom Video Communications, Inc." added items that can run in the background. You can manage this in Login Items Settings.

Search

Patrick Wardle  
Apple ID

- Wi-Fi
- Bluetooth
- Network
- Notifications
- Sound
- Focus
- Screen Time
- General**
- Appearance
- Accessibility

**2**

**2**

**Login Items**

Open at Login  
These items will open automatically when you log in.

Item	Kind
OverSight	Application

Allow in the Background  
Applications add background items to perform tasks when the application isn't open, such as checking for software updates or syncing data. Turning off a background item may prevent these tasks from being completed.


Zoom Video Communications, Inc.   
1 item: 1 item affects all users

just installed item


# WHO CARES?

well, we do!

**Allow in the Background**  
Applications add background items to perform tasks when the application isn't open, such as checking for software updates or syncing data. Turning off a background item may prevent these tasks from being completed.

 Zoom Video Communications, Inc.  
1 item: 1 item affects all users

**Background Items Added**  
Software from "Zoom Video Communications, Inc." added items that can run in the background. You can manage this in Login Items Settings.





Tools



Bypasses



...as defenders



...as hackers

# WHERE TO BEGIN?

...to the logs (after enabling 'private' data)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" ...>
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>PayloadContent</key>
  <array>
    <dict>
      <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
      <string>ManagedClient logging</string>
      <key>PayloadEnabled</key>
      <true/>
      <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
      <string>com.apple.logging.ManagedClient.1</string>
      <key>PayloadType</key>
      <string>com.apple.system.logging</string>
      <key>PayloadUUID</key>
      <string>ED5DE307-A5FC-434F-AD88-187677F02222</string>
      <key>PayloadVersion</key>
      <integer>1</integer>
      <key>System</key>
      <dict>
        <key>Enable-Private-Data</key>
        <true/>
      </dict>
    </dict>
  </array>
</dict>
...

```



Private Data Logging  
(installed profile)



"Unified Logs:  
How to Enable Private Data"  
([www.cmdsec.com](http://www.cmdsec.com))

# LOGGING

## ...while installing a launch daemon

```
% log stream --debug --info --predicate
```

```
smd: [com.apple.xpc.smd:all] Got a fsevent. Doing re-register  
smd: [com.apple.xpc.smd:all] Bootstrapping legacy plists
```


"launchd will scan path"

```
backgroundtaskmanagementd: -[BTMService launchdWillScanPath:reply:]: /Library/LaunchDaemons
```

```
smd: (BackgroundTaskManagement) BTMManager.registerLaunchItemWithBundleURL
```

"register launch item"

```
backgroundtaskmanagementd: registerLaunchItem: pid=0, uid=0, type=legacy daemon, parentURL=(null),  
url=/Library/LaunchDaemons/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon.plist, config=  
BTMConfigArguments =  
"/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
```



# SYSTEM MANAGEMENT DAEMON (SMD)

file system event notification, for new item



```
01 sub_100005a28
02 ...
03
04 0x1027c5a64
05
06 0x1027c5a68
07 0x1027c5a6c
08 0x1027c5a70
09 0x1027c5a74
10 0x1027c5a78
11 0x1027c5a7c
```

```
adr x3, #0x1027d7243 ; argument "format"
("Got a fsevent. Doing re-register")
nop
mov x4, sp ; argument "buf"
mov x1, x19 ; argument "log"
mov w2, #0x0 ; argument "type"
mov w5, #0x2 ; argument "size"
bl os_log()
```

log message: "Got a fsevent"

```
Process 300 stopped
smd`__lldb_unnamed_symbol1:
-> 0x100005a28 <+0>: pacibsp
```

```
(lldb) po $x1
```

```
<OS_xpc_dictionary: dictionary[0x13290d290]: { refcnt = 1, xrefcnt = 1, subtype = 1, count = 1, transport = 0,
dest port = 0x0, dest msg id = 0x0, transaction = 1, voucher = 0x13290bff0 } <dictionary: 0x13290d290>
{ count = 1, transaction = 1, voucher = 0x13290bff0,
  contents = "XPCEventName" => <string: 0x131f06eb0> { length = 28, contents = "com.apple.xpc.smd.WatchPaths" }
}>
```

"XPCEventName: com.apple.xpc.smd.WatchPaths"

debugging SMD

# SYSTEM MANAGEMENT DAEMON (SMD)

file system event notification, for new item

```
01 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
02 <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" ... >
03 <plist version="1.0">
04 <dict>
05     ...
06     <key>Program</key>
07     <string>/usr/libexec/smd</string>
08
09     <key>LaunchEvents</key>
10     <dict>
11         <key>com.apple.fsevents.matching</key>
12         <dict>
13             <key>com.apple.xpc.smd.WatchPaths</key>
14             <dict>
15                 <key>Path</key>
16                 <string>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</string>
17             </dict>
18         </dict>
19     ...
```

file system watch events:

**/Library/LaunchDaemons/**



**/Library/LaunchDaemons**

**SMD**

# SYSTEM MANAGEMENT DAEMON (SMD)

## ...and its "remote" interactions

```
01 * @class BTMManager */
02 -(int)launchdWillScanPath:(int)arg2 {
03     x1 = arg1;
04     x2 = [arg2 retain];
05     x0 = [arg0 connection];
06
07     x21 = [x0 synchronousRemoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:...];
08     [x21 launchdWillScanPath:x2 reply:...];

```

`<NSXPCConnection>` connection to service named `com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement`

`launchdWillScanPath:`  
(BTM framework, linked into SMD)



SMD



BTM daemon

```
Process 300 stopped
BackgroundTaskManagement`-[BTMManager launchdWillScanPath]:
```

```
(lldb) po $x0
<_NSXPCInterfaceProxy_V2ServiceInterface: 0x131e0b690>
```

```
(lldb) x/s $x1
0x1d4037471: "launchdWillScanPath:reply:"
```

```
(lldb) po $x2
/Library/LaunchDaemons
```

"scan path":  
`/Library/LaunchDaemons`

debugging SMD

# BTM DAEMON, BACKGROUNDTASKMANAGEMENTD

## com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementd.plist


```
01 <key>Label</key>
02 <string>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementd</string>
03
04 <key>MachServices</key>
05 <dict>
06     <key>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement</key>
07     <true/>
08     <key>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement.sfl</key>
09     <true/>
10     <key>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement.responses</key>
11     <true/>
12 </dict>
13
14 <key>RunAtLoad</key>
15 <false/>
16
17 <key>Program</key>
18 <string>/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Resources/backgroundtaskmanagementd
19 </string>
20
21 <key>ProgramArguments</key>
22 <array>
23     <string>/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Resources/backgroundtaskmanagementd
24     </string>
25     <string>-daemon</string>
26 </array>
```

Mach interfaces  
(for entitled clients)

BTM daemon binary

# BTM DAEMON

```
% ps aux | grep backgroundtaskmanagementd  
root  /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Resources/backgroundtaskmanagementd -daemon
```



## backgroundtaskmanagementd

(/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework)



### Entitlements:

```
01  {  
02      "com.apple.private.backgroundtaskmanagement.notifications" = 1;  
03      "com.apple.private.security.storage.backgroundtaskmanagement" = 1;  
04  
05      "com.apple.private.endpoint-security.submit.btm" = 1;  
06  
07      "com.apple.private.tcc.allow" = (  
08          kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles  
09      );  
10      ...  
11  }
```

BTM specific

Endpoint Security

# XPC MESSAGES

...between SMD and BTM daemon

```
# ps aux | grep backgroundtaskmanagementd
root 4643 /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Resources/backgroundtaskmanagementd -daemon

# lsmcp -p 4643
Process (4643) : backgroundtaskmanagementd
  name      ipc-object  rights  identifier  type
-----
0x0000310b 0x66b39d3f  send   0x00001807  (300) smd
0x00003b0b 0x677147df  recv   0x0000000000000000
+          send   0x000010af  (300) smd
```

XPC messages  
...to and from SMD

BTM daemon's XPC messages

```
Process 4643 stopped
-[BTMService launchdWillScanPath:reply:]
-> 0x102da9634 <+0>: pacibsp

(lldb) bt
* frame #0: 0x0000000102da9634 [BTMService launchdWillScanPath:reply:]
  frame #1: 0x000000018547eca0 Foundation`__NSXPCCONNECTION_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_EXPORTED_OBJECT_S2__ + 16
  frame #2: 0x0000000185a9e594 Foundation`-[NSXPCConnection _decodeAndInvokeMessageWithEvent:reply:flags:] + 1592
  frame #3: 0x0000000185a9fd88 Foundation`message_handler_message + 88
  frame #4: 0x0000000185a9f7f4 Foundation`message_handler + 152
  frame #5: 0x0000000184163e74 libxpc.dylib`_xpc_connection_call_event_handler + 152
```

call stack w/ XPC functions

call stack (BTM daemon)

# LAUNCH ITEM REGISTRATION

via "registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:"

```
01 -[BTMService registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:parentURL:type:relativeURL:configuration:uid:reply:]
02 0x102da9a24 adr    x3, #0x102dcf8cc ; argument "format"
03                                     "registerLaunchItem: pid=%d, uid=%d, ... url=%@, config=%@"
04 0x102da9a28 nop
05 0x102da9a2c add    x4, sp, #0x20 ; argument "buf"
06 0x102da9a30 mov    x1, x27 ; argument "log"
07 0x102da9a34 mov    w2, #0x0 ; argument "type"
08 0x102da9a38 mov    w5, #0x36 ; argument "size"
09 0x102da9a3c bl     os_log()
```

registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:  
(BTM daemon)

```
Process 4643 stopped
-[BTMService registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:parentURL:type:relativeURL:configuration:uid:reply:]
-> 0000000102da9898 <+0>: pacibsp

(lldb) po $x0
<BTMService: 0x129904630>

(lldb) po $x5
file:///Library/LaunchDaemons/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon.plist
```

plist, of launch item to register

# MORE LOGGING

## BTM daemon & agent: posting "advisory" notification


```
% log stream --debug --info --predicate "subsystem = 'com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement'"
```

backgroundtaskmanagementd: [com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement:main] should post new container advisory=true for uid=501, id=905C1526-CC7A-4343-9C97-55DED87CC397, item=Zoom Video Communications, Inc.

BackgroundTaskManagementAgent: [com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement:main] Posting new container advisory notification request: identifier=905C1526-CC7A-4343-9C97-55DED87CC397, body='Software from "Zoom Video Communications, Inc..'

Handwritten annotations:

- Arrow pointing to the predicate: "should post advisory = true"
- Box around the daemon log line: "should post new container advisory=true for uid=501, id=905C1526-CC7A-4343-9C97-55DED87CC397, item=Zoom Video Communications, Inc."
- Box around the agent log line: "Posting new container advisory notification request: identifier=905C1526-CC7A-4343-9C97-55DED87CC397, body='Software from "Zoom Video Communications, Inc..'"
- Warning icon and text: "posting new advisory notification"



# BTM AGENT: BACKGROUNDTASKMANAGEMENTAGENT

## com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement.agent.plist

```
01 <key>Label</key>
02 <string>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement.agent</string>
03
04 <key>MachServices</key>
05 <dict>
06   <key>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent</key>
07   <true/>
08   <key>com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement.notifications</key>
09   <true/>
10   <key>com.apple.usernotifications.delegate.com.apple.BTMNotificationAgent</key>
11   <true/>
12 </dict>
13
14 <key>RunAtLoad</key>
15 <false/>
16
17 <key>Program</key>
18 <string>/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Support/
19 BackgroundTaskManagementAgent.app/Contents/MacOS/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent</string>
```

Mach interfaces  
(for by entitled clients)

BTM agent binary

BTM agent's property list

# AGENT : BACKGROUNDTASKMANAGEMENTAGENT

```
% ps aux | grep -i backgroundtaskmanagementagent
patrick /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Support/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent.app/
Contents/MacOS/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent
```

## BackgroundTaskManagementAgent

(/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Support/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent.app/)



## Entitlements :

```
01 {
02     "com.apple.private.backgroundtaskmanagement.manage" = 1;
03     "com.apple.private.backgroundtaskmanagement.responses" = 1;
04     "com.apple.private.coreservices.canaccessanysharedfilelist" = "read-write";
05
06     "com.apple.private.tcc.allow" = (
07         kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles
08     );
09
10     "com.apple.private.usernotifications.bundle-identifiers" = (
11         "com.apple.BTMNotificationAgent"
12     );
13 }
```

BTM specific

Notifications



# SHOULD POST NEW CONTAINER ADVISORY?

## ...interactions between SMD & BTM daemon

```
01  /* @class NotificationManager */
02  -(void)postAdvisoryForContainer:(BTMItem*)item reply:(void *)arg3 {
03
04  content = [NotificationManager
05  copyAdvisoryContentWithBodyKey:@"NOTIFICATION_BODY_BACKGROUND_ITEM_ADVISORY" name:name];
06
07  notification = [UNNotificationRequest requestWithIdentifier:id content:content trigger:0x0];
08
09  notificationCenter = [NotificationManager notificationCenter];
10  [notificationCenter addNotificationRequest:notification completionHandler:...];
```

in BTM Agent,  
(invoked by BTM Daemon, via XPC)

```
% ps aux | grep BackgroundTaskManagementAgent
patrick  88262  /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework
/Support/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent.app/Contents/MacOS/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent
```

```
(lldb) process attach --pid 88262
```

```
Target 0: (BackgroundTaskManagementAgent) stopped.
```

```
(lldb) po $x0
```

```
<UNMutableNotificationContent: 0x12684df10; title: Background Items Added, subtitle: (null), body: Software from "Zoom Video Communications" added items that can run in the background. You can manage this in Login Items Settings.,
summaryArgument: , summaryArgumentCount: 0, categoryIdentifier: com.apple.BackgroundTaskManagement.advisory,
launchImageName: , threadIdentifier: , attachments: (
), badge: (null), sound: (null), realert: 0, interruptionLevel: 1, relevanceScore: 0.00, filterCriteria: (null)
```



### Background Items Added

Software from "Zoom Video Communications, Inc." added items that can run in the background. You can manage this in Login Items Settings.

notification (+content)

# MORE LOGGING

## BTM daemon, saving "BackgroundItems-v8.btm"


```
% log stream --debug --info --predicate "subsystem = 'com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement'"  
  
backgroundtaskmanagementd: [com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement:main] BTMStore:  
store saved to /var/db/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement/BackgroundItems-v8.btm
```

```
# FileMonitor.app/Contents/MacOS/FileMonitor -pretty  
{  
  "event" : "ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE",  
  "file" : {  
    "destination" : "/private/var/db/  
                    com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement/BackgroundItems-v8.btm",  
    "process" : {  
      "name" : "backgroundtaskmanagementd",  
      "path" : "/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/  
              BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Versions/A/Resources/backgroundtaskmanagementd",  
    }  
  }  
  ...  
}
```




# Tools (Part I)

leveraging BTM to detect persistent malware



# MAC MALWARE

...the vast majority persists!




## The Mac Malware of 2022 🐛

A comprehensive analysis of the year's new malware

by: Patrick Wardle / January 1, 2023

2022: ~80% persisted  
(all as launch items)

2021: ~90% persisted  
(all as launch items)



alert user when something persists!

BlockBlock (since 2015)

# EXAMPLE: DAZZLESPY

...deployed via Safari 0days!

```
% strings - DazzleSpy/softwareupdate
...
%@/Library/LaunchAgents
/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist

launchctl unload %@
RunAtLoad
```

Embedded strings

```
# FileMonitor.app/Contents/MacOS/FileMonitor -pretty
...
{
  "event" : "ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE",
  "file" : {
    "destination" : "~/Library/LaunchAgents/
com.apple.softwareupdate.plist",

    "process" : {
      "pid" : 1469
      "name": softwareupdate
      "path" : "/Users/user/Desktop/softwareupdate",
    }
  }
}
```

Launch agent persistence

(~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist)




# DUMPING THE BTM DATABASE

and malware!

...to enumerate persistently installed software

```
01  /* @class DumpBTMCommand */
02  -(int)run {
03      ...
04      rax = [BTMManager shared];
05      r12 = [rax dumpDatabaseWithAuthorization:r14 error:&var_28];
06      if(r12 != 0x0) {
07          r12 = [objc_retainAutorelease(r12) UTF8String];
08          puts(r12);
09      }
10      else {
11          NSLog(@"Error fetching the database dump: %@", r15);
12      }

```



sfltool decompilation  
[DumpBTMCommand run];

% log stream ...

mach connection (from sfltool) to: com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement"

```
backgroundtaskmanagementd: -[BTMService listener:shouldAcceptNewConnection]:
connection=<NSXPCConnection: 0x152307aa0> connection from pid 52886 on mach service named
com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement
```

```
backgroundtaskmanagementd: dumpDatabaseWithAuthorization: "noErr: Call succeeded with no error"
```

# DUMPING THE BTM DATABASE

## ..entitlement check(s)

```
01  /* @class BTMService */
02  -(BOOL) listener: (NSXPCListener *)listener shouldAcceptNewConnection: (NSXPCCConnection *)newConnection {
03  ...
04
05  rax = [r15 valueForKey:@"com.apple.private.backgroundtaskmanagement.manage"];
06  if(rax == 0x0) {
07      rax = [r15 valueForKey:@"com.apple.private.coreservices.canmanagebackgroundtasks"];
08  }
09
10  if(objc_opt_isKindOfClass(rax, objc_opt_class(@class(NSNumber))) == 0x0 || [rax boolValue] == 0x0) {
11      //leave, don't accept connection
12  }
13  }
```

## Entitlement checking



# PROGRAMMATICALLY DUMPING THE BTM DATABASE

↗ mimicking: DumpBTMCommand run

```
01 @interface BTMManager : NSObject
02
03 +(id) shared;
04 -(id) dumpDatabaseWithAuthorization: (SFAuthorization*) arg1 error: (id*) arg2;
05
06 @end
07
08 void *handle = dlopen("/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Versions/
09 A/BackgroundTaskManagement", RTLD_LAZY);
10
11 Class BTMManager = NSClassFromString(@"BTMManager");
12 id sharedInstance = [BTMManager shared];
13
14 SFAuthorization *authorization = [SFAuthorization authorization];
15 [authorization obtainWithRight:"system.privilege.admin", ...];
16
17 id dbContents = [sharedInstance dumpDatabaseWithAuthorization:authorization error:NULL];
```

```
% log stream ...
```

↗ GTFO ...you're not entitled

```
backgroundtaskmanagementd: -[BTMService listener:shouldAcceptNewConnection:]: process with pid=20987
lacks entitlement 'com.apple.private.coreservices.canmanagebackgroundtasks'
```


fail : \

# WHAT ABOUT THE (RAW) BTM DATABASE

...a binary plist, containing serialized objects

```
% file /var/db/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement/BackgroundItems-v8.btm
Apple binary property list
% plutil -p /var/db/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement/BackgroundItems-v8.btm
{
  "$archiver" => "NSKeyedArchiver"
  "$objects" => [
    0 => "$null"
    1 => {
      "$class" => <CFKeyedArchiverUID 0x600003e57640 [0x1e69087f8]>{value = 142}
      "itemsByUserIdentifier" => <CFKeyedArchiverUID 0x600003e57660 [0x1e69087f8]>{value = 2}
      "mdmPayloadsByIdentifier" => <CFKeyedArchiverUID 0x600003e57680 [0x1e69087f8]>{value = 140}
      "userSettingsByUserIdentifier" => <CFKeyedArchiverUID 0x600003e576a0 [0x1e69087f8]>{value = 134}
      ...
    }
  ]
}
```

BTM database (contains NSKeyedArchiver)



Serialization, saves objects to a persistent archive (e.g. BTM database)


# SFLT00L'S ITEM DE-SERIALIZATION

## ...implemented in an initWithCoder: method

```
01  /* @class ItemRecord */
02  -(void *)initWithCoder:(NSCoder *)decoder {
03
04      rax = objc_opt_class(@class(NSUUID));
05      rax = [r14 decodeObjectOfClass:rax forKey:@"uuid"];
06
07      rax = objc_opt_class(@class(NSString));
08      rax = [r14 decodeObjectOfClass:rax forKey:@"executablePath"];
09
10      rax = objc_opt_class(@class(NSString));
11      rax = [r14 decodeObjectOfClass:rax forKey:@"teamIdentifier"];
12
13      ...
```

method automatically invoked to de-serialize stored objects

BTM Daemon  
[ItemRecord initWithCoder];



ItemRecord

> Tag Scope

Idx	Name
173	-[ItemRecord uuid]
174	-[ItemRecord setUuid:]
175	-[ItemRecord identifier]
176	-[ItemRecord setIdentifier:]
177	-[ItemRecord disposition]
178	-[ItemRecord setDisposition:]
179	-[ItemRecord generation]
180	-[ItemRecord setGeneration:]
181	-[ItemRecord url]
182	-[ItemRecord setUrl:]
183	-[ItemRecord modificationDate]
184	-[ItemRecord setModificationDate:]
185	-[ItemRecord executablePath]
186	-[ItemRecord setExecutablePath:]
187	-[ItemRecord executableModificationDate]
188	-[ItemRecord setExecutableModificationDate:]
189	-[ItemRecord teamIdentifier]
190	-[ItemRecord setTeamIdentifier:]

'ItemRecord' properties

# ITEM DE-SERIALIZATION

...reimplemented in our own code

```
01 @interface ItemRecord : NSObject <NSSecureCoding>
02 @property NSInteger type;
03 @property(nonatomic, retain)NSURL* url;
04 @property(nonatomic, retain)NSUUID* uuid;
05 ...
06 @property(nonatomic, retain)NSString* executablePath;
07 @property(nonatomic, retain)NSString* teamIdentifier;
08 @property(nonatomic, retain)NSString* bundleIdentifier;
09
10 @end
11
12 -(id)initWithCoder:(NSCoder *)decoder
13 {
14     ...
15     self.url = [decoder decodeObjectOfClass:[NSURL class] forKey:@"url"];
16     self.uuid = [decoder decodeObjectOfClass:[NSUUID class] forKey:@"uuid"];
17     self.executablePath = [decoder decodeObjectOfClass:[NSString class] forKey:@"executablePath"];
18     self.teamIdentifier = [decoder decodeObjectOfClass:[NSString class] forKey:@"teamIdentifier"];
19     self.bundleIdentifier = [decoder decodeObjectOfClass:[NSString class] forKey:@"bundleIdentifier"];
20     ...
}
```

**ItemRecord deserialization  
(custom initWithCoder: method)**

# PROGRAMMATICALLY DUMPING THE BTM DATABASE

## ...reimplemented in our own code



```
01 //load
02 // path set to BTM database
03 NSData* data = [NSData dataWithContentsOfURL:path options:0 error:NULL];
04
05 //init keyed unarchiver with database data
06 NSKeyedUnarchiver* keyedUnarchiver = [[NSKeyedUnarchiver alloc] initWithReadingFromData:data error:NULL];
07
08 //de-serialize
09 // will trigger call to "initWithCoder:" and de-serialize all objects
10 Storage* storage = [keyedUnarchiver decodeObjectOfClass:[Storage class] forKey:@"store"];
11
12 //print out all items
13 for(NSString* key in storage.items) {
14
15     NSArray* items = storage.items[key];
16
17     for(ItemRecord* item in items){
18         printf(" #d\n", ++itemNumber);
19         printf(" %s\n", [[item dumpVerboseDescription] UTF8String]);
20     }
21 }
22
```

# PROGRAMMATICALLY DUMPING THE BTM DATABASE

...reimplemented in our own code

link in the 'dump btm' library

```
01 #include "dumpBTM.h"
02
03 int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
04
05     //set if you want
06     // a custom btm file
07     NSURL* btmPath = nil;
08
09     //dump stdout
10     // (aka sfltool dumpbtm)
11     dumpBTM(btmPath);
12
13     //or parse into a dictionary...
14     NSDictionary* contents = parseBTM(path);
15     ...
16 }
```



[github.com/objective-see/DumpBTM](https://github.com/objective-see/DumpBTM)

# DUMPBTM OUTPUT

...no root access required

```
% ./dumpBTM
Opened /private/var/db/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement/BackgroundItems-v8.btm

=====
Records for UID 0 : FFFFFFFE-DDDD-CCCC-BBBB-AAAA00000000
=====

...
UUID:          EAE1D8DC-2928-47C1-BC53-6274590FE3D1
Name:          us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
Developer Name: Zoom Video Communications, Inc.
Team Identifier: BJ4HAAB9B3
Type:          legacy daemon (0x10010)
Disposition:   [enabled allowed visible notified] (11)
Identifier:    us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
URL:           file:///Library/LaunchDaemons/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon.plist
Executable Path: /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
Generation:    2
Assoc. Bundle IDs: [us.zoom.xos]
Parent Identifier: Zoom Video Communications, Inc.
```

our "Dump BTM" output

# KNOCKKNOCK

## KnockKnock

version: 2.4.0

**Start Scan**

**Categories:**

- Authorization Plugins 0  
registered authorization bundles
- Browser Extensions 3  
extensions hosted in the browser
- Background Managed Tasks 8**  
agents, daemons, & login items managed by BTM
- Cron Jobs 0  
current user's cron jobs
- Dir. Services Plugins 0  
registered directory services bundles
- Event Rules 0  
actions executed by emond
- Extensions and Widgets 3  
plugins that extend/customize the OS
- Kernel Extensions 0  
installed kexts, likely kernel loaded

**Items:**


Item Name	Path	Scan Status	Info	Show
CCXProcess	/Applications/Utilities/Adobe Creative Cloud Experience/CCXProcess/CCXProcess.app/Contents/MacOS/CC...	0/75	info	show
ChmodBPF	/Library/Application Support/Wireshark/ChmodBPF/ChmodBPF	0/75	info	show
Creative Cloud	/Applications/Utilities/Adobe Creative Cloud/ACC/Creative Cloud.app/Contents/MacOS/Creative Cloud	?	info	show
com.adobe.acc.installer.v2	/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.adobe.acc.installer.v2	?	info	show
magnetLauncher	/Applications/Magnet.app/Contents/Library/LoginItems/magnetLauncher.app/Contents/MacOS/magnetLauncher	0/75	info	show
<b>softwareupdate</b>	/Users/Patrick/.local/softwareupdate	<b>33/75</b>	info	show
us.zoom.ZoomDaemon	/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon	0/74	info	show
zoom.us	/Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/MacOS/zoom.us	?	info	show

*OSX.DazzleSpy*

Scan Complete

# Tools (Part II)

leveraging BTM to detect persistent malware




# BTM DAEMON'S REFERENCES TO "ENDPOINT SECURITY"

```
% strings - backgroundtaskmanagementd | grep ES  
  
submitItemAddToES: No URL provided, cannot submit event to EndpointSecurity  
submitItemAddToES: Invalid BTMItemType, cannot submit event to EndpointSecurity
```


References to 0x100007b84

Address	Value
0x10000383b (-[SFLClientProcess addURL:managed:reply:] + 0x677)	call submitItemAddToES
0x1000038ac (-[SFLClientProcess addURL:managed:reply:] + 0x6e8)	call submitItemAddToES
0x100005053 (-[BTMService registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:parentURL:type:relativeUR...	call submitItemAddToES
0x100005084 (-[BTMService registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:parentURL:type:relativeUR...	call submitItemAddToES
0x10000519c (-[BTMService registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:parentURL:type:relativeUR...	call submitItemAddToES
0x1000051cc (-[BTMService registerLaunchItemWithAuditToken:parentURL:type:relativeUR...	call submitItemAddToES
0x1000065dd (-[BTMService addItem:uid:reply:] + 0x1ef)	call submitItemAddToES
0x100006611 (-[BTMService addItem:uid:reply:] + 0x223)	call submitItemAddToES

```
01 submitItemAddToES:  
02 ...  
03  
04 b1 ess_notify_btm_launch_item_add
```



very undocumented :/



implemented in:  
**libEndpointSecuritySystem.dylib**

# ENDPOINT SECURITY

## ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_BTM\_LAUNCH\_ITEM\_ADD event

```
01  /* The valid event types recognized by EndpointSecurity */
02  typedef enum {
03  ...
04
05  // The following events are available beginning in macOS 13.0
06  ...
07  ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD,
08  ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_REMOVE
```



# REGISTERING FOR ES EVENTS

## ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_BTM\_LAUNCH\_ITEM\_ADD event

```
01 //client/event of interest
02 es_client_t* esClient = NULL;
03 es_event_type_t events[] = {ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD};
04
05 //new client
06 //callback will process 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD' events
07 es_new_client(&esClient, ^(es_client_t *client, const es_message_t *message)
08 {
09     //TODO: handle event
10 }
11
12 //subscribe
13 es_subscribe(endpointProcessClient, events, sizeof(events)/sizeof(events[0]));
14
```

1

2

callback for  
BTM events

3

ES BTM Monitor  
(ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_BTM\_LAUNCH\_ITEM\_ADD)

- 1 Specify events of interest
- 2 Create callback for events
- 3 Subscribe for events

# HANDLING ES NOTIFICATIONS

## ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_BTM\_LAUNCH\_ITEM\_ADD event

```
01 typedef struct {
02     es_process_t * instigator;
03     es_process_t * app;
04     es_btm_launch_item_t * item;
05     es_string_token_t executable_path;
06 } es_event_btm_launch_item_add_t;
```

```
01 NSString* toString(es_string_token_t* token) {
02
03     return [[NSString alloc]
04             initWithBytes:token->data
05             length:token->length
06             encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
07 }
```

our helper function

## es\_event\_btm\_launch\_item\_add\_t

```
01 //new client
02 // callback will process 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD' events
03 es_new_client(&esClient, ^(es_client_t *client, const es_message_t *message) {
04
05     NSLog(@"Item URL: %@", toString(&message->event.btm_launch_item_add->item->item_url));
06     NSLog(@"Item Executable: %@", toString(event btm_launch_item_add->executable_path));
07
08     es_process_t* app = message->event.btm_launch_item_add->app;
09     if(NULL != app) NSLog(@"App: %@", toString(&app->executable->path));
10
11     es_process_t* instigator = message->event.btm_launch_item_add->instigator;
12     if(NULL != instigator) NSLog(@"Instigator: %@", toString(&instigator->executable->path));
13     ...
}
```

## Handler for ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_BTM\_LAUNCH\_ITEM\_ADD

# IT (WAS) BROKEN


...in two separate ways 🙄

❶ `ES_BTM_ITEM_TYPE_AGENT` / `ES_BTM_ITEM_TYPE_DAEMON`:

When a new item installed, it would deliver a notification for *every* installed item.

❷ `ES_BTM_ITEM_TYPE_LOGIN_ITEM`:

When a new was item installed, no notification would be delivered.



-----▶ 🙌  
...fixed in macOS 13.3

(my) bug report

# HOORAY, PERSISTENT MALWARE DETECTION

...via `ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_REMOVE`

system alert



## Background Items Added

"softwareupdate" is an item that can run in the background. You can manage this in Login Items Settings.

```
# ./btm_monitor
New Event: 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD'

Type: ES_BTM_ITEM_TYPE_AGENT

Instigator: /usr/libexec/smd

Agent exe: /Users/User/.local/softwareupdate
Agent url: /Users/User/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist
```


Persistence detection  
(OSX.DazzleSpy)



Note: No delivery of BTM removal events  
(`ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_REMOVE`) ...broken!


# Breaking

...avoiding BTM alerts & ES messages




# HACKERS HATE ALERTS & MESSAGES

...that can give away the attack!



  OMG, i've been hacked!!

Can we (as hackers) prevent:  
A: The system notification?  
B: The Endpoint Security event?



# PERSIST "OUTSIDE" BTM

## ...avoid it all together!

```
01 def format(self, src, des, uc):
02     ...
03     if not os.path.isfile(des):
04         os.system('cp ' + src + ' ' + des)
05
06     if des[-3:] == '.py':
07         os.system('sudo crontab -l 2>/dev/null;
08         echo "*/* * * * * python ' + des + '" | sudo crontab -')
```

Persistence via cron  
(OSX.Enigma)

lots of other ways to persist

THEEVILBIT BLOG

## Beyond the good ol' LaunchAgents - Introduction

by: Csaba Fitzl




Remember, BTM (currently) only covers launch agents/daemons, and login items.

# BYPASS METHOD 0x1 (UI NOTIFICATION)

just reset the BTM database, via sfltool

note: requires root privileges

```
# sfltool resetbtm  
sfltool[1261:13567] Database reset.
```




```
% log stream --debug --info --predicate "process = 'backgroundtaskmanagementd'"  
backgroundtaskmanagementd: registerLaunchItem: result=no error, new item  
disposition=[enabled, allowed, visible, not notified],  
identifier=com.apple.softwareupdate,  
url=file:///Users/user/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist  
backgroundtaskmanagementd: should post advisory=false for uid=501,  
id=6ED3BEBEBC-8D60-45ED-8BCC-E0163A8AA806, item=softwareupdate
```

"should post advisory=false"

# BYPASS METHOD 0x2 (UI NOTIFICATION)

pause, then kill the btm agent



```
% pgrep BackgroundTaskManagementAgent 1
88262

% kill -SIGSTOP 88262 2

% ps -o state 88262
T
'T' means, stopped


% kill -SIGKILL 88262 3
```

- 1 Get pid of BTM agent
- 2 Send it a 'STOP' signal
- 3 Once persisted kill it (to prevent alert re-delivery)

# BYPASS METHOD 0x3 (ES EVENTS)

## prevent ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_BTM\_LAUNCH\_ITEM\_ADD

want to prevent this!




```
# ./btm_monitor
New Event: 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD'

item exe: /Users/User/.local/softwareupdate
item url: /Users/User/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist
```

```
01 def submitItemAddToES()
02   ...
03   ess_notify_btm_launch_item_add();
```

found in libEndpointSecuritySystem

```
01 def ess_notify_btm_launch_item_add()
02   ...
03   downcallNotifyOnly();
```



```
01 def downcallNotifyOnly()
02   ...
03   if(!mac_syscall("EndpointSecurity", ...){
04     os_log_impl(..., "Failed to submit event using ES syscall %d: %d %s", &var_50, 0x18);
```

to the kernel (...to force an error?)

# (RESPONSIBLE?) PROCESS LOOKUP

## ...via `proc_find` & `proc_getexecutablevnode`

EndpointSecurity.kext

```
% lladb
(lladb) gdb-remote 8084
...
(lladb) bt
EndpointSecurity`pdbReadAuditToken()
...
EndpointSecurity`EndpointSecurityEventManager::sendNotifyOnly()
EndpointSecurity`EndpointSecurityEventManager::sendBtmLaunchItemAdd()
EndpointSecurity`EndpointSecurityEventManager::es_policy_syscall()
kernel`hndl_unix_scall64
```

```
01 def pdbReadAuditToken()
02     ...
03     PackedDataBufferReader::read
04     ...
05     AutoReleasingProc::createFromPidVer();
06     ...
07     set_common_proc_info();
08
09     //error? no ES message delivered!
```

```
01 def AutoReleasingProc::createFromPidVer();
02     ...
03     proc* process = proc_find(<pid>);
```

proc\* (in kernel)

```
(lladb) p *(proc*)$rdi
(proc) $1 = {
  p_pid = 866
  p_name = {'OverSight'}
```


reported event  
(in user-mode)

```
01 def set_common_proc_info();
02     ...
03     vnode = proc_getexecutablevnode(process);
04     if(!vnode)
05         //set error to 0x3 (ESRCH / "No Such Process")
```

```
# eslogger btm_launch_item_add
"event": {
  "btm_launch_item_add": {
    "pid": 866
    "path": "/Applications/OverSight.app
             /Contents/MacOS/OverSight"
    ...
```

# (RESPONSIBLE?) PROCESS LOOKUP

## ...via `proc_find` & `proc_getexecutablevnode`



What happens if the responsible process ...has (quickly) exited already?

```
01 def AutoReleasingProc::createFromPidVer();
02 ...
03 proc* process = proc_find(NULL);
```

`proc_find(NULL/0)`  
...will return the kernel task

```
(lldb) p *(proc*)$rdi
(proc) $1 = {
  p_pid = 0
  p_name = {'kernel_task'}
```

the kernel task does not have an executable vnode!

```
01 def set_common_proc_info();
02 ...
03 vnode = proc_getexecutablevnode(process)
04 if(!vnode)
05     //set error to 0x3 (ESRCH / "No Such Process")
```

Error  
...and no ES message delivered! 🙄

```
% log stream

Error
backgroundtaskmanagementd: (libEndpointSecuritySystem.dylib)
Failed to submit event using ES syscall 20: 3 No such process
```

# HOW TO TRIGGER?

...as easy as installing BlockBlock 😄


```
01 #install logic
02 if [ "${1}" == "-install" ]; then
03     ...
04
05     cp "com.objective-see.blockblock.plist" /Library/LaunchDaemons/
06
07     echo "launch daemon installed"
```

## BlockBlock Installer

### DEMO


# Detections

...of bypasses



# ATTACK DETECTION

## via Endpoint Security (ES)



"Writing a Process Monitor"  
[objective-see.org/blog/blog\\_0x47.html](https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x47.html)

# MONITORING SIGNALS

## via ES/ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_SIGNAL

```
01 es_event_type_t events[] = {ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_SIGNAL};
02
03 es_new_client(&endpointClient, ^(es_client_t *client, const es_message_t *message) {
04
05     int signal = message->event.signal.sig;
06     es_process_t* sourceProcess = message->process;
07     es_process_t* targetProcess = message->event.signal.target;
08
09     //have signal, source, & target process
10     // TODO: check if SIGSTOP (17), being sent to BTM agent
11
12 }
13
14 es_subscribe(endpointClient, events, sizeof(events)/sizeof(events[0]));
```

attack detected

## ES Monitoring (via: ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_NOTIFY\_SIGNAL)

```
# ./monitorSignals
New Signal (ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_SIGNAL): SIGSTOP (17)

Source process (687): /bin/zsh
Target process (590): /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework
/Support/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent.app/Contents/MacOS/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent
```

# BETTER YET: BLOCKING SIGNALS

## via ES/ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_AUTH\_SIGNAL

```
01 es_event_type_t events[] = {ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL};
02
03 es_new_client(&endpointClient, ^(es_client_t *client, const es_message_t *message) {
04
05     int signal = message->event.signal.sig;
06     es_process_t* sourceProcess = message->process;
07     es_process_t* targetProcess = message->event.signal.target;
08
09     if( (signal == SIGSTOP) &&
10         (btmAgent == audit_token_to_pid(targetProcess->audit_token))) {
11         es_respond_auth_result(client, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY, false);
12     }
13 }
14 ...
```

block via  
ES\_AUTH\_RESULT\_DENY


ES blocking (via: ES\_EVENT\_TYPE\_AUTH\_SIGNAL)

```
% pgrep BackgroundTaskManagementAgent
590
% kill -SIGSTOP 590
% kill: kill 590 failed: operation not permitted
```

attack, now blocked :)

# MONITORING FOR PERSISTENCE

via other ES events




## BlockBlock:

- 1 Leverage ES file events
- 2 Launch item location?
- 3 Alert user, and block

```
01 <dict>
02   <key>description</key>
03   <string>Launch D & A</string>
04   <key>paths</key>
05   <array>
06     <string>^(\/System|\/Users\/[^\/]+)\/Library\/
07     (LaunchDaemons|LaunchAgents)\/.+\/.(?i)plist$</string>
08   </array>
09   <key>alert</key>
10   <string>installed a launch daemon or agent</string>
11   ...
```

# Conclusions

...& take aways



# TAKEAWAYS



Understanding  
macOS's BTM



New malware  
detection tools



A myriad of  
trivial bypasses




If white hats don't point out flaws in Apple's "security improvements" ...who will?

# INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE? read, "The Art of Mac Malware" book(s)

**Books about Mac Malware**  
by Patrick Wardle

**INTRODUCTION**




Do Macs even get malware? If we're to believe an Apple marketing claim once posted on Apple.com, apparently, no:


[Mac] doesn't get PC viruses. A Mac isn't susceptible to the thousands of viruses plaguing Windows-based computers. That's thanks to built-in defenses in Mac OS X that keep you safe without any work on your part.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, this statement was rather deceptive and to Apple's credit has long been removed from their website. Sure, there may be a kernel of truth in it; due to inherent cross-platform incompatibilities (not Apple's "defenses"), a native Windows virus cannot typically execute on macOS. But cross-platform malware has long targeted both Windows and macOS. For example, in 2019 Windows adware was found packaged with a cross-platform framework that allowed it to run on macOS.<sup>2</sup>

Regardless of any marketing claims, Apple and malware have a long history of coexisting. In fact, Elk Cloner, the first "wild virus for a home



Patrick Wardle



capabilities that seek to help the malware author profit, perhaps by displaying ads, hijacking search results, mining cryptocurrency, or encrypting user files for ransom. Adware falls into this category, as it's designed to surreptitiously generate revenue for its creator. (The difference between adware and malware can be rather nuanced, and in many cases arguably imperceptible. As such, here, we won't differentiate between the two.)

On the other hand, malware designed to spy on its victims (for example, by three-letter government agencies) is more likely to contain stealthier or more comprehensive capabilities, perhaps featuring the ability to record audio off the system microphone or expose an interactive shell to allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands.

Of course, there are overlaps in the capabilities of these two broad categories. For example, the ability to download and execute arbitrary binaries is an appealing capability to most malware authors, as it provides the means to either update or dynamically expand their malicious creations (Figure 3-1).




Figure 3-1: A categorization of malware's capabilities

**Survey and Reconnaissance**

In both crime-oriented and espionage-oriented malware, we often find logic designed to conduct surveys or reconnaissance of a system's environment, for two main reasons. First, this gives the malware insight into its surroundings, which may drive subsequent decisions. For example, malware may choose not to persistently infect a system if it detects third-party security tools. Or, if it finds itself running with non-root privileges, it may attempt to escalate its privileges (or perhaps simply skip actions that require such rights). Thus, the malware often executes reconnaissance logic before any other malicious actions are taken.

Second, malware may transmit the survey information it collects back to the attacker's command and control server, where the attacker may use it to uniquely identify the infected system (usually by finding some system-specific unique identifier) or pinpoint infected computers of interest. In

 free: [taomm.org](http://taomm.org)  
for sale: amazon, etc...

# MAHALO!

"Friends of Objective-See"



CleanMyMac X



SmugMug



iVerify




The Mitten Mac



Halo Privacy

# Demystifying macOS's BTM



## RESOURCES :

**"Manage login items and background tasks on Mac"**

<https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/manage-login-items-background-tasks-mac-depdca572563/web>

**"DumpBTM"**

<https://github.com/objective-see/DumpBTM>