Adversary Emulation & Purple Teaming

SCYTHE

Day 2

Agenda

- Module 7: Exercise Methodology
- Module 8: Testing Tools
- Module 9: Capability Management
- Module 10: Capability Development
- Module 11: Adaptive Emulation
- Module 12: Exercise Execution

Poll: Day 2 Background Survey

https://freeonlinesurveys.com/s/PShGVC4y

Send to students via chat.

Module 7: Exercise Methodology

Topics

- Goals & Requirements
- Components
  - Fidelity Levels
  - Testing Environments
  - Testing Mode
  - Detection Categories
- Results

Importance of Methodology

Your methodology will determine the **efficiency** of your testing and **usability** of your results.

There is no “one size fits all”. Every test should be structured to produce the desired results.



Define Requirements: Goals

First, as the **Exercise Coordinator,** define your requirements:

- What is your goal?
  - “We want to determine Sysmon events relevant to Process Hollowing.”
  - “Exercise our incident response team against simulated ransomware.”
  - “Build detection analytics for T1003: OS Credential Dumping.”
  - “Evaluate an EDR we are considering purchasing.”

Define Requirements: Desired Data

First, as the **Exercise Coordinator,** define your requirements:

- What is your goal?
- What data do you need this exercise to generate?
  - Logs, metrics, practical experience, etc.

Collection: Prioritization



(Source: DeTT&CT https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT/wiki/Getting-started)

Collection: Data Source Components

- What logs are potentially needed to write an alert for a TTP?

- Use the Detection Section on MITRE ATT&CK pages.
  - In this example we see the Data Components for Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, ID: T1059.001.

Detection

ID	Data Source	Data Component
DS0017	Command	Command Execution
DS0011	Module	Module Load
DS0009	Process	Process Creation
DS0012	Script	Script Execution

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/

Define Requirements: Restraints

First, as the **Exercise Coordinator,** define your requirements:

- What is your goal?
- What data do you need this exercise to generate?
- What are your restraints?
  - Time/budget restraints, rules of engagement, data sources / tool limitations

Define Requirements: Available Resources

First, as the **Exercise Coordinator,** define your requirements:

- What is your goal?
- What data do you need this exercise to generate?
- What are your restraints?
- What are your resources?
  - Skills, tools, CTI, # of people, $$$, time



Scoping the Exercise

Resources required scale with # of TTPs in scope.

- **Width = # of Techniques in scope**
- **Depth = # of Procedures in scope per Technique.**

Keep the exercise **achievable.**



Components of an Exercise

- Fidelity Level
- Environment
- Testing Mode
- Detection Categories



Three Levels of Fidelity

How granularly should you replicate the adversary's behavior?

Tactic

Technique

Procedure

Fidelity Level: Tactic

“After exploiting a web server the adversary performed privilege escalation, scanned the network to discover internal targets, and performed lateral movement to gain access.”

Tactic-level emulation focuses on the overall goals of the adversary rather than the particulars of how they accomplished those goals.

Use for general red teaming, or where testing environment is unfamiliar.

Fidelity Level: Technique

“The spearphishing payload executed by an employee in HR performed DLL Hijacking to execute the malware, which checked for the presence of a sandbox and scanned running process for security software.”

Technique-level emulation cares about the general techniques the adversary uses, but does not require exact replication of specific commands or activity.

Well-suited to evaluations of people, processes, and technologies.

Fidelity Level: Procedure

“cmd /c SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC DAILY /TN \"MyTasks\\Task1\" /TR \"C:\\update.exe\" /ST 11:00 /F”

Procedure-level emulation replicates specific commands or behaviors, making modifications only when necessary.

Great for education, detection engineering, sensor tuning, and testing prevention controls.

Testing Environment

Live (Production)

- “Test our live infrastructure”

Representative

- Minimal environment with just systems under test
- “A Windows Domain with a few machines”

Simulated (Replication)

- A fully contrived environment or testbed
- “Run the test in our development environment”

Testing Environment: Resources

- Virtual Machines, Online Cyber Ranges, Cloud Providers, etc..
- Attack Range by Splunk
  - https://github.com/splunk/attack_range
- Game of Active Directory by Orange Cyber Defense
  - https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/GOAD
- DetectionLab by Chris Long
  - https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab
- Active Directory Ranges by Immersive Labs/SnapLabs
  - https://www.snaplabs.io
- Building Virtual Machine Labs: A Hands On Guide by Tony Robinson
  - https://leanpub.com/avatar2

Testing Modes

Testing Mode: How the TTPs in scope are executed during the exercise.

Interactive

Scripted

Adaptive



Testing Mode: Interactive

Operations are performed ad-hoc, with a person at the keyboard discovering targets of opportunity and executing TTPs as required by the moment.

Suited for testing where network environment is not fully known ahead of time.

Preferred Fidelity Level: **Tactics**. Techniques at most. If environment is unknown, Procedures planned ahead cannot be guaranteed to work. Attack chains cannot be reliably replicated. Prevention controls may block activity.

Red Team Methodology



Testing Mode: Scripted

Operation is scripted from beginning to end, with every TTP known ahead of time.

Can either be automated or copy-pasted from a cutsheet.

Preferred Fidelity Level: **Procedure.** Best suited for detection engineering or reproducible evaluations of people/processes/products.

Testing Mode: Adaptive

TTPs are scripted, but operators adapt in real-time or with prepared alternative TTPs.

Also, can be coming to exercise with variety of Procedures to test depth vs width

Preferred Fidelity Level: **Technique.** Suited to evaluations with Protections turned on, or Detection Engineering where depth of coverage is required.

Sequential vs. Block Testing

Sequential: Execute a Procedure, capture results, repeat.

- Good when you have extra time to ensure you don't miss anything
- You can test variations/adaptations before moving on

Block: Execute a sequence of Procedures, capture results as a group, repeat.

- Can save a lot of time, especially if logs are delayed
- Keeps everything in context when executing attack chains

Detection / Protection

Detection is knowing and understanding adversary behavior.

Protection is preventing adversary behavior.



Whenever possible, measure with separate tests!

Reporting: Detection Categories

Detections are not True/False!

ATT&CK Evals:



https://attackevals.mitre-engenuity.org/enterprise/wizard-spider-sandworm/detection-categories

Separation of Detection & Protection Testing

Protections break attack chains in the middle.

Assume compromise... and successful evasion.



Whenever possible, turn protections OFF when testing detections!

Example 1

“Emulate an adversary gaining access to our network and modifying source code for our products.”

Fidelity Level:

Testing Environment:

Testing Mode:

Example 1

“Emulate an adversary gaining access to our network and modifying source code for our products.”

Fidelity Level: Tactic

Testing Environment: Production

Testing Mode: Interactive

Example 2

“Evaluate the performance of the EDR we use against LockBit ransomware.”



Fidelity Level:

Testing Environment:

Testing Mode:

Example 2

“Evaluate the performance of the EDR we use against LockBit ransomware.”

Fidelity Level: Technique

Testing Environment: Simulated

Testing Mode: Adaptive



Example 3

“Replicate the Manjusaka malware implant so we can build detections.”

Fidelity Level:

Testing Environment:

Testing Mode:



Example 3

“Replicate the Manjusaka malware implant so we can build detections.”

Fidelity Level: Procedure

Testing Environment: Representative

Testing Mode: Scripted



Module 8: Testing Tools

Topics

- Categories of capabilities
- Emulation vs Simulation
- Choosing the right tools
- Overview of Public Tools
- Introduction to the SCYTHE Platform
- Validating your testing

Choosing Tools

Your choice of testing tools matters!

Why?

- Realism
- Flexibility
- Reliability
- Trustworthiness



Types of Offensive Capabilities: Stage 0

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
  - Goal is to gain initial code execution without triggering defenses
  - Usually the first time defenders can observe the adversary on an endpoint.
  - Can also be an exploit payload. Usually shellcode or command execution.

In order of observability by defenders.

Types of Offensive Capabilities: Stage 1

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
- (Stage 1) Stagers
  - downloaders, loaders, lightweight implants
  - Sometimes includes an implant that is used to gain situational awareness and survey environment determine whether to continue
  - Not every actor uses Stage 1 tools

In order of observability by defenders.

Types of Offensive Capabilities: Infrastructure

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
- (Stage 1) Stagers
  - downloaders, loaders, lightweight implants
- Infrastructure
  - redirectors, C2 services and servers
  - Most common is direct callback
  - Can be indirect, such as DNS
  - May also be third-party services (Slack, Twitter, etc.)
  - Check TOS before using third-party services for C2

In order of observability by defenders.

Types of Offensive Capabilities: Stage 2

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
- (Stage 1) Stagers
  - downloaders, loaders, lightweight implants
- Infrastructure
  - redirectors, C2 services and servers
- (Stage 2) Primary Command & Control (C2)
  - long-term implants, Cobalt Strike, C3
  - Used for bulk of interactive operations
  - Typically engineered for defense evasion
  - Often uses a different C2 mechanism than Stage 1

In order of observability by defenders.

Types of Offensive Capabilities: Post-Ex Payloads

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
- (Stage 1) Stagers
  - downloaders, loaders, lightweight implants
- Infrastructure
  - redirectors, C2 services and servers
- (Stage 2) Primary Command & Control (C2)
  - long-term implants, Cobalt Strike, C3
- Post-exploitation payloads
  - LOLBAS, mimikatz, proxies, ransomware
  - Used to accomplish objectives
  - Produces the bulk of detectable post-access malicious behavior

In order of observability by defenders.

Types of Offensive Capabilities: Payload Generators

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
- (Stage 1) Stagers
  - downloaders, loaders, lightweight implants
- Infrastructure
  - redirectors, C2 services and servers
- (Stage 2) Primary Command & Control (C2)
  - long-term implants, Cobalt Strike, C3
- Post-exploitation payloads
  - LOLBAS, mimikatz, proxies, ransomware
- Payload generators
  - packers, persistence kits
  - Goal: ensure safe code execution
  - High value, low return for emulation

In order of observability by defenders.

Types of Offensive Capabilities

- (Stage 0) Initial access payloads
  - macro document, LNK, ISO, .sh, DLL/EXE, etc.
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In order of observability by defenders.

Emulation vs. Simulation (Tools)

You don’t need to use the same tools as your adversary.



Unless you are specifically building detections for an adversaries tools, you don’t need to replicate them exactly.

Adversary Capabilities -> Emulation Capabilities

How do we map adversary capabilities to emulation capabilities?

1. If their tools are available (and safe to use), use them.



Adversary Capabilities -> Emulation Capabilities

How do we map adversary capabilities to emulation capabilities?

1. If their tools are available (and safe to use), use them.
2. If not, what other tools can perform the TTPs in scope?



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

Adversary Capabilities -> Emulation Capabilities

How do we map adversary capabilities to emulation capabilities?

1. If their tools are available (and safe to use), use them.
2. If not, what other tools can perform the TTPs in scope?
3. If you can't execute the same Procedures with your tools, can you emulate variations on the Techniques?
4. If nothing else, build your own capabilities.



Atomic Red Team

Bringing atomic testing to the security space!



- https://atomicredteam.io/atomicredteam
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses

Inspired Additional tooling and tests!

- https://github.com/swimlane/atomic-operator
- https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team

Adding Command and Control

- Testing on endpoints works well, but a major component of adversaries is missing: Network traffic, or Command and Control (C2)!

C2 Matrix

- Google Sheet of C2s
- https://www.thec2matrix.com/
- Find ideal C2 for your needs
- https://howto.thec2matrix.com
- SANS Slingshot C2 Matrix VM
- @C2_Matrix

	UI			Channel											Agents		
Name	Multi-User	UI	API	TCP	HTTP	HTTP2	HTTP3	DNS	DoH	ICMP	FTP	IMAP	MAPI	SMB	Windows	Linux	macOS
Apfell	Yes	Web	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		No	Yes	Yes
C3													No				
CALDERA	Yes	Web	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
Cobalt Strike	Yes	GUI	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Covenant	Yes	Web	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Dali	No	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	BYOI	BYOI	BYOI
Empire	No	GUI	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
EvilOSX	No	GUI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
Faction C2	Yes	Web	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	No	No
FlyingAFalseFlag	No	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	No	No
FudgeC2	Yes	Web	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
godoh	No	CLI	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
ibombshell	No	GUI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
INNUENDO	Yes	Web	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Koadic C3	No	GUI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	No	No
MacShellSwift	No	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		No	No	Yes
Merlin	No	GUI	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
Metasploit	Yes	CLI	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nuages	Yes	GUI	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	No	No
Octopus	No	GUI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
PoshC2	Yes	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
PowerHub	Yes	Web	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	No	No
Prismatica	Yes	GUI	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
Pupy	No	CLI	No												Yes	Yes	No
QuasarRAT																	
Red Team Toolkit	No	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
redViper																	
ReverseTCPShell	No	CLI	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
SCYTHE	Yes	Web	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SilentTrinity	Yes	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	No	No
Sliver	Yes	CLI	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
Throwback	Yes	Web	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Trevor C2	No	CLI	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No		Yes	Yes	Yes
Voodoo	Yes	Web	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
WEASEL	No	CLI	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

SCYTHE

- Enterprise-Grade platform for Adversary Emulation
  - Creating custom, controlled, synthetic malware
- Emulate known threat actors against an enterprise network
  - **Consistently execute** adversary behaviors (TTPs)
  - **Force-multiplier for security teams** resources
  - **Measure and improve response** of people and process
- SCYTHE is in the lab for you all to use

https://t.me/learningnets

Popular Open Source Tools



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MYTHIC

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

[PowerShell Empire]

COVENANT

[Covenant]

Tools – Validating Your Testing

Live SCYTHE Walkthrough

Exercise: Using Command & Control

1. Find the WIN10 VM in your SnapLabs instance.
2. Login to SCYTHE:
   a. https://192.168.0.10:8443/
   b. Username: unicorn
   c. Password: unicorn
3. Execute a ConviV2 Campaign
   a. Threat Catalog > ContiV2 > “Create Campaign from Threat”.
   b. Download the Campaign client executable. Execute it.
   c. Review the Campaign output.

Instructors will walk around class and help. Ask questions!

Live CALDERA Walkthrough

Exercise: Using Command & Control (CALDERA)

1. Find the SANS Slingshot C2 Matrix VM in your SnapLabs instance.
2. Login to CALDERA
    a.

Instructors will walk around class and help. Ask questions!

Live Covenant Walkthrough

Exercise: Using Command & Control (Covenant)

1. Find the SANS Slingshot C2 Matrix VM in your SnapLabs instance.
2. Login to Covenant
   a. Terminal in “slingshot” VM: *sudo docker start covenant -ai* (then wait a couple minutes)
   b. In web browser on Win10 VM: https://192.168.38.242:7443
   c. Credentials: unicorn:unicorn
3. Try it out
   a. Listeners:
      i. ConnectAddress: 192.168.38.242
      ii. ConnectPort: 8080
      iii. BindPort: 8080
   b. Launchers:
      i. GruntHTTP
      ii. DotNet version: Net40
      iii. Click “Generate”. Then “Download.”
      iv. Run GruntHTTP.exe

Exercise: Using Command & Control (Covenant)

1. Gunts: Click on an active Grunt and select the “Interact” tab.
2. Run the following commands:
   a. help
   b. WhoAmI
   c. Shell whoami /all
   d. ScreenShot
   e. Seatbelt -group=User

Instructors will walk around class and help. Ask questions!

Module 9: Capability Management

Capabilities -> Operational Needs



Filling a Capability Gap



Survivability Gap



Filling a Gap



Measuring Maturity

Overall Concept comes from Wardley Maps

- Value Chain Mapping by Simon Wardley

Resources

- Free Book: https://medium.com/wardleymaps/on-being-lost-2ef5f05eb1ec
- (PDF download) https://learnwardleymapping.com/book/
- 13 minute video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnFeIt-uaEc
- 40 minute video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3wgzl2iUR4
- https://list.wardleymaps.com
- https://github.com/wardley-maps-community/awesome-wardley-maps

Measuring Capability

Research

- Everything starts as an idea
- Unproven
- “I wish I could fasten two things together”

Measuring Capability

Research → Custom

Idea takes hold - it has merit!

“Expert fastener making”

Measuring Capability

Research → Custom → Product

Examples

Follina Vulnerability	GadgetToJScript	Rubeus
“Process Herpaderping”	SysWhispers	Cobalt Strike
Research	**Custom**	**Product**

Measuring Capability: Tactics

Defense Evasion

Measuring Capability: Tactics



Measuring Capability: Tactics



Measuring Capability: Tactics



Measuring Capability: Tactics



Addressing Attack Chains



Addressing Attack Chains



*Identifies current resource heavy points

Addressing Attack Chains



*Identifies current resource heavy points

Choosing Product

Replacing Adversary Capabilities

You will often be unable to use the same tools as the adversary. What then?

Replace with tools that generate as much parity in signal as the original tools.

Comparing Threat to Emulation



Acquiring Capabilities

Open source

- TONS of great tools are available publicly
- Adversaries also use them…
- Awesome Red Teaming: https://github.com/an4kein/awesome-red-teaming

Buying capabilities

- Dual-use commodities are often export-controlled
- Depending on your use case, they may not sell to you
  - Most won't sell to blue teams / defensive engineers for fear it will devalue their product
- Demand documentation and product training

Crafting Custom

Threat Actor

A sophisticated military-intelligence institution funded by taxes, extortion, and ransomware

Purple Teamer

"We have no tool budget."

Adapting Existing Frameworks

Customizing tools is a relatively low-cost way to build emulation capabilities.

- Focus on ROI
- If you're going to do any development, do defense evasion.
- Defense evasion = using existing Product safely



Developing Original Capabilities

Development is expensive! Just because you can, that doesn't mean you should.

Defense evasion = best ROI

Project Management

Prioritize adversary resiliency.

Maximizing attack chains = More viable Procedures per Technique

- Defense Evasion often lets you reuse Procedures safely
- Since Execution Techniques are required for every Procedure, more Execution means more Procedures
- Reduce cost of iteration through DevOps, good SE practices

Adversary Resiliency

Adversary resilience: ability to conduct operations despite costs incurred by defenders

Offensive development efforts should focus on reducing cost of operations. Scale to meet demand for emulation.

Operational Costs

$$\text{Security} = \frac{\text{Cost of adversary}}{\text{Cost of defender}}$$

- Defenders want to maximize this ratio
- Threat Actors want to minimize this ratio

Real-world threat actors succeed by managing their operational costs.

https://sec.okta.com/articles/2020/08/crimeops-operational-art-cyber-crime

Prioritizing Access

If you find you often lose access to targets, prioritize Defense Evasion and Persistence.



You can’t accomplish any testing if you can’t establish and maintain access to targets.

Defining “Burn”

Burn = becoming unsafe to use due to exposure or effective defenses

Examples:

- Payload gets sent to VT and signatured by everything
- Credential dumping via LSASS memory is now commonly known & detected
- Obfuscation technique becomes commonly detected
- Blue team learns that you like to move laterally via remote Service Creation, so they turn that feature off

Managing Burn Rate

Development rate ≥ Burn rate





You cannot control the rate at which defenders incur cost. You can only control your own costs.

Managing Your Pyramid of Pain

David Bianco: http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html



STATIC

DYNAMIC

Documentation

Documentation is critical for adversary emulation tools:

- Aids detection engineering
- Proves emulation tools map back to CTI
- Useful for report writing
- Proves you know how your tools work
- Customers will ask for it!

“Your tool placed a DLL in %APPDATA%. Can you show me how that works and where the adversary did that in CTI?”

Questions?

Module 10: Capability Development

Topics

Developing Attack Infrastructure

Developing Communications Protocols

Developing Primary Payloads

Developing Secondary Payloads

Developing Rootkits/Bootkits

Advanced Research & Development

Unique Challenges

Offensive cyber tools are, for the most part, software programs like any other. But, they face unique challenges due to a hostile environment.

Unique Requirements

- Portability
- Reliability
- Simplicity
- Operational Security
- Predictable Effects
- Documented Artifacts
- Recoverability

Developing Attack Infrastructure

https://t.me/learningnets

Developing Attack Infrastructure

Ambiguity

Deception

Reliability

Redundancy

Modularity



Developing Communication Protocols



C3

https://github.com/FSecureLABS/C3



Developing Primary Payloads

Requirements:

- Modularity
- Reliability
- Operational Security

Write a loader with C2. All the commands can be modules.

Developing Implants: Agnostic Frameworks

Some C2 frameworks are implant-agnostic:

- Don’t need to write a UI or C2 server
- Saves time and money if you need a custom implant
- E.g. Mythic, CALDERA, PoshC2

Developing Secondary Payloads

Requirements:

- Usability
- Minimal Assumptions
- Minimal Effects
- Portability

Excellent example: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus

Developing Secondary Payloads

Developing Rootkits/Bootkits

Requirements:

- Code Signing Certificates
- Reliability
- Passivity



Developing Rootkits: Theory



Developing Rootkits: Reality

Rootkits: Code Signing Certificates

What Threat actors do:

- Buy them from CAs
- Use stolen/leaked/black market certs
- Legit Vulnerable Drivers
- Disable Driver Signing Enforcement

R&D for Adversary Emulation

Generally not the place for original R&D, since the goal is to replicate what has already been observed.

However, it can be used to fill in ambiguity in threat intelligence.

TTP Development

Emulating complex TTPs will require significant R&D investment and skills.

Results should be:

- Shareable
- Repeatable
- Documented

Validating Capabilities

Like any other software engineering, **test your code.**

- Unit tests
- Standard DevOps is great help here
- Test against the scope of possible targets
- Get golden images of internal OS images (for internal red teams)

Automate Deployment

Automated build processes allow for dynamic payload generation and obfuscation.

- Build -> Test -> Pack -> Deploy
- **Every build should have a unique signature**

https://blog.xpnsec.com/building-modifying-packing-devops/

Wrapping Up

Automating capabilities is as important as researching new techniques

Questions?

Module 11: Adaptive Emulation

Topics

- Diversifying your testing
- Adaptive Emulation

Why adaptive?



VS

Team Scoped to Old CTI https://t.me/learningnets

Modern EDR

Why adaptive?

VS



Why adaptive?

LOL

Lessons learned?

Solution: Even the Odds

How do we adapt?



Deliberate TTP Variance

Emulation Plan



Emulation Plan



Emulation Plan



Adaptation: Process Discovery

Adaptation: Process Discovery



Adaptation: Process Discovery



Adaptation: Process Discovery



Emulation Plan: Adaptation Technique Level



Emulation Plan: Adaptation Technique Level



Adaptation: Technique



New Emulation Plan



Adaptation: Tactic

Why?

- New CTI
- Stories with holes
- Modernization requires extra tactics/techniques

Challenges

- Lots of ambiguity
- Staying deliberate
- Staying threat driven

Emulation Plan: Adaptation Tactic Level



New CTI: Antivirus Discovery



Added TTP



Beyond Emulation

You may have a concern that some people haven't seen in the wild, and what do you do to make that as realistic as possible?

Atomic Red Team

- Great place to start, but it is not complete
- Focus is on breadth, not depth
  - Has become a checkbox exercise
- Testing of individual techniques
  - Great for validating data sources
  - Great for continuous validation in CI/CD
  - You cannot comprehensively test all ATT&CK TTPs
- ATT&CK Secret: It almost always takes two techniques to execute a test



Example: Process Discovery (T1057)



Example: Process Discovery (T1057)



Example: Process Discovery (T1057)



Example: Process Discovery (T1057)



PTEF Step 2



- Table-top discussion of security controls and expectations for TTP execution
- This is where you come up with and document these variations

Exercise 1: Adaptation

1. Run a SCYTHE campaign with Defender off.
2. Run a SCYTHE campaign with Defender on.
3. Compare your results. Did the campaign succeed with Defender on? If not, why did it fail?
4. If it failed with Defender on, how would you adapt your procedures or your testing methodology to overcome this roadblock and proceed with the exercise?

Exercise 2: Adaptation

1. Research the ATT&CK technique T1003.001 (LSASS Dumping)
    a. Write three different emulation procedures for this Technique. Each should use a different tool or capability
    b. How do these procedures differ?

Extra Exercise 3: Adaptation (Extra)

1. Research the “Protected Process Light” (PPL) protection that can be enabled to protect against LSASS Dumping.
2. Suppose this protection is enabled in the testing environment. How would you perform LSASS Dumping despite this protection? Perform research online as needed to find the answer.

Questions?

Module 12: Exercise Execution

Topics

- Coming prepared
- Setting the stage
- Exercise flow
- Tracking results
- Execution
- Results Analysis
- Retesting

Coming Prepared

- ❏ Easily distributable emulation plan
- ❏ Clearly identified roles and responsibilities
- ❏ Test attack infrastructure
- ❏ For remote ops, test voice, chat, screensharing



Setting the Stage

1. Before you start, review the exercise plan with everyone.
2. Confirm roles and responsibilities
3. Confirm workflow, how results will be tracked
4. **Review the Incident Response process**



Incident Response

A purple team exercise should **exercise** the Incident Response process.

- Replicate the process as much as you can
- Compare process on paper to the *actual* process
- Be prepared to discover real threats...



Reporting: Tracking Results

At a minimum:

- Screenshots
- Timestamps
- Outcomes

Recommended:

- Notes
- Artifacts
- Deviations from plan

Reporting: Capturing Data

Capture results **as you go.**

1. You can never have too many screenshots.
2. Note-taker shouldn't be the operator.
3. Don't move on until note-taker is satisfied that enough info is captured.

Reporting: Tools

Free:

- **VECTR:** https://github.com/SecurityRiskAdvisors/VECTR
- Ghostwriter: https://github.com/GhostManager/Ghostwriter
- Spreadsheets or documents work too!

Paid:

- **Plextrac:** https://plextrac.com/
- Dradis: https://dradisframework.com/ce/

Collection

- Verify data is collected around the event(s).
  - MITRE ATT&CK can assist in identifying data sources.
- Where are the logs found?
  - SIEM, EDR, Host, etc
  - Check out DeTT&CT
- Are there visibility gaps in the logs?
  - If logging gaps are identified, they should be fixed or documented as gaps.
- Start hypothesising detection opportunities.



Collection: DeTT&CT

- “DeTT&CT aims to assist blue teams in using ATT&CK to score and compare data log source quality, visibility coverage, detection coverage and threat actor behaviours. All of which can help, in different ways, to get more resilient against attacks targeting your organisation.”
- https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT



Collection: DeTT&CT

- Leverage DeTT&CT to visualize coverage and map your log sources



https://rabobank-cdc.github.io/dettect-editor/

Red Team Log Collection

Red teams have logs too!

- Command input/output
- Files downloaded
- Artifacts/IOCs
- Operator Chat

Collecting all of this will save time in reporting.

RedELK: https://github.com/outflanknl/RedELK

Exercise: DeTT&CT Lab

- Follow the instructions, if you'd like you can input your data sources.
  - While filling in data sources you can also try adding process creation and file modification.
  - TIP: You can also click "Add all data sources" and go line by line.
- NVISO Resource
  - https://blog.nviso.eu/2022/03/09/dettct-mapping-detection-to-mitre-attck/

Validating Testing

Test outcomes may be:

- Delayed
- Uncertain
- Unpredictable
- Difficult to interpret

Reserve time at the end of exercises for validation of results. Finish the planned exercise first. Then re-test.

Exercise: SCYTHE – Manual

Execute the emulation plan from Module 6's exercise.

SCYTHE:

1. Create an empty campaign called "Shell". Execute it.
2. Bring up the Shell. Type each command from the emulation plan and run it.

Exercise: SCYTHE - Automated

Execute the emulation plan from Module 6's exercise.

SCYTHE:

1. Create a Campaign from the emulation plan, adding each Procedure as a Step in the Campaign. Save it as a Threat so that it can be reused later. Execute it and wait for results to come in.
2. Visit the report page to see results
3. Generate a report using SCYTHE's reporting features.

Exercise: Covenant

Execute the emulation plan from Module 6's exercise.

Covenant:

1. Run a Grunt and Interact with it.
2. Modify the emulation plan from Module 6 to work with the set of commands available in Covenant.
3. Run each command from the modified emulation plan. Compare to SCYTHE.
4. (Optional) Record your results, marking:
    a. Timestamp
    b. Result
    c. Screenshot

Questions?

End of Day 2

Feedback Link for Day 2:
https://freeonlinesurveys.com/s/k9bflWgI

SCYTHE

Extra Content

SCYTHE

Open Time: Enjoy the Lab Range! We're around to chat and answer questions

Thank you for joining us!

SCYTHE