



SMS E2E Encryption and Tunneling for Smart Mobile Devices

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Questions

1. Have you ever communicated with someone you know via SMS (sent or received) over the past 30 Days?
2. Have you ever had the feeling or suspicion that your SMS messages are not private?
3. Do you use Whatsapp or the Signal app for the privacy it provides?
4. Would you like the same level of privacy that Whatsapp or Signal provide for SMS communication?

If you answered **YES** to at least **TWO** of the
Four Questions, **this could be for you.**

#whoami

- Researcher (Cryptography and AI) - Published
- Technical and Cyber Security Consultant
- Software Developer
- Lecturer
- PhD Candidate CS UoN - Randomized Cryptography
- Kenpo Practitioner - Shodan

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], ebx
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
mov esi, ebx
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F

loc_313066:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+4E
; sub_312FD8+55
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

loc_31306D:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+2D
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C

loc_31307D:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+9C
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+A3
mov [ebp+var_4], eax

loc_31308F:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+B0
cmp edi, 0FFFFFFFFh
jz short loc_31309A
push edi
```

SMS

SMS stands for **S**hort **M**essage **S**ervice and is commonly known as texting. It's a way to send text-only messages of up to 160 characters between phones.

The MOST Ubiquitous form of messaging:

- Device independent
- Provider independent (Doesn't depend on the Service provider Airtel/Safaricom/Country)
- Doesn't require internet connection - global reach

SMS Security

Dependent on the GSM Service providers encryption implementation A5/1, A5/2, A5/3, A5/4

Depending on the Country'S Agreement and export controls

Between mobile and base station controller (BSC, the network entity entity that manages the radio resources). The radio link transports a couple of higher level protocols, among them MAP which is used to transport SMS.

Encryption and security is not E-2-E, Just over the air from Device to BTS

Refer here :

[https://payatu.com/dissecting-gsm-encryption-location-update-process#:~:text=GS M%20makes%20use%20of%20a,a%20ciphering%20key%20\(KC\).](https://payatu.com/dissecting-gsm-encryption-location-update-process#:~:text=GS%20M%20makes%20use%20of%20a,a%20ciphering%20key%20(KC).)

Note

Cellular service providers retain records of the parties to a text message and the date and time it was sent. They do not, however, retain the content of text messages for very long, if at all.

They can However turn retain and turn over your text if requested through a court order.

Laws only change as technology advances.

major cellular service providers. The memorandum contained information from the six largest cell phone carriers in the United States: Verizon, T-Mobile, AT&T/Cingular, Sprint, Nextel and Virgin Mobile. All of the providers retained records of the date and time of the text message and the parties to the message for time periods ranging from sixty days to seven years.

However, the majority of cellular service providers do not save the content of text messages at all. As of 2010, Verizon Wireless saved text message content for three to five days while Virgin Mobile retained text message content for ninety days but stated that it would only disclose that content if law enforcement had a search warrant containing a "text of text" request. As recently as November 25, 2015, T-Mobile's privacy policy indicated that it retained "calls and text messages you send and receive (but we do not retain the content of those calls or messages after delivery)." Nathan Freitas, a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University explained that the carrier may have "details of whom [was]texted and when" but "the actual text is what is really hard to get, if not impossible" from the carrier. The Boston

Source:<https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2016/06/02/cell-phone-forensics-powerful-tools-wielded-by-federal-investigators/#:~:text=Cellular%20service%20providers%20retain%20records,very%20long%2C%20if%20at%20all.>

<https://t.me/learningnets>

<https://www.safaricom.co.ke/dataprivacystatement/>

3.2.6 Your contact with us, such as when you: call us or interact with us through social media, our chatbot Zuri, 'snail mail', email (we may record your conversations, social media or other interactions with us), register your biometric information such as your voice, finger prints etc, visit a Safaricom Shop or other retail outlet.


3.2.7 Your account information, such as your handset type/model, tariff, top-ups; subscriptions (including third party subscriptions), billing statements, cloud hosting registration details, e-commerce registration and usage, M-PESA and mobile money transactions.

3.2.8 Your call data records: phone numbers that you call or send messages to (or receive calls and messages from), log of calls, messages or data sessions on the Safaricom network and your approximate location (save for customer service interactions as noted above we do not record or store message or call contents).

3.2.9 We use Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance recordings. CCTV Devices are installed at strategic locations to provide a safe and secure environment in all Safaricom premises as a part of our commitment to community safety, security and crime prevention.

SMS Security

WORKING OF A GSM NETWORK



Sim Card

A3,A8
IMSI
Ki



1. IMSI

4. RAND

5. SRES

6. Encrypt with Kc

Mobile
<https://t.me/learningnets>



Base
Station

2. IMSI


3. (RAND,SRES,Kc)



Home
Network

Side Note

Any communication service provider who generates the shared key, or a portion of it, FROM their CENTRAL SERVICE/SERVER can decrypt your encrypted communication. It is NOT encrypted with E-2-E.



Current SMS Communication and Security

SMS Privacy Issues

Since SMSes are not E-2-E Encrypted, s dependent on the Service Provider Only Encrypted from the device to the BTS the below issues arise:

GSM Sniffing: Voice Decryption 101 - Software Defined Radio Series Source
-<https://youtu.be/krJJKjYdwgc>

Interception from in plaintext format From the service provider SS7 .




Communication network patterns analysis: Michael M Kangethe, Robert Oboko.
Associations Rankings Model for Cellular Surveillance Analysis. Journal of
Computer Sciences and Applications. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2020, pp 40-45.
<http://pubs.sciepub.com/jcsa/8/2/1>

Encryption & Tunneling


Tunneling is a way to move packets from one network to another. Tunneling works via encapsulation: wrapping a packet inside another packet. Networking Basics. Network Layer.

Encryption is the process of transforming information in such a way that an unauthorized third party cannot read it; a trusted person can decrypt data and access it in its original form though.



SMS E-2-E Leverages on GSM Technologies and Encryption Algorithms and solutions to enhance Security and Privacy in SMS Communications




E-2-E SMS Communication and Security



Step 1: Encrypt with Bob Session Kc Key and containing Routing Info



E-2-E SMS and Tunneling Communication and Security using SMS Gateway






Alice App Generates a **Shared Private key** and **IV** for **Alice&Bob** and appends the key to the
 Encrypts The **Key Update** using Bob's Public Key


Decrypts SMS using own private key then compares hash received with hash of Shared Private Key and IV. if match Key Exchange successful

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If Exchange Successful Alice will send ACK else send new Key and IV to Bob
















Contact Key exchange Protocol



Bob Decrypts SMS Using own Private Key then Updates **Bob&Alice** Shared Private Key. Then generates a **hash** of the **Shared Private Key** and **IV**

If Message from Alice is ACK then Update key Exchange Confirmation else Do nothing and use Alice Public key for Communication

Privacy Options Security Matrix

	(Option 1) Encrypt and Send Directly	(Option 2) Encrypt and Send Using SMS Gateway	(Option 3) Encrypt and Send Online using SMS APIs
SMS cannot be read by any party other than the sender and receiver			
Uses Public Key Encryption			
Uses Shared Private Key Encryption			
Sender and Receiver Partially Obscured			
Sender and Receiver Fully Obscured			

Privacy Options -Explained

- **(Option 1) - Encrypt and Send Directly**
 - SMS cannot be read by any party other than the sender and receiver
 - Sender and receiver is known
 - Uses Both Public and Shared Private Key Encryption
- **(Option 2) - Encrypt and Send Using SMS Gateway**
 - SMS cannot be read by any other party other than the sender and receiver
 - Sender and receiver can only be known by use of Advanced Querying and Data Mining techniques
 - Uses Both Public Key Encryption
- **(Option 3) - Encrypt and Send Online using SMS APIs**
 - SMS cannot be read by any other party other than the sender and receiver
 - Sender and receiver can Not be known even by use of Advanced Querying and Data Mining techniques
 - Uses Both Public Key Encryption

Target Users

Anyone who needs an extra layer of privacy in their SMS Communications

- Companies (With Sensitive Communications)
- Basically if you use whatsapp or Signal you are a target user



DEMO



FULL DEMO, HERE WE GO

<https://t.me/learningnets>

Observed Issues for Further Research

Message Limitation and dependency on Key Size,


- This is only dependent on Public Key Communication and not a problem in Shared Private Key communication
- For Public Key Communication it uses Multiple messages due to the 256 bit Key size

Latency due to Tunneling and Proxying SMS.

- The time it takes for an SMS to arrive at the clients device is purely dependent to the SMS Gateway/API speed and Uptime.
- However negligible for Most Services

Available Devices

The Current POC
has been tested to
work on ALL
Android Devices
from Version 5 and
above



Going Forward

Development for IOS
Devices has started
with a focus on the
Kotlin Version
Collaborations
Welcome

Q&A

Thank you!



@MichK_01



github.com/mich01



linkedin.com/in/mkangethe



Demo APK Source Code: <https://github.com/mich01/SpiderSMS>

<https://t.me/learningnets>